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 Introduction 
 
Tamara Hervey, Calum Young, Louise Bishop  
  
As we complete and submit this manuscript, in early July 2016, it seems almost wrong for a 
book on EU Health Law and Policy to be co-edited by three scholars in the United Kingdom. 
The referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU reverberates across the EU, with some 
even interpreting it as a portent for the end of the European project as we know it. 
Questions of health were among the key issues for the referendum debates in the UK. 
The now infamous claim on the ‘Leave battlebus’ that leaving the EU would release £350 
million a week to be spent on the UK’s NHS was one of the first ‘promises’ of Leave to be 
revealed as a total fabrication. Claims that EU membership meant privatisation of the NHS 
via the backdoor of TTIP were not far behind in being exposed as inaccurate scaremongering 
by Leave. Among the concerns of the subsequently regretful Leave voters is access to free 
health care while on holiday in other EU countries. Much more seriously, the position of the 
many UK nationals living and working in other EU countries quickly became a significant 
anxiety. As did the position of non-UK EU nationals in the UK – especially those working in 
the health system. Provision of nursing care, in particular, would be quite simply impossible 
without the many EU nationals who provide the backbone of such care in the UK. A debate 
in the House of Commons on protecting the ‘acquired rights’ of EU citizens in the UK 
attracted significant media attention. Noticeable were the abstentions from a very large 
number of Conservative MPs, along with the inevitable statement from the Government that 
no promises could be made.  
Whatever the future relationship between the UK and the EU, and whichever way the 
EU itself develops, the EU’s involvement with health law and policy will continue. Indeed, in 
some possible futures, much if not all of what we have written in this Research Handbook on 
EU Health Law and Policy will continue to apply in the UK. Even if it does not, there are 27 
other Member States for which it will continue to be important. Health is one of the issues 
that concerns Europeans the most. 
And so we are delighted to be able to offer this collection of analyses on EU Health 
Law and Policy. Each chapter in the Research Handbook reflects on the ‘state of the art’ in a 
particular aspect of the broad topic. Each chapter brings together an account of the legal 
position, including questions that remain unresolved, and reflects on the broader policy 
contexts. We asked each author also to consider the ‘direction of travel’: what are the current 
issues, and how might these unfold in the short and medium term? The result is more than a 
timely snapshot of where we are now – it is also an agenda for the future. 
EU Health Law and Policy is not a subject that can be readily understood from the 
perspective of any one discipline. Consequently, we count ourselves very fortunate as editors 
in having attracted a group of contributors whose interests and expertise across several 
disciplines: in particular, law, political science, policy studies and sociology. We also sought 
to include contributors from a range of stages in their careers. This allows the views of the 
‘old hands’ or ‘established names’ to be balanced by fresh voices in the field: a blend of 
expertise significantly strengthening the Handbook. We are particularly grateful to our 
contributors for the open-minded and respectful way in which they approached the 
collaborative task we set for them.  
Our contributors also come from many different countries: both within the EU and 
beyond. Bringing some degree of coherence into such a project is made easier when 
contributors are able to meet and discuss their work in progress face-to-face. With the support 
of the Observatoire Social Européen, the Society of Legal Scholars, the University 
Association for Contemporary European Studies, and the Health Law and Policy Research 
Group at the University of Sheffield, we were able to organise a round-table workshop. In 
January 2016 in Brussels, the majority of the papers were discussed and we are grateful to all 
our sponsors for facilitating this. This workshop followed directly after an open event, with a 
large audience, at which some of the contributors spoke. Hearing the views of a range of 
stakeholders enriched our own small workshop immeasurably. We would like to thank all the 
workshop participants, particularly our hosts Bart Vanhercke and Rita Baeten, as well as the 
excellent administrative support provided by Françoise Verri in Brussels and Sarah Beedham 
in Sheffield. We would also like to express our thanks to those who gave their time and 
expertise as discussants, especially Martin McKee, Bart and Rita, Katherine Fierlbeck and 
Eleanor Brooks. 
 
THE ‘STATE OF THE ART’  
The Handbook is organised into five main parts, reflecting the broad divisions within EU 
health law and policy as we see them. We begin by considering the historical and institutional 
contexts. Mary Guy and Wolf Sauter draw out the broad historical trends in EU health law 
and policy. Their analysis reveals three broad periods of its development: up to 1992; 1992–
2007; and 2007 onwards. In so doing, they also define the scope of EU health law and policy, 
noting that it has moved beyond a ‘patchwork’ or ‘interface’ approach. It has emerged as both 
a legal and policy domain, and a subject for academic study in its own right. Dorte Sjindberg 
Martinsen uses the example of the Patients’ Rights Directive to show how institutional 
structures and political preferences enable and constrain EU policy-making in health fields. 
The impact of the Directive on actual patient mobility is negligible. However, the ways in 
which different stakeholders were able to access and condition the law-making process 
nonetheless gives important insights into the past and future of EU health law and policy-
making.  
As EU Health Law and Policy is often seen as a creation of courts, rather than 
legislatures or executives, two chapters follow in which the roles of national courts and the 
CJEU (under the powerful narratives of human rights) have played out in the unfolding of EU 
Health Law and Policy. Clemens Rieder considers both the implications of actual litigation, 
and the ‘shadow of litigation’, which may indeed be more important. The relationships of the 
CJEU with national courts, the governments of the Member States, and the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg are all crucial institutional contexts for the development and 
future trajectory of EU Health Law and Policy. The emergent and powerful narrative of 
human rights is taken up by Calum Young, who characterises this as an area of ‘frustrated 
potential’ for the future development of EU health law and policy. 
The second part of the Handbook concerns people and products. Readers may be a 
little surprised to discover that there is no stand-alone chapter on free movement of patients, 
either on the law or on its practical impact. In a book of this nature, coverage cannot be 
exhaustive, and as editors we made some difficult choices of exclusion. The actual numbers 
of mobile patients within the EU are so small as to have led to Martin McKee describing EU 
patient mobility as a ‘solution without a problem’. That is the principal reason for our 
decision: other areas of EU Health Law and Policy have much more significant effects than 
patient mobility. Moreover, we have provided for readers who want to learn more about that 
particular topic through the information in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 19.
1
 Ellen Kuhlmann and 
others explain the effects of EU Health Law and Policy on health professionals. Drawing on 
new empirical data, they show how the EU’s free movement law, combined with its fiscal 
disciplines (considered further in Chapter 12), have challenging effects on sustainability of 
healthcare systems, reinforcing negative implications for equality and solidarity. Both people 
and products – as ‘citizens’ and ‘science’ – appear in Mark Flear’s chapter on EU biomedical 
research law and policy. Flear shows how the spaces created for biomedical research by EU 
law and policy embody a particular type of citizen, and play on narratives of hope and 
promise. The result is an obfuscation of the dominant drivers of market-oriented norms and 
values.  
The ways in which EU Health Law and Policy protects consumers – through 
regulation and litigation – are the subject of Marcus Pilgerstorfer’s chapter on 
pharmaceuticals. Interactions between those two regimes leave uncertainties in the legal 
position, with implications for policy. The development and regulation of, as well as potential 
liabilities for, new health technologies are also the subject of Estelle Brosset and Aurélie 
Mahalatchimy’s chapter. They consider both EU pharmaceuticals and medical devices law, 
as new health technologies may occupy either space, even though a separate body of EU law 
and policy, with its own logics, has developed for each. The theme of novelty in health 
products is continued in the chapters by Jean McHale and Aurélie Mahalatchimy, and Andre 
den Exter. McHale and Mahalatchimy note insufficient attention to the ethical dimensions of 
EU human materials law. den Exter’s chapter shows how EU law and policy on innovative 
health technologies raise similar legal and ethical concerns. The complexities of legal 
liabilities alone, in the context of a market for e-health technologies spanning over 28 legal 
systems, provide ongoing challenges for health lawyers. 
A short part 3 of the Handbook focuses on the implications of EU Health Law and 
Policy for health systems. Johan van de Gronden and Catalin Rusu investigate the extent to 
which EU competition law and policy may improve, or worsen, the efficiency of national 
health systems. The application of EU competition law to the behaviour of powerful market 
actors, such as the pharmaceutical industry, (social) health insurance providers or hospital 
chains, certainly has the potential to do so. But this may be at the cost of health-specific 
values – a point which is taken up in Chapter 19. For Eurozone Member States, the 
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requirements of economic and fiscal governance are even more challenging than competition 
law for health systems and the values they embody. Tomislav Sokol and Nikola Mijatović 
show how the consequences of these rules, enforcing austerity economics, are felt unevenly 
across EU Member States. The resulting negative effects on access to medical care raise 
important questions of equality.  
Public health is (arguably) the longest-standing area of EU Health Law and Policy. It 
is covered in part 4 of the Handbook. Markus Frischhut and Scott Greer explain how EU 
communicable disease policy is intertwined with EU law on communicable diseases, 
particularly as embodied in the ‘precautionary principle’. There follow a trio of chapters on 
products which pose threats to public health: tobacco, alcohol and food. Alberto Alemanno’s 
review of the constitutional debates surrounding the EU’s tobacco law shows how a direction 
of travel (to significantly constrain the freedom of operation of the tobacco industry) may 
have reached its limits in recent developments. These align more with soft regulatory 
approaches (‘nudging’) than with hard EU-level restrictive laws. From a different direction, 
Oliver Bartlett and Amandine Garde reach a similar conclusion. The limits of EU law create 
significant constitutional imbalances, which impede national evidence-based policies seeking 
to constrain alcohol consumption. At the same time, EU-level alcohol control measures are 
hortative only. Iris Goldner Lang tracks the development of EU food law and policy from an 
original focus on food safety (where public health concerns were encapsulated in EU-level 
regulatory measures, and significant institutional structures) towards a focus on the key 
public health challenge of obesity. Here again, the consequences of the EU’s free movement 
rules and limited Member State discretion to protect public health, combined with the lack of 
political will to adopt EU-level binding measures, leave public health protections embodied 
in ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ norms. 
The final substantive part of the Handbook turns from the internal aspects of EU 
Health Law and Policy to the external context. Holly Jarman and Meri Koivusalo consider 
the health implications of the EU’s external trade policies and law. From the narrow focus 
(essentially on food) of the past, the EU’s trade agreements now concern a very wide range of 
matters concerning health. Included are pharmaceuticals, insurance and even the provision of 
healthcare services themselves. If health ministers are not ‘at the table’ of these negotiations, 
Jarman and Koivusalo warn that the values associated with European health systems will be 
‘on the menu’. Similar conclusions are arrived at concerning the fragility of health in EU 
external relations law and policy. Here Tamara Hervey broadens the focus to include the 
EU’s development law and policy, as well as its external human rights work. Echoing 
Young’s chapter, the overall analysis reaches a conclusion of unfulfilled potential and missed 
opportunities. 
Anniek de Ruijter’s concluding chapter is a powerful discussion of the values of 
solidarity, universal access, equality and human dignity, in the context of EU Health Law and 
Policy. de Ruijter assesses the extent to which such values are – and could ever be – 
promulgated through EU Health Law and Policy, given the EU’s constitutional arrangements. 
She shows how the EU’s infamous ‘constitutional asymmetry’ leaves solidarity, universal 
access, equality and human dignity – more often than not – in a non-equal relationship with 
free trade, free competition, competitiveness, the knowledge economy, and above all, fiscal 
austerity. Fundamental (human) rights represent a possible future site for constitutional 
realignment, allowing ‘the constitutional order of the EU to be changed or set up in a manner 
in which EU health laws values will not have to compete so hard with EU economic values’. 
This is – at present – the ‘road not taken’ by the EU and its health law and policy. 
 THE ‘STATE OF THE ART’: THREE THEMES 
Overall, from the detailed analyses in the Handbook, we discern three broad themes. 
1. Fractured Decision-Making, Leading to Policy Ineffectiveness or Incoherence 
 
We are not the first to observe that the pursuit of health agendas within the EU’s institutional 
structures is complicated by the actors and the decision-making processes involved. The need 
to secure agreement from multiple parties or bodies, often with conflicting interests, 
sometimes with no expertise in health, damages the pursuit of policies with a central focus on 
health and its protection and improvement. This fracturing is evident in Martinsen’s chapter 
(legislative institutions); Rieder and Young’s chapters (courts and litigation); and de Ruijter’s 
chapter (the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ of EU Health Law and Policy) and what this means 
for health values. It is also either evident or implicit in the detailed accounts of specific health 
policy areas in the other chapters of the book. For instance, McHale and Mahalatchimy are 
critical of the lack of a coherent EU policy for human materials, leading to an inconsistent 
approach to its regulation. The ways in which the EU’s laws and policies on novel health 
technologies are similarly dispersed among different institutional settings is reflected in 
Pilgerstorfer’s, Brosset’s and Mahalatchimy’s, and den Exter’s chapters.  
Health law and policy does not ‘belong’ and has never fitted within a single law or 
policy-making space in the EU’s institutions. As Martinsen’s chapter shows, the governance 
of health for the sake of health, and especially law and policy affecting health systems, are 
areas of law and policy that the EU has found difficult to enter. Where the EU does adopt law 
and policy affecting health systems, the effects may be undesirable, as van de Gronden and 
Rusu, and Kuhlmann et al. demonstrate. The difficulties are present even in the area of public 
health, where the EU has significant formal competences. Alemanno’s, Bartlett’s and Garde’s, 
and Goldner Lang’s chapters show how the EU is still searching for the right set of tools to 
solve a series of public health problems through different institutional settings, none of which 
is squarely concerned with public health protection or promotion per se.  
Further, law and policy-making competences are shared between the EU and its Member 
States in virtually every health policy area discussed in this Handbook. Even in areas where 
the movement over time is for policy to be increasingly made at EU level, as, for instance 
Frischhut and Greer argue is the case for communicable diseases, significant powers remain 
with national bodies. Those policy areas where the EU has ‘exclusive competence’ (for 
instance, trade deals concerning goods, marketing authorisation for novel pharmaceuticals) 
are very much the exception. Distribution of policy competences between different 
institutional actors, within the EU and at national level, makes for fractured decision-making 
with discernable consequences for responsibilities and effectiveness. The EU’s Eurozone 
governance arrangements have unplanned effects on health systems, as shown by Sokol and 
Mijatović. Moreover, the dispersion of powers between the EU, its Member States and the 
IMF means it is impossible to use traditional accountability mechanisms, such as judicial 
review of executive decisions. Regulatory vacuums can emerge, as Kuhlmann et al. 
demonstrate, where neither EU nor national institutions are sufficiently able to control 
unwelcome developments. Yet shared decisions between EU and national institutions are 
impossible to reach. None of this institutional context is good for hammering out legal and 
policy settlements that are good for health. 
  
2. The Place of ‘Science’ and ‘Innovation’ in EU Health Law and Policy 
 
Innovation is a significant challenge for EU Health Law and Policy. The balance between 
enabling novel technological developments and securing protection for patients, health 
systems and others, is a theme that emerges in several chapters of the book. It is most evident 
in the chapters by Flear, Pilgerstorfer, Brosset and Mahalatchimy, McHale and Mahalatchimy, 
and den Exter. All of these chapters, along with those in the part of the Handbook on public 
health, consider the extent to which the EU institutions have secured a fair and effective 
compromise between competing interests. The EU’s ‘scorecard’ in this regard is mixed, at 
best. In particular, McHale and Mahalatchimy consider that the ethical dimensions of 
innovation have been insufficiently accommodated in the EU’s regulation of human materials. 
The ways in which litigation (or the mere threat of litigation) interacts with legislation 
and other regulatory measures, including executive decision making, are an important 
institutional context here. This theme is taken up by Rieder, Pilgerstorfer and, in particular, 
by Frischhut and Greer, who explore how the legal concept of ‘the precautionary principle’, 
based on the idea of ‘scientific evidence’, is articulated in various policy contexts. The notion 
of ‘science-based’ policy making thus imbues EU legislation and litigation alike.  
de Ruijter argues that ‘good science’ should be a value that plays an important role in 
health policy. Where the EU’s policies incorporate ‘good science’, these are often said to 
encapsulate nuanced and balanced settlements between competing interests. They are also 
considered to be effective, in that they express the state of the art in terms of technological 
innovation, and seek to regulate it. Elements of the EU’s food, tobacco, clinical trials, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices and e-health technology laws and policies may be said to 
meet this description. But the EU does not always meet the health policy community’s 
standards of such ‘science-based’ decision making, as, for instance, Bartlett’s and Garde’s 
chapter demonstrates, in their argument that the EU has failed to engage with the scientific 
evidence on alcohol. Likewise, Frischhut and Greer argue that the EU’s communicable 
disease policy is not simply a product of ‘science-based’ decision making. 
Nonetheless, as Flear reminds us, ‘good science’ is not a ‘scientifically’ determined 
concept. The social construction of ‘science’, and indeed also of ‘innovation’ forms a crucial 
vector in understanding the EU’s Health Law and Policy. ‘Innovation’ can be an opportunity 
for the EU institutions to become involved in health law and policy making in unexpected 
ways. For instance, by supporting health technology industries through Horizon 2020, itself 
part of the EU’s economic governance mechanisms. The notion of the ‘knowledge economy’ 
as the future for the EU includes the health knowledge economy. Here, the imbalances 
between different parts of the EU (as Sokol and Mijatović show) cannot themselves be 
corrected by ‘science-based’ decision-making alone. The benefits of health innovation will 
not be evenly enjoyed across the EU without some kind of redistributive policies. And – of 
course – the EU lacks redistributive competences. This brings us to our final theme. 
3. The Fragility and Frustrated Potential of EU Health Law and Policy, and Yet its 
Remarkable Durability 
 
The EU institutions have been involved in health policy for a considerable period of time – 
arguably from the inception of the EEC. We see the temporal aspect of EU Health Law and 
Policy in Sauter’s and Guy’s historical chapter, but also in the timelines de facto considered 
in all the substantive chapters of this Handbook. There is hardly a chapter which does not 
reach back to at least the 1980s, if not earlier, in its substantive scope. In that sense, therefore, 
EU Health Law and Policy has proven remarkably durable through time. 
However, although EU Health Law and Policy may be seen as long-standing, it is also 
seen as precarious. Many commentators on EU Health Law and Policy frame their analysis in 
terms of a ‘clash’ between the values of the market and the values of health – with health in a 
suboptimal position in that conflict of values. The majority of the contributors to our 
Handbook follow this approach. This ‘standard narrative’ sees the EU’s market orientation 
(free movement of factors of production, free competition) in conflict with a wide range of 
public interests. Health is such a public interest. What is good for businesses (or more 
accurately for private capital) can be damaging to individual human beings or wider society. 
The classic articulation of this dynamic in EU law is known as ‘constitutional 
asymmetry’. 2  Where EU law applies, the logic of the market stands in a hierarchical 
relationship above other logics. It follows that where health goals can be successfully aligned 
with economic goals, health can be improved through EU law and policy. But the converse is 
also true: EU market law and policy can be detrimental to human health. 
In this Handbook, these ideas are expressed in their purest form in van de Gronden’s 
and Rusu’s chapter. Their analysis shows that, where Member States choose to shelter their 
healthcare systems from competition, the effects of EU law are significantly different from 
the effects of EU law on those Member States which seek to bring competition within their 
healthcare systems. In the latter case, the EU approach in general does not protect healthcare-
specific values. In this instance, bringing EU law into healthcare – with all that entails – is a 
choice for governments of Member States. 
But in many instances, once a country is a Member State of the EU, and even more so 
if it is a Eurozone Member State, any such choice is removed. Health stands in a non-equal 
relationship to market-based, or fiscal-austerity based, values, with negative consequences for 
health systems (Sokol and Rusu); public health protection (Frischhut and Greer, Alemanno, 
Bartlett and Garde, Goldner Lang); securing professional care for patients (Kulmann); and 
global health (Jarman and Koivusalo, Hervey). EU law’s entitlements for healthcare 
professionals to move throughout the EU undermine an approach to healthcare capacity-
building based on accountability to national populations. This approach leads to growing 
inequalities between patients in different EU countries. In the Eurozone, the pursuit of 
macroeconomic stability through a narrow approach to austerity affects the de facto provision 
of healthcare in crisis-hit economies. EU law on free movement of products prevents Member 
States from enacting legislation to tackle (childhood) obesity or alcoholism. In the EU’s 
global trade and development policies, economic liberalism is pursued over and above 
increasing health protection in the global South. 
The idea that health is in a non-equal relationship to market-based values such as free 
trade also features strongly in Young’s and de Ruijter’s chapters. Those chapters, along with 
Sjindberg Martinsen’s, and several other chapters, also explore the ways that litigation based 
on the logics of EU market law is fundamentally disruptive of health policy. The ability of 
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individual market actors (usually powerful companies) to rely on their rights to trade in EU 
law is a crucial feature of the highly fragile position of health within the EU’s law and policy. 
And yet, there is nothing inherent about the place of health (or other non-market) 
values within EU law. It is a matter of law and policy-making choice. For courts, and 
administrative authorities, it is a matter of interpretation. Specific considerations and 
concrete choices can be made to ensure the promotion and protection of health. The place of 
‘services of special economic interest’ in EU competition law is a case in point. The EU’s 
approach to tobacco regulation is another. These examples show how in many ways what is 
remarkable about EU health law and policy is its very durability in the face of such fragility. 
The very fact that EU health law and policy is under discussion at all is itself significant.  
Here, our Handbook offers a potential direction of travel – an increased focus on 
human rights – which would see the protection and promotion of health as a central value of 
EU law and policy. Human rights – as an embodiment of EU law and policy value in itself, as 
part of the EU’s ‘constitutional settlement’ – offer a value system for the EU’s general law 
and policy-making orientation (de Ruijter). They also offer a strategy of judicial 
interpretation (as Young’s discussion of AG Opinions shows), or a policy goal (eg Frischhut 
and Greer). We do not have space here to explore the problems with such a human rights-
based approach. As this was not our agenda for the Handbook, we simply note here that we 
are not in agreement (as contributors or as editors) as to the desirability of this potential 
future for EU health law and policy.  
What we do agree on is that rather than the frustrated potential, or missed 
opportunities (Hervey), inherent in the standard narrative, a health-values based future for the 
EU may be within reach. A systemic approach to values would fundamentally change EU 
health law and policy. For instance in the regulation of human material (McHale and 
Mahalatchimy, Flear); the sharing of the benefits of novel medical technologies (Pilgerstorfer, 
Brosset and Mahalatchimy, den Exter); the deployment of human (Kulmann et al.) and other 
(van de Gronden and Rusu, Sokol and Mijatović) resources; and the protection of human 
health in the spaces occupied by powerful global industries (Pilgerstorfer, McHale and 
Mahalatchimy, Brosset and Mahalatchimy, den Exter, Frischhut and Greer, Alemanno, 
Bartlett and Garde, Goldner Lang). If the reasons for the EU institutions not having pursued 
health agendas in the past, despite formal legal competence and sufficient resources, lie in the 
political preferences of governments of powerful Member States, an EU without the UK may 
offer altered possibilities. 
 
THE ‘DIRECTION OF TRAVEL’ 
These themes are, in our view, likely to influence the overall direction of travel for the EU’s 
health law and policy. It seems presumptuous to say that EU Health Law and Policy as a 
whole has a single direction of travel. Of course, we recognise that each area of EU health 
law and policy progresses at its own pace and following its own logics. We respect the 
different conclusions on the trajectory of a particular area reached by each of our contributors. 
Nonetheless, as editors, we offer some final thoughts, drawing together the threads of 
analysis which we hope our readers will explore through the rest of the Handbook. 
As editors located in the UK, we expect that the EU without the UK will be a different 
forum for health law and policy making, and to the extent to which we are able, we reflect on 
that future EU in the remaining paragraphs. 
The British referendum of June 2016 represented an opportunity for various calls to 
reshape the EU as a whole. If such reshaping takes place, it could include a dramatic change 
for EU Health Law and Policy. We note that, looking across European integration as a whole, 
periods of centralisation involve many areas of EU law and policy-making developing at the 
same time, at a significantly faster pace than at periods of stagnation or sclerosis. Key to 
these periods of centralisation are questions of legitimacy: in whose name is the European 
project being carried out, and how are the voices of European populations heard in the 
integration process? The movement over time from an EEC which was a governance space 
for technical elites, to an idea of a EU in which citizens feel allegiance, may be continued 
more readily without a Member State 51.9% of whose population does not share that 
allegiance. We note that calls for similar referenda in other supposedly ‘Eurosceptic’ 
countries, such as Denmark, have been significantly muted as the effects of the UK’s 
referendum are beginning to be felt. To the extent that the UK government represents a 
barrier to the transfer of competences to the EU, the EU’s powers in the future might be 
significantly enhanced in many areas that are important to European populations, including 
health.  
In the alternative, of course, the UK leaving the EU could be taken as a signal that the 
EU has become too centralised. We might see the ‘repatriation’ of legal and policy-making 
competences to national or regional levels, returning the EU to a more inter-governmental era. 
With the exception of areas where a clear inter-governmental mandate is present (for instance, 
regulation of pharmaceuticals or communicable disease control), in that scenario we would 
expect much less in the way of EU health law or policy. Even those areas might revert to 
non-EU international fora, such as the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use or the World Health Organisation. A 
possible future sees the end of the EU as we know it, including as a site for health law and 
policy. 
In either future, we see the possibility for the articulation of the core values of the EU 
(or whatever it becomes) to include health – and not just health as a factor of production or a 
contribution to economic growth and prosperity. Human health will remain a significant 
consideration for the legitimacy of any government. This is also true for any inter-
governmental or supranational arrangements, through which national governments and other 
institutions cooperate to create law and policy. There is scope for the European project to be 
given greater legitimacy to include a re-articulation of health values – whether through a 
human rights frame, or in another way such as within equality policies concerned with 
redistribution. The ‘health in all policies’ approach of the current position, along with the idea 
of the EU as a ‘social market economy’, 3  and the EU’s constrained competences over 
national welfare settlements, are good places to start. This moment represents an opportunity 
to revisit the tensions in the current constitutional arrangements of the EU, and to articulate 
more clearly which are inherent and which are the product of choices of the EU’s institutions 
and those of its Member States.  
                                               
3
 Article 3(3) TEU. 
The effects of economic integration, even when they translate into increased overall 
prosperity, are not equally felt in all parts of an economy or society. Equality and dignity – 
including in health contexts – requires redistribution, not growth alone. Legitimated 
constitutional arrangements respect that insight. When the balance between the powers and 
capabilities of international, EU, national and local institutions reflects this position, whatever 
the EU becomes, it can contribute to the health of Europe, and of the world. 
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5. EU law, policy and health professional mobility 
 
Ellen Kuhlmann, Claudia B Maier, Gilles Dussault, Christa Larsen, Emmanuele Pavolini and 
Marius-Ionuț Ungureanu 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Free movement in the European Union (EU) single market has created a novel situation for health 
professionals and workforce governance. Healthcare organisations can recruit from a larger pool of 
human resources, providers and policymakers can mitigate shortages and maldistribution of skills, 
and EU health sciences and research benefit from knowledge exchange. For individual health 
professionals, an open EU labour market improves employment and career opportunities. A ‘rosy 
picture’ of an EU single market and its mobile professionals is however challenged, when looking 
at it from a public health and health system perspective. 
The EU free movement law came at a time of turbulent health labour markets with adverse 
dynamics caused by high demand for healthcare workers in most EU countries and cuts in public 
sector and healthcare services as part of austerity measures.
1
 Economic push-pull factors create 
uneven and unpredictable mobility flows, which may negatively affect the health labour markets of 
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Eastern Member States, and of Southern Europe hit by austerity programmes.
2
 Health professional 
mobility creates and reinforces inequality within the EU and may threaten universal healthcare 
coverage in resource-poorer EU countries. Until recently, only few EU countries heavily relied on 
foreign-trained health professions.
3
 Yet a self-sufficient health workforce is increasingly difficult to 
achieve and more countries recruit from a European and international pool to respond to a growing 
demand for health workers.
4
  
Health workforce mobility and cross-border movements have created new demand for 
complex transnational EU regulation and an integrated, multi-level governance approach, while EU 
law is primarily concerned with labour markets, leaving healthcare regulation a domain of Member 
States.
 5
 These conditions of poor sectoral coordination between labour market and healthcare 
policies as well as between transnational EU and national/regional regulations cause a continuing 
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‘regulatory gap’ between free labour markets and the needs of healthcare systems for qualified 
professionals. Although a sector-based regulatory approach is gaining momentum, as illustrated by 
the EU Professional Qualifications Directive,
 6
 there are currently no signs of a systematic policy 
change and coherent governance approach to close the gap. 
The chapter is framed as a clash between the core EU values of free movement on the one 
hand, and the healthcare system needs for qualified professionals on the other. More specifically, 
the problems are exemplified by health workforce mobility, using empirical data to highlight the 
problematic effects on health systems. Three case studies provide deeper insights into the regulatory 
dilemma. Case study (i) reveals tensions between the EU’s objective to promote financial discipline 
and Member States’ health workforce recruitment and retention policies. The other two cases 
illustrate how open labour markets counteract sustainable and responsible policy solutions in the 
healthcare sector. Case (ii) looks at nurses and how EU mobility is used to mitigate system deficits 
in the skill mix of the workforce. Case (iii) sets the focus on doctors and illustrates the unequal 
effects of (missing) EU regulation that hit the healthcare systems of Eastern EU Member States the 
most. 
The chapter begins with an overview of EU regulation and policy as relevant for our topic and 
comparative empirical data on health workforce mobility in the EU, followed by three case studies. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn on the direction of travel in EU law and the need for more visionary 
approaches to reduce inequality in healthcare in the EU. 
 
II. EU HEALTH WORKFORCE MOBILITY: REGULATION, POLICY 
AND EMPIRICAL FACTS 
Health workforce issues have moved up the EU policy agenda, and data sources and monitoring 
systems have improved.
7
 The following sections provide an overview based on document analysis, 
statistical data and secondary sources, including new research carried out by the authors. 
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II.i EU Health Labour Market and the Health Professions: Regulation and Policy  
EU law is still ‘patchy’ 8  and fragmented into sector-specific policy domains, promoting EU 
regulation on labour markets and protecting the rights of Member States in healthcare including 
finance, provision of care and regulation of the health workforce. This fragmentation and 
distribution of responsibilities is key to understanding the EU politics of health workforce 
regulation and the governance challenges embedded in growing health workforce mobility. ‘EU 
health law treats health professionals as first and foremost as market actors, as ‘service providers’, 
subject to consumer law; not as professionals subject to legal and ethical frameworks of 
professional regulation.’ 9 This approach preserves the ‘regulatory trade-off’ between the EU and its 
Member States, whereas ‘[S]ervice providers are understood as operating in a market; professionals 
are operating in the context of national health (insurance) systems’. 10  
In what follows from this approach, EU law sees a health professional ‘as equivalent to any 
other professional who provides services, takes up employment, or establishes herself in a Member 
State other than the state she became professionally qualified’.11 Regulation of education/training 
and recognition of qualifications across the EU as well as working conditions of employees in the 
healthcare sector are therefore the major concern of EU health workforce regulation.
 12
An 
individualised approach and labour market focus of EU law cause major problems for health 
systems and services accountable to the ‘public’, in terms of serving the health needs of citizens. At 
present, EU law creates strong incentives for mobility but does not provide appropriate governance 
tools to better target the free movement of healthcare workers and counteract asymmetric mobility 
flows.  
With the enlargements since 2004, the EU has become more diverse in terms of salary levels, career 
opportunities and working conditions. This has provided strong pull factors drawing health professionals 
from less affluent EU Member States to move to wealthier countries. A precondition for a well-functioning 
labour market for health professionals is to have the right numbers and the right skills. But this is being 
jeopardized because as the EU population ages and shrinks, so does the health workforce.
 13
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Greer and colleagues have highlighted that the ‘European Commission has, therefore, tried to 
forecast future workforce supply and demand and has projected a shortage of two million health and 
social workers by 2020. The supply of nurses is a particular concern.’ 14  
Improved ‘forecasting’ efforts can be viewed as a policy shift in the wider context of EU 
policy development and increasingly more complex challenges of workforce mobility flows. 15 EU 
law responds to the challenges by expanding a ‘sectoral approach’, while keeping the labour market 
and employment focus.  
At EU level, Directive 2003/88/EC (the Working Time Directive) aims at providing minimum standards 
common to all EU countries to protect workers from health and safety risks associated with excessive or 
inappropriate working hours, and with inadequate time for rest and recovery from work.
 16
  
The Directive appears in the shape of employment policy, while the effects may stretch far beyond. 
For instance, ‘Nursing Times’ described a direct impact in professional development and the 
composition of the health workforce in the English National Health Service (NHS): 
The impact of cutting junior doctors’ hours started a sea change in nursing in terms of how it is planned, 
coordinated and led. The result of this was a shift of responsibility from doctors to nurses and a raft of new 
opportunities for nurses. Different working patterns, skill mixing, and new and extended nursing roles have 
resulted from these changes…
17
 
Similarly, bringing workforce planning higher up the policy agenda18 not only improves data and 
planning but also promotes coordination and governance of the health workforce across the 
Member States. Most recent regulatory attempts furthermore expand a labour market approach by 
focusing on professional qualification and quality standards. The revised Professional 
Qualifications Directive19 significantly facilitates the recognition of qualifications of the main State-
regulated health professions, including doctors, dentists, pharmacists, midwives and general care 
nurses.
 20
  A broader approach to all healthcare workers and workforce governance is lacking, 
however.  
The Professional Qualifications Directive as well as the Working Time Directive provide 
examples of the dynamics released in the health workforce by EU law. The Professional 
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Qualifications Directive includes in its current version only the regulated healthcare professionals, 
which fall in the category of high- or middle-level qualifications, while ignoring the occupational 
groups at the basis of the care sector, namely the predominantly female carers with lower-level or 
no formal qualifications and lack of power in policymaking. The new regulation may therefore 
reinforce a negative trend of employment conditions of less qualified, female-dominated groups.
 21
 
In contrast, the Working Time Directive has been shown to favour the interests of nurses in relation 
to doctors by shifting tasks and responsibilities (at least in more centralised healthcare systems, like 
the English NHS), thus promoting a professional group with weaker power resources and higher 
proportions of women.  
Overall, the recent Directives (both the Working Time and the Professional Qualifications Directive) 
mark a further step towards sectoral regulation of an EU single market and the blurring of boundaries 
between the labour market and healthcare sectors. For instance, the Briefing Note on the amended EU 
Qualifications Directive mentioned health professional mobility in the context of changing demand of 
healthcare services systems
22
and highlighted the benefits of common training frameworks.
 23
 As Baeten and 
Vanhercke argue, the ‘Eurozone crisis created a policy ‘window of opportunity’ to push through fiscal 
surveillance of health systems as part of the solution to the crisis. The cognitive frameworks put forward by 
certain elites added up to the primacy of an economic perspective over health objectives.’ 24  
In relation to international migration and recruitment, 25  there are more general problems, 
which limit direct EU interventions. Most importantly, EU health law follows a partnership model 
(state, private and ‘third sector’ institutions). While there are some successful efforts of the EU to 
act globally by collaborating on initiatives such as the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the ‘Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation’, it has not 
taken a global leadership role. 26  
II.ii  EU Health Professional Workforce and Mobility Flows: Facts and Figures 
Health professional mobility is highly variable across Europe’s single market, the largest 
free movement zone worldwide. Countries have virtually zero governance options to restrict flows 
within Europe’s free movement zone (which includes all 28 EU Member States plus Economic Free 
Trade Area countries and Switzerland). Instead, governments and health planners must react to the 
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consequences of mobility by adjusting workforce policies, planning and education.
 27
 Five health 
professions benefit from automatic recognition of diplomas: medical doctors, nurses, midwives, 
pharmacists and dentists. Within Europe’s free movement zone, in the early 2010s, approximately 
2–3% of all physicians, 1–2% of nurses and 2–3% of dentists worked in another country. 28These 
figures are probably higher as a result of the economic crisis which has hit many Member States. 
There are, however, large variations across countries, leading to an asymmetrical situation in the 
region. Moreover, mobility has increased and diversified over the last decade, where short-term and 
temporary flows are increasing and co-exist with long-term migration.
29
  
Classic destination countries, such as Germany, France, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) are benefiting from this mobility, with more than 20% of 
their medical doctors trained abroad
30
 (Figure 5.1). These countries are among the top destination 
countries worldwide, on par with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US.
31
 Among nurses, 
mobility tends to be lower compared to medical doctors. Top destination countries within Europe 
are Norway, Switzerland and the UK, with more than 10% of their nursing workforces being 
foreign-educated
32
 (Figure 5.2). It should be noted, however, that ‘foreign-trained’ professionals 
also subsume national citizens having obtained their education abroad (e.g., due to domestic 
restrictions on student intakes, such as numerus clausus or other reasons) and returned to their home 
country for completion of their education or for work. The numbers are estimated to be low but 
increasing due to the increasing options globally to study abroad.
33
 
Mobility often happens between neighbouring countries with similar socio-cultural 
traditions and linguistically close ties. Examples include bi-directional movements between 
Germany and Austria, and France–Belgium–the Netherlands, or movements from Latin America to 
Spain, from Estonia to Finland, within a larger mobility context between Finland, Sweden, Estonia 
and the Russian Federation.
34
 The picture and reasons for mobility are highly diverse – individual 
reasons to work in another country are triggered by economic factors, such as unemployment rates 
and perceived (higher) salary, but also professional development opportunities, perceived better 
work environment or work-life balance, personal reasons, as well as language and cultural factors in 
the destination countries.
35
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Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 Countries’ reliance on foreign-trained physicians and nurses, by % of 
foreign-trained physicians and nurses of total physician/nursing workforces, 2014 or nearest years 
available. 
Figure 5.1 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
 
 
 Source: OECD database 2016, OECD.stat. Data extracted on 11 January 2016 10:20 UTC (GMT) from OECD.stat 
<http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT#>. 
Notes: *years 2014: except for (data on physicians): Canada, United States, Australia, Slovenia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Turkey: 2013 covered; for Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland: 2012, and Netherlands, Slovak 
Republic, Spain: 2011; (data on nurses): Australia, Canada, United States, Portugal, Hungary, Slovenia, Turkey: 2013, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland: 2012; Netherlands, Spain: 2011, Germany: 2010. 
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In addition to the ‘net gainers’ of mobility, there are several countries within Europe 
that do not receive a large influx, moreover, they lose parts of their workforce. Countries for 
which data were available, such as Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and the 
Netherlands have low levels of less than 3% reliance on foreign-educated medical doctors 
and/or nurses.
36
 Since joining the EU, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia for instance saw increasing numbers of health professionals leaving their countries, 
peaking in 2004 and 2007 at the time of the EU enlargements. While rates stabilised 
thereafter in many countries, they remained at higher levels than before. In addition, countries 
hit by the economic crisis often faced increasing rates of outflows during the economic 
downturn.
37
 Typical source countries are often those with lower economic status where health 
professionals’ income is low and unemployment high, acting as an economic push factor to 
emigration.
38
  
Mobility has increased and further diversified since the global economic crisis.
39
 New 
and changing mobility directions have emerged. There is an increasing trend of movements 
from lower-income countries in Southern or Eastern Europe to higher-income countries in 
Northern and Western parts of the EU.
40
 The 2008 economic and financial crisis impacted the 
entire European region, but some countries, such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
were more heavily hit than others. They implemented large-scale cost containment strategies 
in healthcare, including salary freezes and cuts that acted as push factors for health 
professionals to leave the country.
41
 A new trend of short-term, fluctuating movements has 
emerged, in addition to long-term migration, where foreign health professionals stay in the 
destination country for periods of several months or less. Weekend work in another country 
and other short-term movements have also been observed.
42
 Movements have been triggered 
by economic or geopolitical developments within a variety of governance approaches. 
This asymmetric situation with rapidly changing mobility directions requires countries 
to monitor flows and include net gains or losses of their workforce into their workforce 
strategies and planning. Yet, often data are not available, or are of poor quality or patchy.
43
 
Moreover, the new and emerging trend of short-term, fluctuating movements further 
challenges an adequate country and EU response towards countries’ workforce self-
sufficiency. At the EU level, governance options face a paradox: the EU free movement 
principle across countries of various economic levels facilitates mobility and does not leave 
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options for restrictions, but all countries have signed the WHO Code of practice in 2010 
towards ethical recruitment practices.
44
 The following sections of this chapter will show in 
more detail how this clash between different policy areas and values plays out in the health 
workforce. 
 
III. CONFRONTING EU SINGLE MARKET REGULATION 
WITH HEALTH WORKFORCE AND SYSTEMS EFFECTS: 
CASE STUDIES 
III.i EU Law, Austerity Measures and Country-Specific Health Workforce Effects: 
The Case of Portugal 
EU regulations apply equally to all Member States, but their effects are not neutral. They 
vary in function of economic, political and social factors, as well as in function of the 
specificities of the healthcare system. The case of Portugal serves to illustrate two such 
specific effects: the impact of austerity measures on migratory flows of nurses and physicians; 
and the challenge to health workforce planning posed by nationals graduating from medical 
schools in other EU countries. 
Portugal was already a heavily indebted country when the economic and financial 
crisis of 2008 erupted. An austerity programme was agreed with the European Central Bank, 
the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (the so-called Troika), as a 
condition for access to loans of 78 billion Euros. This programme included a series of 
measures that eventually affected the health workforce in the public sector, even though they 
did not target it specifically. These included salary cuts, which amounted to more than 30% 
over three years for those earning above 1,400 Euros monthly, a freeze on promotions and of 
recruitment, increase in hours worked and of workloads, and reduction in the number of 
statutory holidays.
45
  
These measures applied across public services. In health, only physicians working in 
primary care services succeeded in maintaining their salaries in exchange for increasing their 
work schedule and patient list. In nursing, unemployment, particularly of new graduates, 
grew. The government-stated policy was that these measures would remain in place at least 
for the whole duration of the agreement with the Troika. The overall result was high 
dissatisfaction rates among nurses and physicians, as illustrated by the numerous strikes in 
the National Health Services. Austerity measures also affected the private sector as it lost 
‘clients’ who could less afford the direct costs or those of insurance and switched to public 
services.  
These effects combined to push an increasing number of health workers to consider 
moving to another country, an option made easier by the EU regulations on free movement as 
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described previously.
46
 The number of potential emigrants corresponds to the number of 
applicants for the relevant documentation, figures that professional Councils in Portugal 
provide. For nurses, there have been 11,144 requests for documentation confirming 
qualifications between 2009 and mid-2015, which on an annual basis represents between one-
third and 50% of new graduates, and 4% of the total of registered nurses (in 2013, the number 
was 2,366 and in 2014, it was 2,278).
47
 
The number of those who effectively left the country can only be estimated. Figures 
for registration in another country exist but they have to be retrieved from registries of every 
other country of the EU. A recent study
48
 reports that the most important emigration 
destinations are the UK (mainly England), France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium in that 
order. In the UK, the number of new registrations of Portuguese nurses increased from 91 in 
2008 to a peak of 1,286 in 2014 and a total of 4,351 between these two dates. Interviews with 
a sample (n=398) of Portuguese nurses working in England confirmed that the ‘push factors’ 
that led to their decision to emigrate were linked to the austerity context: difficulty in finding 
a post; reduced salary; increased workload; and lack of career opportunities. Most had been 
recruited through recruitment agencies or directly by hospitals who had organised recruitment 
campaigns in Portugal itself.
49
 
For physicians, numbers are not published, and estimates have to be gathered from 
public statements from representatives of the profession. Even though the issue of losses of 
physicians to emigration has received much attention from the press, the phenomenon, which 
is typically described as ‘augmenting’, is not properly documented.50 The President of the 
Medical Council has given the figure of 1,122 requests for Certificates of professional status 
in 2014, adding that it was five times more than in 2010.
51
 No exact figures of doctors 
leaving the country are published, but the President of the Medical Council used the figures 
of 300 in 2013 and 400 in 2014. What is known is that there is active recruitment from EU 
countries, such as Denmark and England. 
With respect to the impact of the regulation on the recognition of professional 
qualifications, it is potentially a problem if high numbers of foreigners want to work in a 
specific country, which is not the case in Portugal. On the other hand, it is a problem when 
nationals train in a foreign country and return. They compete with students who trained in 
Portugal for available specialty internships whose number is based to the output of national 
programmes. In 2015, more than 200 graduates could not enter an internship. Medical 
Council data to the end of 2015 report that 1,405 Portuguese trained in other EU countries 
                                               
46
 See also, Leone and others (2013) (n 2); Leone and others (2016) (n 2); Ribeiro and others (n 2). 
47
 C Pereira, Vidas Partidas. Enfermeiros Portugueses no Estrangeiro (Lusodidactica 2016). 
48
 ibid. 
49
 Ribeiro and others (n 2). 
50
 S Amaral and AP Marques, ‘Emigração Portuguesa de Profissionais de Saúde (Di) Visões em torno de um 
fenómeno emergente’ in MI Carsalade Martins and others (eds), Trabalho em Saúde, Desigualdades e Políticas 
Públicas (Health Sciences Research Centre 2014) 141–158. 
51
 MF Reis, ‘Bastonário dos Médicos defende ser preciso travar as causas da emigração’ Journali (27 May 
2015) <www.ionline.pt/393732> accessed 3 June 2016. 
 
 
were registered.
52
 The number of Portuguese studying medicine in countries like Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia or Spain, the principal destinations, is not known.
53
  
In sum, EU law and the values of free movement can have undesirable effects in some 
circumstances. When push factors (economic crisis, lack of jobs, low salaries, poor career 
prospects) are strong, freedom to move may stimulate emigration at a cost for the sending 
country and healthcare system. Also, regulations on the recognition of professional 
qualifications, combined with the availability of training opportunities in other EU countries, 
create an important challenge for planners and policymakers. 
III.ii EU Workforce Mobility and the Volatile Mitigation of Health System Deficits: 
The Case of Foreign Nurses in Italy 
A major problem of the Italian healthcare system is a lack of efficient health workforce 
policies to change the skill mix of the workforce. Italy shows one of the highest doctors’ 
density in the EU, but suffers from shortage of nurses and other health and social care 
personnel, especially for basic tasks of care provision.
54
 The healthcare sector lacks 
investigation in the education of nurses as well as attention to the consequences of an ageing 
labour force.
55
 These challenges need to be met in the context of a relatively devolved 
healthcare system, with significant powers vested in regional and local institutions. 
Against this backdrop, the EU single market and free movement of workers opened 
up new opportunities for the Italian NHS to tackle some of the workforce imbalances. The 
strategies and recruitment patterns vary, however. Two different phases emerged over the 
past 15 years: phase I from the 2000s until around 2010; and phase II starting with the 
economic crisis and, more specifically, with the austerity measures. Until 2000 or so, Italy’s 
healthcare workforce was ‘home made’, staffed by nationals. The situation changed markedly 
within only one decade for nurses and other health professions, while the medical profession 
remained largely untouched by growing EU mobility; approximately 1%–3% of the medical 
workforce were foreigners, often trained in Italy.
56
  
In 2002, nurses with foreign citizenship represented around 0.7% of the total nursing 
workforce.
57
 Within just a few years, until 2010, numbers have increased to around 38,000 
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nurses, equal to 10.2% of the total nursing workforce.
58
 By the end of the last decade, 
absolute numbers as well as trends showed a strong increase: around 25% of newly enrolled 
nurses between 2007 and 2010 were foreign.
59
 This increase was mainly the result of three 
different phenomena:  
 The shortage of nurses in the Italian healthcare system increased demand for nurses 
with foreign citizenship; 
 Italy changed its migration law in 2002, and introduced permanent exemptions for 
nurses with foreign citizenship from the annual quotas for entry to the Italian labour 
market;
60
 
 The EU internal market regulation has facilitated the recruitment of nurses in the new 
Member States of Eastern Europe.  
Until the end of the last decade there were still problems for the recognition of 
professional degrees obtained in the countries of origin, also for nurses coming from Eastern 
EU countries. The situation has improved in recent years.
61
 As a result of these three 
phenomena, in the second part of the last decade between 55% and 65% of foreign nurses 
came from within the EU, mostly from Eastern European countries. In 2010, for instance, 
43.9% of the foreign nurses were Romanian. However, since 2010 a new annual inflow of 
registered nurses trained in Romania has decreased sharply, from more than 1,000 in 2010 to 
less than 500 or even less in 2013.
 62
  
The recruitment of Eastern EU nurses has been strongly supported by local and regional 
institutions in Italy.
 63
 Demand for EU nurses was particularly high in the private hospital 
sector, in nursing homes and nursing home care activities as well as in the NHS services of 
the central-northern Italian regions.
 64
 Several bilateral agreements have been signed by 
Italian regional and local governments and foreign nursing institutions in order to recruit 
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qualified personnel.
65
 Added to this, private companies increasingly act as brokers between 
the demand-side and the supply-side of professionals.
66
 
Since the onset of the economic crisis and the austerity measures (phase II) the situation, 
once again, changed radically. If growing mobility of foreign nurses seemed an unstoppable 
phenomenon until 2010, signs of a slowdown of EU nursing mobility were already observed. 
The crisis itself and austerity measures can only partly explain the changing trend. Moreover, 
more general problems of inefficient health workforce governance also came into play.
67
 
Migrant nurses, although qualified, represent one of the weakest segments of the health 
workforce, and show higher turnover rates compared to Italian nurses.
68
 They have more 
often unstable (fixed-term) employment contracts with lower salaries due to widespread sub-
contracting practices: nurses work for temporary work agencies or cooperatives, which offer 
their services to private and public healthcare institutions.
69
 As a consequence of overall poor 
employment and career conditions, an increasing number of EU nurses try to move to other 
EU countries, where contracts seem to be more attractive.
70
  
In summary, EU single market law and growing mobility have had positive effects on the 
Italian healthcare system and mitigated system deficits in the skill mix through extensive 
recruitment from resource-poorer Eastern EU countries. The opportunity to use EU health 
workforce mobility to solve country-specific system deficits is markedly constrained since 
austerity measures were introduced. In this situation, adverse effects of EU mobility law are 
gaining momentum in the Italian healthcare system, as nurses increasingly search for better 
work conditions elsewhere in the EU. This development is facilitated by the EU’s 
Professional Qualifications Directive,
71
 which makes ‘country hopping’ easier for 
professionals. Ironically, the Italian NHS may itself face in future the symptoms of ‘draining’ 
(although not at the same level) that its foreign recruitment policy caused in Eastern EU 
Member States. 
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III.iii EU Mobility and the ‘Draining’ of Resource-Poorer Healthcare Systems: The 
Case of Romanian Doctors  
Since joining the EU in 2007, Romania has become one of the major source countries of 
health professionals for Western European countries, although migration was also relevant 
prior to EU membership. Health professionals trained in Romania (mainly doctors) represent 
one of the largest shares of foreign-trained health professionals in Germany, Belgium and 
France.
72
 However, the figures of foreign-trained doctors may include nationals who were not 
admitted to medical studies in their country and who went to Romania to qualify as medical 
doctors. Growing shortages of doctors in Germany and other resource-rich EU countries will 
reinforce a trend of ‘fishing’ from the pool of other healthcare systems,73 such as in Romania, 
which are heavily struggling to establish universal healthcare coverage and improve 
healthcare for the population. 
The present situation has emerged as the result of a combination of factors, 
originating both in Romania, as source country, and in the destination countries. In Romania, 
although the health professionals’ emigration was expected to increase after Romania joined 
the EU, little was done to prevent this development.
74
 Moreover, since the phenomenon 
became more pressing in the years after 2007, there were no significant efforts and policy 
changes towards managing health professionals’ migration more efficiently.75 Low wages, 
poor working conditions and widespread corruption, among other things, acted as strong push 
factors.
76
 On the other hand, pull factors such as better payment, greater access to modern 
technology to support clinical care, and more transparent and systematic opportunities for 
professional development, further influenced the decision to emigrate and accelerated the 
mobility flows.
77
 
The number of doctors trained in Romania increased significantly over the past years.
 
78
 Apart from the push and pull factors, aggressive recruitment campaigns from, or 
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incentivised by, institutions from Germany and other destination countries largely contributed 
to the high figures of emigrating Romanian doctors. Germany has proven to be especially 
welcoming to young Romanian doctors by offering attractive packages, including 
accommodation and language training. A statement from the German government highlighted 
the Professional Qualifications Directive as a success story: between 2012 and 2014 about 
5,000 foreign doctors applied for a work permit in Germany, thus helping to fill the gaps: 
Romania was among the major sending countries.
 79
 At the same time, many of the doctors 
are hired by private hospital chains, which have more flexibility than public sector hospitals 
in salary negotiations. Also, foreign-trained doctors may not be fully aware of their rights as 
employees; they are often less well integrated in professional networks and in doctors’ trades 
unions or professional organisations.  
Data provided by Germany through the Joint Questionnaire
80
 shows a close to ten-
fold increase of doctors trained in Romania currently working in Germany, from 342 doctors 
in 2000, to 3,042 doctors in 2013.
 81
 Most recent data from the German Physicians’ Chamber 
show an ongoing increase. The overall proportion of foreign EU doctors working in Germany 
increased to 11.1% (10.3% in 2013) with Romanian doctors leading the table of EU doctors: 
in 2014, the total number of Romanian doctors increased to 3,857.
82
 However, most recent 
data suggest a decline in the annual inflow since 2014.
83
 
The situation of Romanian doctors moving to Germany shows a lack of concerted 
workforce governance at all levels (micro, meso, macro and transnational). This lack of 
coordination calls for a European policy approach based on solidarity, which may be 
promoted by bilateral agreements. The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International 
Recruitment of Health Personnel
84
 could represent a starting point for designing 
improvements in a joint effort between Romania and Germany.
85
 Three areas could be 
explored in more detail, including bilateral agreements, circular migration and health 
workforce recruitment practices.  
 Bilateral agreements could serve as overarching frameworks that set out the direction 
of Romania–Germany collaboration on health workforce issues;  
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 Circular migration could be an option to replace or at least supplement the current 
non-structured movement of doctors from Romania to Germany, by following the 
principle of triple win – for the source country, the destination country and the health 
professionals themselves;  
 Health workforce recruitment practices by German recruiters in Romania should be 
better regulated by the Romanian Government, to ensure that health professionals are 
fully aware of the benefits and risks of any position advertised.  
Mobility and migration of health professionals are part of any individual’s fundamental 
human rights, but the manner in which mobility is managed at a systemic level is a health 
policy and systems issue. As such, mobility can either be useful or damaging for a healthcare 
system.
86
 The example of Romanian doctors emigrating to Germany shows the lack of 
coherence and ‘joined up-ness’ of the EU law and policy. It highlights the need for more 
systematic and elaborated policy efforts to sustain the health workforces in both the sending 
and receiving countries. If benefits of a mobile health professional workforce are to be 
enjoyed equally, and values of healthcare systems to be respected, EU regulation should 
provide a policy framework and governance incentives to prevent aggressive recruitment and 
to support health workforce retention strategies of small countries in Eastern Europe.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION: CLASHING POLICY GOALS AND THE 
DIRECTION OF TRAVEL IN EU HEALTH PROFESSIONAL 
MOBILITY 
This chapter has set out to explore a regulatory gap in EU law and policy of health 
professional mobility. Using a public health and health systems lens and empirical data, we 
have illuminated how this gap affects the healthcare workforce in Member States in different 
ways. Our analysis reveals unequal effects of growing mobility (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2) 
caused by the clashing logics of labour markets and free movement on the one hand, and 
healthcare goals and principles, such as universal health coverage and solidarity, on the other. 
More generally, the politics of EU health professional mobility embody the contrasting logics 
of individual human rights and opportunities for health professions and service providers, and 
the population-based logics of (public) healthcare systems accountable to the citizens’ health 
and in need of a qualified health workforce.
87
  
Our analysis also reveals more specific problems of current EU law. One important 
problem is the distribution of policy responsibilities between the EU and Member States, 
which is manifest in the austerity measures aiming to improve fiscal stability while being 
blind to the needs of healthcare systems.
88
 Another issue is the EU policy focus on the 
regulated professions, which reinforces an existing trend of more negative occupational 
development at the basic levels of the health workforce compared to the higher qualified 
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groups.
89
 Finally, within a regulatory vacuum of EU law, market powers are gaining 
momentum and create a spiral of inequality, which may boost health workforce policy and 
service provision in the more powerful countries, and threaten weaker Member States.
90
 This 
pattern was observed for nurses and for doctors, and hits Eastern healthcare systems the most. 
The direction of travel of EU law and policy has changed, since free movement was 
first introduced. The EU Working Time Directive
91
 marks an important policy shift that is 
becoming even more visible with the Professional Qualifications Directive
92
 and its most 
recent updates. Although the developments bring about only ‘creeping change’, there is a 
uniform direction of travel, which expands EU law towards the Member States’ domain of 
healthcare and workforce issues. However, entering the regulatory territory of Member States 
via the health workforce is still framed in terms of labour market policy; so EU law acts 
sideways to enter ‘foreign’ terrain of Member States regulation. This strategy has brought 
about some remarkable improvements in EU health workforce governance, such as improved 
data and monitoring,
93
 but it does not provide an opportunity to overcome market logics,
94
 
where these are ill-suited to serve values such as equality and solidarity.  
Our empirical data have shown that inequality between Member States is reinforced, 
since regulatory mechanisms to control such market forces are lacking. This situation should 
be alarming for EU law and for health policymakers. It highlights a need for systematic 
policy changes and more visionary approaches to EU law and policy. A promising future 
direction of travel would be the development of an EU approach to healthcare policy, which 
is based on solidarity to promote a needs-based distribution
95
 of health professionals across 
Member States.  
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SYSTEMS 
 12. EU Health Law and Policy and the Eurozone crisis 
Tomislav Sokol and Nikola Mijatović* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare represents of the most important areas of public policy in the world. The 
economic, social and political choices this area of human activity entails are regularly in the 
limelight, with many different stakeholders involved in the public debate. The European 
Union is no exception in this regard. Issues of prolonged lifespan influencing healthcare costs, 
public versus private governance of healthcare institutions, costs of medicines and access to 
publicly covered healthcare, just to name a few, are of crucial importance for the future of 
Europe and its inhabitants.
1
 
The economic crisis of the Eurozone, which has spilled over to other EU Member 
States as well, although not caused by the health sector, has affected healthcare systems in 
many respects. The most important of these is the decrease in healthcare spending in many 
Member States which have the primary competence to organise and regulate provision of 
healthcare in the EU.
2
 Of course, such a situation reflects heavily on those aspects of 
healthcare law and policy where the EU has a role to play, like free movement of healthcare 
professionals, marketing of medicines and similar.
3
 
This chapter presents the developments in EU health law and policy since the start of 
the economic crisis, the impact of the latter on the said developments and indicates the future 
trends concerning that field in the years to come. 
First, the chapter provides a brief overview of the instruments of economic governance 
the EU has at its disposal and their development since the start of the Eurozone crisis. Crucial 
areas of EU health law, like access to healthcare, free movement of healthcare professionals 
and regulation of medicines are covered next, along with an analysis of the impact of the 
crisis in those areas. Finally, possible trends in the years to come will be discussed. 
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II. EUROZONE ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS 
Limitation of healthcare public expenditure is not a novelty in the framework on coordination 
of EU Member States’ macroeconomic policies. The Stability and Growth Pact facilitating 
and maintaining the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union is the key instrument in 
understanding these limitations on public expenditure. The Pact has set thresholds of 3% of 
GDP concerning government deficit and 60% of GDP concerning public debt. If these 
thresholds are breached, the Council may initiate an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
which can result in financial sanctions for the Member State in question.
4
 
       The Eurozone crisis that started in 2008 has put pressure on EU Member States to hand 
over strong powers to the EU’s institutions, concerning the control of national fiscal and 
economic policies, including national healthcare spending. The strongest control mechanism, 
involving the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (Troika) has focused on the countries belonging to the Eurozone. The Eurozone 
countries, in need of financial assistance from the EU’s institutions and the IMF, need to 
fulfil conditions consisting of reforms in economic and social policies determined by 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) concluded with those institutions. The 
Memorandums are not legal instruments of internal EU law, but are based on the 
intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism established by the Eurozone countries. The 
European Stability Mechanism has generally assumed the tasks of providing future assistance 
previously fulfilled by the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (which nonetheless still exist). These MoUs represent a strong tool 
for ensuring compliance of the countries concerned. The European Commission is primarily 
responsible for monitoring whether the Member States fulfil the conditions set by the MoUs 
and non-compliance may result in sanctions and strict conditions for future financial 
assistance.
5
 
       For all other EU Member States, crucial instruments are set in the framework of the 
European Semester for economic policy coordination, presented in Figure 12.1 below. Within 
the European Semester, a ‘soft’ governance framework concerning Member States’ 
employment and social policies has complemented the coordination of national macro-
economic and fiscal policies based on the Stability and Growth Pact. The Semester starts in 
November each year with the European Commission’s Annual Growth Survey, determining 
EU priorities for growth and job creation in the year to come. On the basis of Guidelines 
made by the Council, Member States prepare National Reform Programmes for the coming 
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year. The latter are reviewed by the Commission which publishes Country Reports for each 
Member State, analysing national economic and social policies which are then followed by 
the Council’s Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR). Strict procedures for the detection, 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances have also been put in place by the 
EU legislation, ensuring national implementation. All in all, monitoring of Member States’ 
fiscal policies has been strengthened, forcing the countries in question to respect concrete 
deadlines for sustainably correcting their deficits. Member States which do not implement the 
recommendations in time may be issued policy warnings that are endorsed by the Council 
and can finally result in financial sanctions.
6
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Figure 12.1 An overview of the European Semester 
 
Source: European Commission, ‘Making it happen: the European Semester’ (2015), through Baeten and 
Vanhercke (n 6) 5. 
 
III. ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE 
The Eurozone economic policy instruments described above focused on fiscal control have to 
a large extent resulted in (or at least contributed to) spending cuts in the Member States. 
Concerning the countries receiving financial assistance from the EU and the International 
Monetary Fund, such as Ireland and Portugal, the Troika plays the crucial role of imposing 
conditions concerning reform of economic and social policies (including healthcare), in 
return for receiving EU and/or IMF assistance. These conditions, set through the MoUs, have 
been mainly focused on reduction of costs, often in the short term. Furthermore, the European 
Semester has been used to introduce EU policies to Member States concerning healthcare.
7
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Only three Member States received Country-Specific Recommendations for reform of 
their healthcare and/or long-term care systems in 2011, within the European Semester. But by 
2014, the number had increased to 20. The recommendations are somewhat more multi-
dimensional, mostly focusing on sustainability and cost-effectiveness of national health 
systems (but sometimes also mentioning access to healthcare), requesting reforms in the most 
important sectors of these systems.
8
 
Such EU policies and instruments have influenced access to healthcare, as one of the 
most important aspects of health law and policy in Europe. The crucial question here is not so 
much physical access to medical facilities, which is generally not a huge problem within most 
of the EU Member States, but rather the bearing of treatment costs. Of course, within this 
context, a very important role belongs to the national social security healthcare systems. 
These can be described as statutory systems based on the principle of solidarity, providing 
protection against (the threat of) a lack of earnings, or against particular costs in case of an 
occurrence of a recognised social risk. The systems can be further divided according to 
different criteria.
9
 One of these divisions is between the social health insurance systems and 
national health services. The former originally covered only economically active persons, and 
they are financed primarily from earmarked contributions, with the insurer and the provider 
being separate entities. Today the vast majority of the population is covered also in the 
European countries using that type of system.
10
 The latter generally cover the entire 
population, are financed via taxation, with healthcare funding and provision being carried out 
through a single entity.
11
 An example of the former can be found in various countries, for 
example some central European ones, while the example of the latter can be found (at least 
historically) in the UK National Health Service (NHS).  
The diversity of national (social) healthcare systems is not limited to the personal 
scope of application and the formal source of funding. One of the most important aspects 
which came to the fore through the economic crisis involves the range of healthcare covered. 
This can be analysed via three dimensions: depth, height and breadth. Depth means the 
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number and character of covered health services; height means the extent of the coverage of 
healthcare costs and breadth means the extent of the covered population.
12
 
The economic crisis has generally affected financial aspects of public health systems 
in the EU
13
 and this has also influenced the above mentioned aspects of social healthcare 
coverage, mainly the height of the coverage. The development can be illustrated by an 
example of a Member State particularly hard hit by the crisis, Ireland. In Ireland, the budget 
of the public health provider the Health Service Executive (HSE) was reduced by €4bn (27%) 
between 2008 and 2014.
14
 This is an enormous amount, both in absolute (the amount of 
money) and in relative (percentage of the entire public health budget) terms. Of course, 
reductions in health spending were not limited to Ireland. It can be mentioned for example 
that, besides Ireland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Romania, 
Portugal and Spain reduced their health budgets between 2007 and 2011. Reductions in terms 
of per capita healthcare spending between 2007 and 2012 occurred in Ireland (the largest), 
Portugal, Latvia, Greece and Croatia.
15
  
 Generally, changes in the national healthcare policies which have taken place between 
2008 and 2013, influencing, inter alia, the range of healthcare covered, have not been along 
the lines of differing types of national healthcare systems mentioned at the beginning of this 
section. They depended on the level of EU influence instead. Where national and 
supranational decision-making have been entwined the strongest (Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal), through Memorandums of Understanding, the emphasis was placed on cost-
containment and privatisation. In Ireland, for instance, several co-payments have been 
increased or newly introduced, including an amount of €2.50 which persons who are entitled 
to the highest range of coverage (having ‘full eligibility’) have to pay for a prescribed 
medicine. In Greece, a €25 admission fee and an extra €1 payment (in addition to the existing 
25% co-payment) for prescriptions were imposed in 2014. Also, the number of publicly 
provided beds has been reduced by more than 10%, and for-profit financing of hospital 
infrastructure has been expanded. In countries where this ‘EU leverage’ was moderate, 
reforms were focused on a ‘changing healthcare mix’. Reforms either shifted control powers 
from insurance funds towards the State (France, Germany), or the market (Italy and the 
Netherlands) with some degree of privatisation of service provision. Finally, the countries in 
which the influence of the EU was weakest, like Lithuania, Sweden and the UK (significantly 
not belonging to the Eurozone, at least at the time), reforms were more focused on systemic 
reorganisation, driven by domestic policy considerations.
16
 Therefore, where the influence of 
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own healthcare without undue hardship. See Health Act 1970 s 45. See also, on this issue, F Paolucci, Health 
the EU on national healthcare policies was significant, the focus was placed on fiscal 
consolidation, instead of ensuring access to healthcare. 
How has the EU addressed these developments through its health law and policy 
instruments, as opposed to those of economic governance? Obviously, the overall context and 
primary focus on fiscal consolidation do not sit well with ensuring access to healthcare within 
the EU. Related to this, the Commission has identified the three biggest problems in terms of 
access to healthcare within the EU: waiting time, travelling distance and cost sharing, two of 
which are directly related to the ongoing crisis and the fiscal pressure on Member States’ 
healthcare systems. The Commission has also acknowledged that there is no common EU 
methodology of measuring and monitoring access to healthcare.
17
 Still, it has emphasised 
three areas which can contribute to increasing the accessibility of healthcare. Apart from cost-
effective use of medicines and the EU health workforce, which will be analysed in the 
following sections discussing free movement of healthcare professionals and regulation of 
medicines, the optimal implementation of the Patients’ Rights Directive has been 
emphasised: 
Directive 2011/24 broadens patient choice in healthcare and helps them avoid undue delay in 
receiving the treatments they need. The Directive will improve transparency by requiring the Member 
States to set up national contact points to provide information to citizens, including on their rights and 
entitlements, patient safety and quality of care standards. It also calls for a better understanding of 
baskets of healthcare. Member States should ensure that all the provisions of the Directive are 
properly implemented. The Commission will closely monitor how the concept of undue delay is 
applied in Member States. 
Reference networks will promote cooperation among highly specialised providers across Member 
States, allowing patients with low prevalence, complex or rare diseases to access high quality care. 
The Commission intends to launch calls for expressions of interest in becoming European reference 
network members, who could also provide training for health professionals and support in defining 
common quality assurance requirements.
18  
The above extract shows the limitations of EU health law and policy mechanisms. On one 
side, there are relatively strong regulatory tools described in the previous section to force the 
Member States to reduce their budgetary deficits according to (inter alia) TFEU Articles 121, 
126 and 136, as well as EU secondary legislation. As has also been observed in the literature, 
the EU has exerted influence on national healthcare system reforms either directly – through 
the Memorandums of Understanding and Country-Specific Recommendations – or indirectly, 
via hardening public budget constraints within the Eurozone. On the other side, the 
consequences of these cuts are addressed via ‘developing recommendations, common tools, 
indicators and guidelines’ to support Member States in their actions.19 All this means that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Care Financing and Insurance (Springer 2011) 35 and A Nolan and B Nolan, ‘Eligibility for free GP care, 
“need” and GP visiting in Ireland’ (2008) 9(2) European Journal of Health Economics 157. In Greece, the 
overall government deficit has reduced 3.6% in 2014, from double-digit figures in the previous years. See 
EUROSTAT, ‘General government deficit (-) and surplus (+) – annual data’ (EUROSTAT) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=teina200> accessed 19 
March 2016.  
17
 See Commission, ‘On effective, accessible and resilient health systems’ (Communication) COM (2014) 215 
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instruments of EU economic governance (especially those concerning the Eurozone) have 
had the biggest practical impact on Member States’ healthcare systems. The situation can be 
understood through Figure 12.2 below. 
Figure 12.2 The relationship between EU economic governance and health reform 
 
 
 
Source: Baeten and Vanhercke (n 6) 26. 
Additionally, despite the best intentions, it remains questionable how the greater efficiency of 
health systems that the Commission promotes, and which Member States may achieve (for 
example, through better procurement, generic substitution of medicines, development of e-
health and better planning) can offset budgetary cuts in the long run. This is especially 
questionable in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. Even the Commission itself recognises 
that a number of factors (including population ageing) will result in public expenditure on 
healthcare and long-term care generally increasing by one-third by 2060. Still, the 
relationship between healthcare expenditure and health outcomes is not linear, with the same 
amount of per capita expenditure being associated with very different health outcomes even 
after taking into account the specificities of different countries. Future developments are thus 
hard to predict.
20
 
 All in all, the issue of ensuring access to medical care is very complex, and may be 
seen as exacerbated by the crisis, at least in some Member States. Unfortunately, the current 
legal framework of the EU does not seem to be best equipped to answer the challenges.  
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 IV. FREE MOVEMENT OF HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 
As noted in the preceding sections, EU economic governance instruments have emphasised 
fiscal consolidation of the Member States. A question emerges of whether this emphasis has 
influenced the mobility of healthcare professionals between different Member States. 
Before describing migration patterns in more detail, another significant aspect of the 
EU legal framework facilitating them needs to be investigated. These are free movement 
rules which influence possibilities of healthcare providers to establish themselves in a 
Member State other than that of which they are a national, or in which they are medically 
qualified. A significant case-law on this issue concerns TFEU Article 49, according to which 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State are prohibited, which is relevant for self-employed healthcare 
professionals. The notion of ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment’ may include both 
national measures the wording of which discriminates between providers on the basis of 
nationality, and those which do not. For example, a national rule which allows only 
pharmacists to operate pharmacies, and denies other economic operators access to this self-
employed activity in the Member State concerned, is a restriction upon the freedom of 
establishment.
21
 Of course, the national measures which restrict the freedom of establishment 
may be justified by reasons of general interest, as is the case with the other freedoms like the 
freedom to receive healthcare services.
22
 
Apart from EU primary law, freedom of movement of healthcare professionals is 
protected by EU secondary legislation on the recognition of professional qualifications, 
enacted to facilitate free movement of persons, services and establishment within the EU. 
This Professional Qualifications Directive has been generally well implemented by the 
Member States.
23
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EU policies of cost containment, combined with the right to free movement protected 
by EU law, have had an impact on the mobility of healthcare professionals in the EU. As the 
European Commission already stated in 2012, reduction in public expenditure is strongly 
affecting the recruitment and retention of professionals, like nurses, within national 
healthcare systems. A significant pattern of healthcare professional outflows from certain 
Member States has been observed. These are countries hardest hit by the spending cuts, along 
with corresponding worsening of working conditions, lower wages and difficulties in finding 
employment, resulting partly from the EU law and policy instruments described in the 
previous two sections.
24
 
If we look for some particular examples and patterns concerning countries subjected 
to the fiscal consolidation imposed by the EU, one of them may include Greece. The number 
of Greek doctors in Germany grew by 50% during the period 2010–2014. Also, analyses 
covering Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain which have been conducted across three time 
points, covering the period before and during the impact of the crisis, have shown a variable 
change in the different Member States but real reductions in the number of physicians in 
Portugal, as well as nurses in Italy and Ireland. This is not surprising due to healthcare being 
labour-intensive whereby the workforce is a major cost and staffing reductions can reduce 
these costs within the periods of reduced health spending (like the one witnessed in Ireland 
subjected to fiscal consolidation via Memorandum of Understanding). As noted in the 
literature, this can be achieved inter alia by direct reductions of personnel, by changing skill-
mix to a less costly one, by reducing pay and conditions of employment and by reducing 
pension entitlements, as has been observed in different EU Member States.
25
 
Increased outflows of healthcare professionals can have negative consequences in 
terms of efficiency, since funds for training in source countries are redistributed to destination 
countries and planning the workforce becomes more problematic. In the destination Member 
States, arrivals from the other Member States may require time and resources to fully 
integrate into the system, while source Member States may lose their best personnel, resulting 
in a greater workload for those who remain and imbalances in areas already lacking relevant 
expertise. In terms of equity, the differences between the Member States may be strengthened 
when health professionals exit the resource-strained systems to work in more advantageous 
Member States. Mobility also favours those professionals who are more able to radically 
change their lives, such as young physicians without families.
26
 
How has the European Commission responded to these migration patterns and their 
influence on health workforce imbalances? Concerning the EU health workforce, the 
Commission has stated: 
Health workforce planning efforts should develop sustainable solutions at EU level to ensure 
sufficient numbers of adequately trained health professionals with the right skills to provide care to 
all who need it. To avoid future shortages and skills mismatches, the Commission intends to work 
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further with Member States on developing recommendations, common tools, indicators and 
guidelines, strengthening EU support for Member States’ planning.27 
This extract shows that the issue of imbalances concerning healthcare professionals in certain 
parts of the EU has been recognised by the European Commission. Unfortunately, the 
instruments it has at its disposal to tackle the problem are significantly limited, as has also 
been observed in the case of access to healthcare. 
All in all, it can be seen that the free movement of health professionals, protected by 
EU primary and secondary law, may result in certain imbalances within the healthcare 
systems of the EU. These fears have been exacerbated with the onset of the economic crisis, 
which has resulted in adverse effects for those healthcare systems hit hardest by the economic 
crisis and the subsequent spending cuts triggered to a large extent by the EU itself.  
 
V. REGULATION OF MEDICINES 
European Union instruments of economic conditionality imposed upon certain Member 
States have had an important impact on regulation of medicines as well. Control of the 
pricing of medicines is an important tool for achieving sustainability of national public 
(healthcare) spending. Lowering of prices, for example through the increase of generic 
medicine usage and reference pricing, has been especially important in that regard and as 
such explicitly mentioned in the Memorandums of Understanding addressed to individual 
Member States.
28
 
It is impossible to explain the Member States’ responses to this context without 
briefly analysing the EU legal framework concerning medicines. As noted in the previous 
chapters, regulation of medicines in the EU is divided between the EU and the Member States. 
The legal framework on the placing of medicinal products on the market of the EU is set by 
the EU. This includes also supervision of products after putting them on the market, the 
manufacturing, wholesaling, advertising of medicinal products for human use, clinical trials 
and similar. The European Medicines Agency evaluates medicines according to safety 
standards with the final approval granted by the European Commission.
29
 On the other hand, 
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putting healthcare products within the ambit of social security coverage still primarily 
belongs to the Member States’ autonomy, in line with TFEU Article 168, and national social 
security spending covers the bulk of cost of medicines in the EU.
30
 The only EU-level 
limitations on this national competence are that decisions on (not) including certain medicinal 
products in the national coverage must contain reasoning based on verifiable objective 
criteria, avoiding discrimination against products from other Member States. Also, these 
decisions must be subject to judicial control.
31
 
A related issue concerns pricing and, within the context of the crisis, external 
reference pricing mechanisms used by several Member States are especially relevant. This 
means that official prices of medicines in certain Member States are used by other Member 
States in determining their own official price. The economic crisis has affected this issue in a 
way that some countries have taken measures that have resulted in significant drops in the 
pricing of medicines. As stated by the Commission, these developments have been a cause of 
concern, since reference prices affected by these national measures may influence the price 
level in other Member States or in third countries.
32
 The consequences resulted in significant 
discussions between public authorities and the relevant stakeholders. According to the 
European Commission: 
Cost-effective use of medicines 
The EU needs a competitive pharmaceutical industry. With this background, Member States and the 
Commission should reflect further on how to reconcile the policy objectives of ensuring accessible 
healthcare for all EU citizens with the need for cost containment. Consideration should be given to 
improved cooperation on building mechanisms for increased transparency and better coordination to 
minimise any unintended effects that current national pricing systems may have in terms of 
accessibility throughout the EU.
33 
This extract from a Commission Communication shows the good intentions of the 
Commission to address important but also conflicting issues of ensuring accessible healthcare 
for EU citizens with the need for cost containment (and also a competitive pharmaceutical 
industry). The EU pharmaceutical industry remains the world leader in the trade of medicines, 
traditionally being the biggest exporter of medicinal products in the world, accounting for 
more than a quarter of Europe’s high technology exports. On the other hand, the worldwide 
competition from emerging countries is growing
34
 and it is questionable whether the EU has 
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enough tools to answer these challenges. Deficiency of these tools is visible from the extract 
itself, which mentions mechanisms like improved cooperation and better coordination, which 
belong primarily to ‘soft law’ with all its limitations. Hard law mechanisms of binding 
common EU rules are still mostly present in the area of (facilitating) free movement, like the 
recognition of medical prescriptions issued in another Member State, or determining their 
minimum contents. Thus, in terms of policy responses to the crisis, Member States have had 
the crucial role to play, albeit some of them having been pressured by the EU’s economic 
governance in doing so. Important steps undertaken by several Member States have included 
lower prices and a focus on generic substitution of branded medicines, enhancing the 
efficiency of their health systems.
35
 
Generally, the weaknesses of the EU legal mechanisms are becoming especially clear 
within the context of an extremely diverse EU, where different socioeconomic contexts of 
individual Member States make common policies hard (or impossible) to develop. It has to be 
stated, however, that the problem may not be as acute concerning the pricing itself, since 
most Member States use the external reference pricing,
36
 but is more visible in other areas. 
The latter will be elaborated below, within the context of a discussion of future prospects and 
scenarios concerning the development of EU health law and policy. 
 
VI. DIRECTION OF TRAVEL 
Previous analysis has shown that the economic crisis has had an impact upon different 
aspects of EU health law and policy. The impact is impossible to understand without 
investigating different effects of the crisis on different Member States, particularly in the area 
of access to (socially covered) medical care. Reductions in health budgets in the countries hit 
hardest by the crisis, like Ireland, have adversely affected patients’ possibilities to access 
publicly covered healthcare, inter alia through increases in cost sharing. Significant outflows 
of health professionals from certain Member States may also result in adverse effects for 
patients’ access to quality healthcare. 
 Apart from adopting different budgetary possibilities to provide the best possible 
healthcare, Member States also diverge in terms of legal ways of defining the depth of their 
public health coverage. These vary from broad duties of promoting a comprehensive health 
service,
37
 to defining broad categories of public coverage
38
 and even explicitly excluding 
certain types of treatment from that coverage.
39
 Within such a diverse range of Member 
States’ healthcare systems, the challenges the EU is facing seem hardly surmountable.  
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 The first step in determining the potential for future EU action in the field of health 
consists of setting the objectives it should try to accomplish. A good starting point is found in 
the Council Conclusions on Common values and principles the health systems of the EU 
share. According to this document, overarching values of universality, access to good quality 
care, equity and solidarity are shared by all the Member States, and, logically, also the EU 
itself. Universality means that no person is forbidden access to healthcare: solidarity is linked 
to the financial context of national health systems and the need to ensure accessibility to all 
and equity means equal access according to need, regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, social 
status or ability to pay.40 On the other hand, the EU focus on the free market, visible, for 
example, through the above-mentioned reliance on free movement rules influencing 
healthcare, as well as on fiscal consolidation, poses deep questions on the real priorities of the 
EU in the field. If one tries to predict and evaluate possible scenarios for future development 
within this context, focusing on the economic aspects influencing European healthcare 
systems, three potential developments may come to mind. 
 First, it could be that the EU initiates strong policies to overcome the diversity of 
national health systems described above, and to achieve as much as possible equal access to 
healthcare for all EU citizens, irrespective of the country they live in, by way of 
harmonisation of healthcare provision (in the three dimension mentioned above) across the 
EU. This would constitute a strong articulation of one of the Council’s ‘values and principles’ 
in EU health systems, that of equity. Legally, though, this would probably have to be 
achieved through an amendment to the TFEU, since unanimity still applies to social security 
(including healthcare) and obviously, it is very hard to come to unanimous decisions in a EU 
consisting of 28 Member States (this can be observed through the example of the time it took 
for the adoption of social security coordination Regulation 883/2004 and its final entry into 
force).
41
 Still, even if the Treaty were amended accordingly (and there are no signs of such a 
course of events), a purely regulatory role is simply not enough in a EU in which the 
Netherlands and Austria, for example, spend five times more per capita on healthcare than 
Romania, and different countries have faced the economic crisis in different ways, as shown 
in the previous sections. In other words, it is very hard to imagine some level of regulatory 
harmonisation of healthcare systems without first harmonising their financial capabilities.
42
 
 So the first scenario necessarily entails strong financial input from the EU in order to 
tackle diversity of national health systems in Europe. Significant EU-level redistributive 
actions would be necessary. Does this seem realistic? It is not really realistic in a EU in which 
the Health Programme 2014–2020 has around €450 million at its disposal. This is a feeble 
amount compared even to health spending of smaller Member States such as Croatia and 
Slovenia, without analysing larger countries like Poland, Romania and similar.
43
 The first 
scenario, therefore, remains extremely unlikely. 
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 Since the EU budget itself does not leave much room for significant increase, a 
second scenario, according to which the situation stays the same, with concrete EU action 
mainly limited to ensuring fiscal consolidation, facilitating free movement and using ‘soft 
law’ mechanisms of promoting Member States’ cooperation in health matters, seems 
probable. Significant new mechanisms for soft law cooperation have been set up by the 
Patients’ Rights Directive. One area (which could be mentioned as an example) concerns 
cooperation and exchange of information between different national institutions on health 
technology assessment. Here, a health technology assessment network has been set up, with 
participating institutions from all Member States.
44
 This kind of cooperation could result in a 
stronger convergence of the methods for defining the depth of coverage of different Member 
States. Such convergence may, for example, help Member States compare levels of health 
coverage in other Member States with their own and thus assist in planning their costs 
accordingly. A similar statement could be made regarding methods for calculating costs of 
medical treatments. Also, cross-border cooperation between healthcare providers through 
European reference networks may contribute to maximising the cost-effective use of 
resources by concentrating them where it is appropriate.
45
 
 Finally, there is the third scenario which could be imagined. According to this, the EU 
redistributive mechanisms become even weaker than they are now, and the EU reverts to 
being not much more than a free trade zone with an insignificant role in other areas of human 
activity. This scenario is already advocated by governments of some Member States.
46
 Under 
this scenario, some adverse impact of free movement on certain countries (like the outflow of 
healthcare professionals) might be maintained without the redistributive mechanisms 
offsetting such development. On the other hand, some level of common policy may be 
maintained through intergovernmental cooperation. Some of the existing mechanisms already 
depend on Member States’ voluntary participation, and there is no rational reason why these 
would not be maintained outside of the current EU legal and institutional framework. An 
important question is whether the current role of the Commission (which would probably 
diminish in this scenario) in facilitating this cooperation is indispensable. Also, the overall 
political climate in a (partly) disintegrating EU, as presumed in this situation, may prove to 
be an obstacle to strong cooperation between the national healthcare systems. Therefore, it is 
hard to predict how the individual EU health systems could develop in the last scenario, but 
in that case it would be hard to speak of a real EU health law and policy anyway. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The economic crisis has had an impact on health law and policy in the EU. This can be 
observed through areas of primary EU interest in the healthcare sector, namely free 
movement of healthcare professionals and regulation of medicines, but also access to 
healthcare. This impact has been visible through the increase in cost sharing and privatisation 
of parts of healthcare provision in Member States subjected to the EU instruments of 
economic governance, outflow of healthcare professionals from the States hit hardest by the 
crisis and efforts to reduce prices of medicines in various Member States. 
 It is impossible to understand EU health law and policy within the context of the crisis 
without analysing the problems national (public) healthcare systems are facing in trying to 
ensure access to medical treatments for their population. The economic crisis has generally 
affected their capabilities of providing social healthcare coverage to patients, especially in 
Member States under EU fiscal control. The EU has addressed these issues, but that reaction 
has only stressed the limited mechanisms the EU has at its disposal to influence the level of 
health protection within different Member States, when compared to mechanisms of 
imposing fiscal consolidation upon the countries concerned. 
 Out of the three scenarios of future development, the first one, consisting of stronger 
integration, seems the least likely. A prognosis on which of the second two (status quo or 
disintegration) will prevail is hard to make, meaning that the future remains uncertain, to say 
the least. 
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 15. EU public health law and policy – on the rocks? A few 
sobering thoughts on the growing EU alcohol problem 
Oliver Bartlett and Amandine Garde 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The consumption of alcoholic beverages has been an important part of European culture for 
centuries.
1
 Alcoholic beverages are important commodities that are widely traded across 
frontiers.
2
 Alcohol is, however, a toxic substance whose excessive consumption is one of the 
four leading risk factors for the development of non-communicable diseases (NCDs),
3
 which 
account for around 86% of deaths and 77% of the disease burden in Europe.
4
  
The prevention of alcohol-related harm and NCDs is complex, not least because 
multiple factors influence alcohol consumption and various policy tools of differing 
effectiveness are available to address them.
5
 This chapter analyses the issues that this 
complexity poses for both Member States and the EU. For Member States this comprises 
balancing the global commitments they have made to reduce alcohol-related harm as 
members of the World Health Assembly, while respecting their obligations under the EU 
Treaties to protect the free movement of goods. For the EU this comprises fulfilling their own 
Treaty obligations – supporting the Member States in developing their public health policies 
and alleviating cross-border health problems, while respecting the principles of conferred 
powers, subsidiarity and proportionality.  
We will begin by analysing the effect of EU law on the adoption of alcohol control 
measures by Member States, first placing the adoption of these measures in their international 
public health context, then discussing the way in which the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has assessed the compatibility of these measures with Articles 34 and 36 
TFEU on the free movement of goods. We will argue that the CJEU’s analysis has not fully 
captured the complexity of alcohol control, nor the fact that Member States must balance 
trade and public health interests in light of the international commitments they have made, 
and that this potentially threatens the multisectoral, evidence-based approach that all Member 
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States have committed to. We will then analyse the direct contribution of EU law to 
preventing alcohol-related harm, examining key EU legislative and policy measures. We will 
conclude that the EU has failed to use evidence effectively to discharge its duty to ensure a 
high level of public health protection in all EU policies. Ultimately, we argue that if the EU 
does not seize the opportunities that the EU Treaties offer, Member States will continue to 
face problems in negotiating the dual nature of alcoholic beverages as they seek to find 
effective solutions to an inherently complex issue.  
 
II. EU JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF NATIONAL ALCOHOL 
CONTROL MEASURES 
The Court’s case law assessing the compatibility of national laws with EU free movement 
Treaty provisions (II.i) must first be contextualised (II.ii). 
II.i The International Public Health Context for Member State Alcohol Control 
All EU Member States are parties to the UN Political Declaration of September 2011 on the 
prevention and control of non-communicable diseases.
6
 They have all also committed to the 
WHO Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol
7
 and the WHO Global Action Plan 
on the Prevention and Control of NCDs for 2013–2020.8  Furthermore, within the WHO 
European Region, the Member States have committed to a European Action Plan to reduce 
the harmful use of alcohol.
9
  
All these strategic documents recognise the severity of alcohol-related harm. The 
Political Declaration states plainly that NCDs are ‘one of the major challenges for 
development in the twenty-first century’.10 According to the WHO Global strategy, harmful 
use of alcohol alone accounts for 3.8% of global deaths and 4.5% of the global disease 
burden.
11
 The burden of alcohol-related harm is especially pressing in Europe, which has the 
highest levels of alcohol consumption and thus the highest levels of alcohol-related harm in 
the world.
12
 In response to the critical need to address alcohol-related harm, WHO members 
have committed to evidence-based action on alcohol control, recognising that ‘countries that 
are most active in implementing evidence-based and cost effective alcohol policies and 
programmes will profit from substantial gains in health and well-being’.13  
There is international recognition however that, despite the available evidence, 
responses to alcohol-related harm are currently insufficient at both global and European level. 
According to the Global strategy, ‘policy responses are often fragmented and do not always 
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correspond to the magnitude of the impact on health’.14 The European action plan more 
explicitly recognises that ‘alcohol policies still do not reflect the gravity of the health, social 
and economic harm resulting from the harmful use of alcohol’.15 In particular, the Global 
strategy emphasises that addressing the ‘multifaceted determinants of alcohol-related harm’16 
requires ‘comprehensive action across numerous sectors’. 17  The European action plan 
similarly encourages ‘coherence and “joined-up” action’.18  
Accordingly, the Global alcohol strategy provides ‘a portfolio of policy options and 
interventions that should be considered … as integral parts of national policy’. 19  These 
options are organised into 10 action areas, which broadly cover leadership, research, 
treatment and prevention. The action areas relating to prevention focus on a range of legal 
interventions, which are also recommended by the European action plan. First, ‘the 
implementation of even small reductions in the availability of alcohol can bring health 
gain[s]’,20 so Member States are encouraged to strengthen laws on alcohol outlet density and 
maintain government retail monopolies where they exist.
21
 They are furthermore encouraged 
to set minimum purchase ages at 18 years and develop strong systems for licensing the sale of 
alcohol. Second, Member States should ‘have systems in place to prevent inappropriate and 
irresponsible alcohol advertising and marketing that targets children and young people’,22 and 
are urged to consider the following options: regulating the content of advertising; regulating 
sponsorship by alcohol brands; regulating alcohol marketing in new media; and restricting or 
banning promotions that target children. The European action plan specifically notes that 
supranational action is needed with respect to commercial communications that cross 
borders.
23
 Member States are reminded that ‘action in drinking environments is also 
fundamentally important’,24 and that ‘labelling should be introduced like that used for other 
foodstuffs … on the content and composition of the product for the protection of [consumer] 
health and interests’.25 Finally, ‘of all alcohol policy measures, the evidence is strongest for 
the impact of alcohol prices as an incentive to reduce heavy drinking occasions and regular 
harmful drinking’.26 States are encouraged to both increase alcohol taxation and consider 
imposing minimum prices for alcohol.  
States are urged to take primary responsibility for adopting as broad a range of the 
above measures as possible, but they are not expected to do so unaided. The European Action 
Plan therefore declares that ‘international frameworks should enable, rather than hinder, 
individual countries to be bold and innovative in taking evidence-based approaches to 
reducing the harmful use of alcohol’.27 Although such bold pursuit of public health interests 
must be balanced against other competing policy interests, such as free trade, the Global 
Strategy notes that free trade agreements recognise the right of countries to adopt justifiable, 
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non-discriminatory public health measures. Therefore it is noted that, ‘national, regional and 
international efforts should take into account the impact of harmful use of alcohol’28 in the 
balancing process.  
Member States must also be mindful of the economic and political power of the 
global alcohol industry. Multinational alcohol corporations recorded profits in 2005 totalling 
$26 billion, and the top 10 alcoholic beverage manufacturers accounted for 48% of branded 
sales.
29
 For particular alcoholic beverages, the concentration of economic power is even 
greater, with 50% of the global beer market belonging to only five corporations.
30
 The largest 
multinational alcohol corporations therefore have considerable market leverage, especially in 
Europe from which 70% of the world’s alcohol is exported.31 As a result, these corporations 
are also powerful political players and attempt to influence policymaking through a number 
of overt and covert tactics, including: the manipulation of evidence;
32
 the direct lobbying of 
policymakers and politicians;
33
 the promotion of personal responsibility through social 
marketing campaigns;
34
 and the co-opting of policymaking processes,
35
 often through front 
groups.
36
 Member States must therefore be aware of the tactics of the alcohol industry, and 
take steps to avoid conflicts of interest which would limit the effectiveness of their alcohol 
control policies.  
II.ii The Compatibility of Member State Alcohol Control Policies with EU Internal 
Market Law 
Since the Member States have committed at WHO level to implementing a range of 
legislative alcohol control measures, and since free trade and public health interests are often 
likely to collide,
37
 it is unsurprising that the CJEU’s alcohol control case law under Article 34 
TFEU is extensive. Restricting alcohol advertising makes it ‘more difficult for new foreign 
products to break onto the market’,38 which is ‘liable to impede access to the market’39 more 
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for imported products than for domestic products. Minimum unit pricing prevents ‘the lower 
cost price of imported products being reflected in the selling price to the consumer’40 which 
in itself is capable of hindering market access. Information disclosure measures that require 
physical changes in labelling or production impose dual regulatory burdens on alcoholic 
beverages, and there is ‘no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced 
and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into 
any other Member State’.41 Finally, the Court has consistently held that conditioning the 
importation of alcoholic beverages can create barriers to trade (though retail monopolies are 
permissible).
42
   
Measures caught by Article 34 can be justified under Article 36 TFEU or the 
mandatory requirement doctrine.
43
 They must pursue a legitimate objective of public interest 
and satisfy the principle of proportionality, which means that they must be appropriate for 
securing the achievement of the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it.
44
 Early cases explicitly acknowledged the ‘undeniable’ link between alcohol 
advertising and consumption, and the Court has recognised that preventing alcohol-related 
harm is ‘indisputably one of the grounds which may justify derogation from [Article 34] of 
the Treaty’. 45  However, if establishing a legitimate objective for alcohol control is not 
contentious, establishing the proportionality of alcohol control measures that fall within the 
scope of Article 34 TFEU raises a range of complex questions.  
II.ii.a Establishing appropriateness 
To establish a measure’s appropriateness, the Court will enquire as to whether there is 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the means chosen will be suitable for achieving the 
objectives pursued. In earlier case law such as Franzen, the Court hardly engaged with 
evidence, insisting that it was for the Swedish government to demonstrate the proportionality 
of their licensing system, and that they had not done so in this instance.
46
 Similarly, in 
Bacardi France (on the closely related area of free movement of services) the Court was 
willing to accept that rules restricting direct and indirect advertising for alcoholic beverages
47
 
were ‘appropriate to ensure their aim of protecting public health’ 48  without any further 
discussion of the supporting evidence. 
Recent case law however demonstrates a shift in the Court’s approach to evidence. In 
Ahokainen, the Court still insisted that Finland had not demonstrated the proportionality of its 
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licensing system,
49
 however then proceeded to refer to the judgments in Heinonen
50
 and 
Gourmet, acknowledging that those cases presented a variety of plausible arguments on the 
relative desirability of alcohol control measures. In doing so the Court showed a more 
nuanced appreciation of the way in which alcohol control policy is shaped by evidence and 
context.  
In Rosengren, the Court went further, weighing the ban on personal importation of 
alcohol against the fact that the alcohol monopoly could theoretically refuse to import any 
beverage that it did not stock. It concluded that ‘in the light of the alleged objective … 
limiting generally the consumption of alcohol in the interest of protecting the health and life 
of humans, that prohibition, because of the rather marginal nature of its effects in that regard, 
must be considered unsuitable for achievement of that objective’.51 Thus, in Rosengren the 
Court directly engages with the supporting evidence, albeit that this lead to a conclusion of 
inappropriateness in the circumstances.  
Scotch Whisky confirms that the Court is now prepared to directly engage with public 
health evidence. The Court explicitly acknowledged that a minimum unit pricing measure ‘is 
part of a more general political strategy designed to combat the devastating effects of alcohol’ 
and that the measures ‘constitutes one of 40 measures whose objective is to reduce, in a 
consistent and systematic manner, the consumption alcohol’.52 This awareness of the fact that 
single interventions may play a particular role within a more complex strategy led the Court 
to conclude that it was not unreasonable to consider that minimum unit pricing was suitable 
for reducing alcohol consumption.
53
  
II.ii.b Establishing necessity 
In establishing the necessity of alcohol control measures the Court must ask whether the 
public health objective(s) pursued could have been equally attained with less trade-restrictive 
alternative measures.  
In early alcohol control cases, the Court’s necessity review was ‘light touch’.54 In 
Aragonesa, restrictions on advertising in public places did ‘not appear to be manifestly 
unreasonable as part of a campaign against alcoholism’.55 In Commission v France (loi Evin) 
the Court found that ‘although there are less restrictive measures … there is not currently any 
measure which is less restrictive which can exclude or conceal indirectly television 
advertising for alcoholic beverages’.56 The review of necessity tended to pay greater attention 
to the viability of alternative alcohol control options, and to whether the Member State had 
exceeded its margin of discretion in electing to implement the measure it did. 
However, the CJEU’s review of necessity has become increasingly focussed on the 
substance of the measures under review. In Rosengren, the Court examined the merits of 
                                               
49
 Case C-434/04 Ahokainen ECLI:EU:C:2006:609, [2006] ECR I-9171, para 35. 
50
 Case C-394/97 Heinonen ECLI:EU:C:1999:308, [1999] ECR I-3599.  
51
 Rosengren (n 42) para 47.  
52
 Scotch Whisky (n 40) para 38. 
53
 ibid para 36.  
54
 A Alemanno and A Garde, ‘The emergence of EU lifestyle risk regulation: new trends in evidence, 
proportionality and judicial review’ in HW Micklitz and T Tridimas, Risk and EU Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 
164.  
55
 Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa ECLI:EU:C:1991:327, [1991] ECR I-4151, para 17.  
56
 Commission v France (loi evin) (n 47) para 34.  
monopoly rules on personal importing, distribution and age checks in depth, and concluded 
that the ban went ‘manifestly beyond what is necessary for the objective sought’,57 and that 
‘it does not appear that there is, in all circumstances, an irreproachable level of 
effectiveness’.58 Establishing ‘an irreproachable level of effectiveness’ of the chosen measure 
was not previously the objective of the necessity review. Member States have a margin of 
discretion in determining which measures are ‘likely to achieve concrete results’59 in pursuit 
of legitimate objectives, and may therefore give ‘regard to the particular social circumstances 
and to the importance attached … to [those] objectives’.60 Thus, the purpose of the necessity 
review should arguably be to ensure that Member States have demonstrated that they have 
not been unreasonable in deciding how to strike the balance between cross-border trade and 
public health interests. However, the necessity review conducted in Rosengren  purports to 
increase the intensity of the burden placed upon Member States to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and thus proportionality of their chosen measures. This arguably restricts the 
previous flexibility they enjoyed by requiring even greater diligence in adducing evidence to 
demonstrate the precise necessity of the measures chosen, where plausible and less trade 
restrictive alternatives may exist..  
The consequences of Rosengren can be observedin Scotch Whisky. The Court 
appeared to start from a presumption that alternative measures were more proportionate due 
to their being less restrictive of trade, and conducted an analysis of whether minimum unit 
pricing offered anything more towards the achievement of the legitimate objective than the 
alternatives.
61
 The Court states at one point that they were examining the ‘question as to 
whether it is possible to prefer the adoption of [a minimum unit price] to fiscal measures’.62 
The increased scrutiny of the substance of the measures chosen in light of potential 
alternatives eventually led the Court to conclude that the perceived additional benefits of 
increased taxation over minimum unit pricing ‘not only cannot constitute a reason to reject 
such a measure, but is in fact a factor to support that measure being preferred to the measure 
imposing [a minimum unit price]’.63 The Court nonetheless left it to national courts to assess 
this factor alongside any other relevant factors. 
Ultimately, one can observe a distinct intensification in the standard of the Court’s 
necessity review in alcohol control cases.– Instead of being largely content to enquire 
whether Member States overstepped their margin of discretion in deciding that certain 
measures were necessary to achieve certain objectives of alcohol control,, it now appears 
willing to examine the whether a measure is effective enough to warrant a particular level of 
trade restriction. This higher standard arguably makes it far more difficult to justify alcohol 
control measures that make greater restrictions on trade but offer greater public health 
benefits. This is because ‘as many factors may contribute to some health conditions, the 
causal link between a risk factor and the harm may be impossible to estimate with any degree 
of accuracy’.64 Such a standard arguably sidelines Member States’ traditionally broad margin 
of discretion to ‘decide what degree of protection they wish to ensure, and the manner in 
which that degree can be achieved’65 – an argument which is reinforced by the fact that in 
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Scotch Whisky the issue of discretion was mentioned only in order to support the assertion 
that Member States might adopt taxation measures over minimum unit pricing.
66
  
II.ii.c Issues arising from the Court’s review of the compatibility of alcohol control 
measures with the free movement of goods 
We can highlight two issues from the above analysis. First, it seems that the burden of proof 
has been placed far more stringently upon Member States to show that the bold, evidence-
based measures they have committed to pursue to comply with their WHO commitments are 
more effective than other measures that they could adopt. This is despite the fact that Member 
States have collectively agreed as WHO State Parties that pursuit of such measures as part of 
a multisectoral approach are likely to be effective, and should be pursued in order to reduce 
the burden of alcohol-related harm. Demonstrating the explicit need for strong alcohol 
control measures in isolation will be difficult, since Member States are urged to adopt them 
as part of a complex network of interdependent legal and non-legal measures,
67
 some of 
which perform very specific roles, meaning that their specific effects on other interests such 
as free trade may be balanced by other policies within the overall strategy.
68
 This makes it 
hard to explicitly demonstrate the projected public health effects of a particular alcohol 
control measure, and thus difficult to show in isolation that it is necessary as compared to 
other interventions that appear to achieve the same result.
69
 Thus, Member States face the 
problem of being committed to adopting a plethora of interlinked, evidence-based alcohol 
control measures, but unable to prove that every measure they adopt will make a contribution 
to reducing alcohol-related harm commensurate to the distortion of trade it may create by its 
very nature. The consequence is that pursuit of the full range of measures pursued at WHO 
level may potentially be compromised by the preclusion of certain measures at EU level.  
Second, in defence of the CJEU, European judges are not expert public health 
practitioners, nor do they have full knowledge of the circumstances driving alcohol policy in 
each Member State. They must therefore base their judgments on the  facts they are presented 
with , and are reliant upon Member States framing the objectives of measures and the 
evidence supporting their adoption in a clear and accurate manner. It is understandable, 
though regrettable, that when this does not happen the Court will not be able to reflect the full 
complexity of the evidence base or the national public health context in their legal 
assessments. For example, in Scotch Whisky the Court, when told that the MUP measure 
pursued a dual objective, were arguably misled into inappropriately comparing MUP and 
taxation, leading to an inaccurate application of the evidence base. The Court concluded that 
increased taxation of alcoholic beverages may be an effective alcohol control tool after 
analogously applying evidence presented to it on tobacco taxation. However it did not factor 
into its analysis that tobacco is a homogenous consumer product that is always harmful to 
health, and for which price increases are always desirable – whereas alcoholic beverages are 
an extremely heterogeneous set of products, consumption of which is not always harmful, 
and for which increasing prices in a blanket fashion through taxation is not always 
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appropriate.
70
 The Court’s task is indeed a difficult one -it may be asked to review individual 
measures out of the international public health context in which they were adopted, against a 
legal standard that is designed to protect economic interests, and which frames the issues to 
be analysed in terms of a simple dichotomy between trade restriction and public health 
protection. It should not therefore be surprising that it is difficult for the Court to fully factor 
the incredibly complex evidence base and the WHO-level commitments that the Member 
States have made into its legal analysis of complex matters of public health practice. 
Inevitably, when the Court’s capacity to achieve this is over-stretched, the outcomes can be 
disappointing from a public health perspective. 
The Member States’ internal market obligations should be approached within the 
context of the commitments that Member States have now made at WHO level topursue a 
multisectoral and evidence-based approach to alcohol control. However the development of 
the CJEU’s alcohol control case law has not been able to reflect the developing international 
public health context. Neither the Member States nor the CJEU can resolve this clash on their 
own – individual Member States are not in a position to determine how supranational legal 
frameworks make provision for the balancing of interests. EU regulatory intervention is 
therefore required if the EU legal framework is going to support rather than hinder Member 
States’ pursuit of their WHO commitments. The EU has a duty to help resolve issues that are 
generated by the cross-border nature of the alcohol trade. 
 
III. REGULATING THE CROSS-BORDER TRADE OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AT EU LEVEL  
As public health policy within the EU began to develop, the Member States agreed that the 
EU should be given the legal competence to act in the field of public health, to reflect the 
public health activities that had been taking place at European level for some time.
71
 This 
competence, introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, was subsequently strengthened when 
demands were made of the EU to step up its efforts to contain BSE.
72
 The latest revision of 
the EU Treaties specifically refers to the prevention of alcohol- and tobacco-related harm, 
while continuing to exclude ‘any harmonisation of the law and regulations of the Member 
States’. However, beyond this supportive competence in the field of health, the EU also has a 
mandate to adopt a high level of public health protection in the development and 
implementation of all its policies, including its internal market policy.
73
 Thus, the EU can 
rely on Article 114 TFEU – the EU’s general power to enact harmonisation measures which 
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have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market – to adopt 
alcohol control measures with cross-border implications.  
The EU legal mandate to ensure a high level of public health protection in all its 
policies, and therefore tackle cross-border issues arising from the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, is supplemented by a firm political mandate from Member States. In 2001 the 
European Council asked the European Commission to develop a ‘comprehensive Community 
strategy aimed at reducing alcohol-related harm’, 74  and in particular pushed for the 
Commission to ‘make full use of all Community policies’.75 These calls were reiterated in 
particular with the Council’s Conclusions on alcohol and young people in 200476 and those 
on alcohol and health in 2009.
77
 More recently, the European Parliament joined the chorus 
with its Resolution on Alcohol Strategy in 2015,
78
 which prompted yet another set of 
Conclusions from the Council.
79
  
However, it is clear that, over the years, the EU has failed to effectively mainstream 
the protection of public health in its internal market policy in light of existing evidence (III.i) 
and has ‘instrumentalised’ the principle of subsidiarity to minimise its intervention in this 
controversial policy area where political will has been lacking (III.ii).  
III.i The EU’s Failure to Fulfil its Obligation to Mainstream Public Health 
Concerns into its Internal Market Policy 
Article 168(1) TFEU requires that ‘A high level of human health protection shall be ensured 
in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.’ This 
‘mainstreaming’ obligation can also be found in Article 114(3) TFEU, and has been further 
reinforced following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with new Article 9 TFEU and 
Article 35 EU Charter. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that any policymaking in 
fields that could have either a positive or a negative impact on health are arranged in such a 
way as to have a positive impact upon health. Even though the threshold of what would 
constitute ‘a high level of public health protection’ remains undefined, these provisions 
nonetheless require the EU to place health concerns at the centre of the policy process and to 
give them sufficient consideration when balancing them against other interests, not least 
economic interests.  
Mainstreaming is particularly important if the issue at hand is as complex as alcohol 
control and requires a multisectoral response to the problems excessive alcohol consumption 
raises. It should help ensure that a given issue is treated consistently across multiple policy 
fields, when input from multiple policy fields – and therefore Directorates-General of the 
Commission – is required. 
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Public health mainstreaming was first seriously addressed at EU level during the 
Finnish Council Presidency in 2006, with the introduction of Health in All Policies,
80
 a 
strategic initiative that was intended to galvanise policymakers to consider health 
determinants controlled in sectors other than health. Health in All Policies was considered 
necessary on the grounds that: 
(a) the EU’s policies did not consider health appropriately, (b) the EU’s policy-making system did not 
utilize the available structures and mechanisms in the best possible way, from a public health point of 
view, and (c) simply, because an implementation shortfall was seen in how health was integrated in 
all community policies.
81
 
Health in All Policies therefore offered the EU an ideal opportunity to recognise that complex 
economic policies could have significant health impacts which it should in turn consider as 
part of its obligation to ensure a high level of public health protection in all its policies. 
Unfortunately, the EU did not seize this opportunity. 
III.i.a The EU alcohol strategy and the EU Forum 
The EU’s Alcohol Strategy of 2006-2012, which responded to the various calls for action 
discussed above, did not mention Health in All Policies, or indeed the EU’s mainstreaming 
obligations. There was very little discussion as to how the Strategy could be used as a vehicle 
through which to mainstream alcohol control concerns into other relevant policy areas: the 
Strategy was vague at best in this regard,
82
 and failed to provide any specific guidance as to 
how objectives related to the prevention of alcohol-related harm could be integrated into 
other EU policymaking areas. Even though the Commission stated that the EU would add 
value to Member State actions and deal with issues that they could not effectively handle on 
their own
83
 through ‘a coordinated strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm’,84 it did not take 
the opportunity to focus on ensuring coherence between the public health and internal market 
imperatives set out in the Treaties.  
This is all the more disappointing as the EU Alcohol Strategy presented itself as a 
comprehensive plan to reduce alcohol-related harm in Europe.
85
 The main part of the Strategy 
was in reality an exercise in mapping good practice – nothing novel was suggested, rather a 
brief selection of measures that Member States were already undertaking was presented, 
organised into five focus fields.
86
 In terms of the Strategy’s suggestions for how the EU itself 
could act to reduce alcohol-related harm, the options put forward were decidedly lacklustre 
and did not address the conflict between public health and free trade interests. The prospect 
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of EU harmonisation in response to cross-border concerns was specifically excluded. The 
proposals mostly advocated reliance on self-regulatory mechanisms.  
The EU Alcohol and Health Forum was set up in 2007 as the ‘cornerstone’87 of the 
EU Alcohol Strategy. Conceived of as a ‘Forum for action’,88 the Forum was a gathering of a 
broad range of stakeholders, from industry and hospitality operators to consumer and public 
health organisations. The founding Charter of the Forum required its members to ‘devote an 
increasing level of effort’89 to the commitments made within the Forum to reducing alcohol-
related harm, and to demonstrate how their commitments were contributing to reducing 
alcohol-related harm in a ‘transparent, participatory and accountable way’.90 However, the 
Forum did not live up to these expectations and never was the driver of action that it 
purported to be. Supposedly comprised of ‘experts from different stakeholder organisations 
and representative from Member States, other EU institutions and agencies’,91  in reality 
Forum membership comprised a disproportionately large number of industry operators,
92
 who 
have sought to use their position to shift policymaking towards weak, smokescreen 
interventions.
93
 Although the Forum was set up to cover a range of policy areas – from 
curbing underage drinking to commercial communications, education, enforcing age limits 
and changing consumer behaviour – 70% of active commitments on the Forum’s database94 
related only to education and responsible consumption. When one also considers that most 
Forum commitments were made by industry operators, it becomes clear that the Forum was 
not a vehicle for ‘concrete and verifiable’95 commitments, but rather the alcohol industry’s 
vehicle for the promotion of ineffective information-based interventions and personal 
responsibility rhetoric.
96
 Any hope that the Forum would be a way to ‘step up actions relevant 
to reducing alcohol related harms’ 97  was also misplaced. In 2012 a quarter of Forum 
members did not even submit a monitoring report on their commitments.
98
 The reports have 
also consistently failed to demonstrate the effectiveness of commitments.
99
  
Overall, the Forum – and somewhat by extension, the Strategy, which placed 
considerable reliance upon the Forum – cannot be considered a success. It acted as a vehicle 
for the promotion of conflicts of interest rather than the promotion of action.
100
 It therefore 
was no surprise that, in 2015, all the public health NGOs resigned from the Forum on the 
basis that it had failed to deliver the meaningful and durable contribution to addressing 
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alcohol-related harm that had been promised, precipitating its eventual collapse.
101
 The lack 
of any ambition in the EU Alcohol Strategy to implement a Health in All Policies approach to 
alcohol control is astonishing. The fact that the Commission has refused to develop another 
EU Alcohol Strategy to replace the 2006 Strategy, which expired in 2013, means that it has 
relinquished yet another opportunity to uphold its public health mainstreaming obligations 
with respect to alcohol control.  
While the EU Alcohol Strategy entrusted Member States with the adoption of 
comprehensive multisectoral strategies, it also explicitly acknowledged that:  
Studies carried out at national and EU level show that in some cases, where there is a cross border 
element, better coordination at, and synergies established with, the EU level might be needed. 
Examples include cross-border sales promotion of alcohol that could attract young drinkers, or cross-
border TV advertising of alcoholic beverages that could conflict with national restrictions. However, 
very few EU harmonizing rules have been adopted to date to combat alcohol-related harm.
102  
III.i.b The striking paucity of EU alcohol control harmonisation measures 
Ten years’ later, and despite growing awareness and commitments at international level, this 
is still the case.
103
 For the purpose of this chapter, we will focus on three regulatory 
instruments adopted as EU internal market measures to demonstrate the EU’s insufficient 
commitment to addressing the public health concerns resulting from the extensive cross-
border trade in alcoholic beverages.
104
  
The first area of EU regulatory intervention intended to reduce the harmful 
consumption of alcoholic beverages is the ban imposed on the use of nutrition and health 
claims on alcoholic beverages of more than 1.2% by volume of alcohol.
105
 Claims are often 
used by industry operators as a means to promote the characteristics of the foods they have 
placed on the market, and therefore constitute a potentially powerful tool to distinguish their 
goods from competing goods and influence consumer behaviour. More specifically, claims 
may ‘encourage consumers to make choices which directly influence their total intake of 
individual nutrients or other substances in a way which would run counter to scientific 
advice’.106 It is therefore not surprising that the validity of Article 4(3), which significantly 
limits the freedom of alcohol manufacturers and distributors to promote their products using 
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food claims, was challenged both during the legislative process that has led to the adoption of 
the Food Claims Regulation (i.e. ex ante)
107
 and after its adoption in a judicial review action 
before the CJEU (i.e. ex post).  
The question the CJEU was requested to answer was whether, by prohibiting the 
description of a wine as ‘easily digestible’ (‘bekömmlich’), Article 4(3) violated the freedom 
of a German winegrowers’ cooperative to choose an occupation and to conduct a business, 
under Articles 15 and 16 of the EU Charter.
108
 In its judgment, the Court placed a strong 
emphasis on Article 35 of the EU Charter, which requires that ‘a high level of human health 
protection be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the European Union’s 
policies and activities’, to dismiss the claim and uphold the validity of Article 4(3). After 
referring to the EU’s mainstreaming obligation laid down in Article 9 TFEU,109 the Court 
pointed out that ‘in view of the risks of addiction and abuse as well as the complex harmful 
effects known to be linked to the consumption of alcohol, in particular the development of 
serious diseases, alcoholic beverages represent a special category of foods that is subject to 
particularly strict regulation’.110 Thus, even if the claim is ‘substantively inherently correct 
in that it indicates reduced acidity levels’, it nonetheless remains ‘incomplete’ in that it is 
‘silent as to the fact that, regardless of a sound digestion, the dangers inherent in the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages are not in any way removed, or even limited’. 111 
Consequently, the EU legislature was ‘fully entitled’ to take the view that such claims on 
alcoholic beverages are misleading and that ‘the prohibition of such claims is warranted in 
the light of the requirement to ensure a high level of health protection for consumers’.112 This 
case provides a rare example of the EU’s attempt to effectively mainstream public health 
concerns in its internal market policy in that it recognises that exposure to alcohol marketing, 
through health and nutrition claims or otherwise, does ‘increase the risks for consumers’ 
health inherent in the immoderate consumption of any alcoholic beverage’.113 Subsequent 
case law unequivocally confirms that the CJEU will grant a broad margin of discretion to the 
EU when determining the extent to which public health concerns should justify a restriction 
to purely economic interests.
114
 
The second instrument of relevance which the EU has adopted on the basis of its 
internal market harmonisation powers stands in stark contrast with the Food Claims 
Regulation in that it exempts alcoholic beverages from some of the mandatory disclosure 
requirements it imposes on other foods. Regulation 1169/2011 on the food information 
provided to consumers requires the disclosure of information intended to help consumers 
make ‘informed’ food choices, referring specifically to the list of ingredients and the nutrition 
declaration.
115
 As such, it is very much in line with the information paradigm characterising 
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 However, if Article 9(1)(k) does require, as its 
predecessor did,
117
 that alcoholic beverages containing more than 1.2% by volume of alcohol 
should indicate their actual alcoholic strength by volume,
118
 Article 16(4) exempts them from 
the obligation to disclose the list of ingredients and make a nutrition declaration. The 
Commission should have produced a report by 30 December 2014 on whether alcoholic 
beverages should in future provide information on their energy value, and the reasons 
justifying possible exemptions. It was also asked to consider the need for a definition of 
‘alcopops’, which specifically target young people.119 Leaving aside the important fact that 
the Commission has not complied with this mandate, it would arguably have been far more 
preferable – and far less reckless – to presume that alcoholic beverages, whose harmful 
consumption poses a real public health threat, should have been covered in the first instance. 
Calling on industry operators to provide voluntary information
120
 will not lead to the level 
playing field required to promote a high level of public health protection, while it may in the 
longer term limit the freedom of Member States to do so at national level.  
 The third internal market measure of relevance is the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive (AVMSD) which, among others, sets down minimum standards on audiovisual 
commercial communications, including advertising, teleshopping, sponsorship and product 
placement.
121
 In particular, Article 9(1)(e) requires that ‘audiovisual commercial 
communications for alcoholic beverages shall not be aimed specifically at minors and shall 
not encourage immoderate consumption of such beverages’.122 This provision is a missed 
opportunity, not least because it does not sufficiently protect children from exposure to 
alcohol marketing, insofar as most of the television programmes which children watch are not 
‘aimed specifically’ at them and do not therefore have to be free from such marketing.123 If 
the Commission has somewhat recognised this concern, it proposes to address it by adding a 
new Article 9(3) in the AVMSD which would read as follows: 
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Member States and the Commission shall encourage the development of self- and co-regulatory codes 
of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial communications for alcoholic beverages. 
Those codes should be used to effectively limit the exposure of minors to audiovisual commercial 
communications for alcoholic beverages.
124  
Once again, the Commission merely reasserts its dogmatic belief in the virtues of self-
regulation. To make matters worse, it simultaneously proposes to further liberalise a range of 
provisions, which could increase the exposure of children to alcohol marketing. Two points 
are worth noting here. First, Article 23(1) would be amended to contain a daily limit on 
television advertising to replace the existing hourly limit: ‘The daily proportion of television 
advertising spots and teleshopping spots within the period between 7:00 and 23:00 shall not 
exceed 20%.’ This means that a broadcaster would have more flexibility to decide when to 
insert advertising and teleshopping spots in television programmes within the limits set by the 
Directive. One could venture the hypothesis that this would lead to more marketing in 
programmes with high audience thresholds, and less in programmes with low audience 
thresholds – with an overall increase in exposure to marketing and alcohol marketing more 
specifically.
125
 Second, product placement would be liberalised under Article 11. In the 
current version of the AVMSD, Member States have an option to ban product placement.
126
 
One positive change is that the ban on product placement would remain in ‘children’s 
programmes’ (as is currently the case) and would be extended to ‘programmes with a 
significant children’s audience’. This takes into account the fact that children can be – and 
often are – exposed to marketing even in programmes that are not classified as children’s 
programmes. Unfortunately, however, the notion of ‘significant’ seems to lay down a high 
threshold which will in turn allow industry operators to continue to promote their alcohol 
beverages when children are watching. This is particularly insidious in light of the report 
published alongside the proposed revision of the AVMSD that children are affected by 
embedded marketing even though they do not always recognise it and that they openly 
declare not to like it.
127
 The fact that the AVMSD is a minimum harmonisation directive only 
partially alleviates these concerns, as Member States who will want to seize the opportunity 
to implement stricter provisions than those contained in the AVMSD may be challenged on 
the ground that these measures are not compatible with the general free movement provision 
on the free movement of goods. Furthermore, the freedom which Member States have to 
regulate audiovisual commercial communications more strictly is limited by the country of 
origin principle.
128
 Overall, therefore, the Commission has not sufficiently taken on board all 
the evidence that has accumulated over the years on the exposure of children to alcohol 
marketing.  
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Bearing in mind 1) existing evidence supporting strong alcohol policies, 2) the EU’s 
public health mainstreaming obligations and 3) the Court’s case law on the compatibility of 
national alcohol control measures with general free movement provisions, it is indeed 
extremely difficult to comprehend why the EU has not done more in areas with a clear cross-
border effect, if this is not for its chronic lack of political will. 
III.ii The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Cloak for the EU’s Chronic Lack of Political 
Will to Adopt an Evidence-based EU Alcohol Policy 
The principle of subsidiarity has traditionally been invoked to guard against excessive EU 
regulatory intervention. In this instance, however, the EU has relied on this principle to 
significantly limit its regulatory intervention. The way the European Commission has 
interpreted the principle of subsidiarity in its EU Alcohol Strategy is to avoid using the 
Union’s competences at all, insisting that ‘there is no intention to substitute Community 
action to national policies … in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity … In particular 
the Commission does not intend as a consequence of this Communication to propose the 
development of harmonised legislation in the field of the prevention alcohol-related harm.’129 
We argue that this position is misconceived in that it ignores the fragmentation resulting from 
the Court’s case law and the impact such fragmentation has had on Member States’ freedom 
to adopt alcohol control policies.  
The principle of subsidiarity constrains EU action by requiring that: 
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at 
central or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, but better achieved at Union level.
130 
Despite ‘its lack of conceptual contours’,131 the principle of subsidiarity was never intended 
to be relied upon as a way out of the EU’s obligation to ensure that a high level of public 
health protection should be ensured in the development and implementation of all its policies, 
and more specifically its internal market policy. If it admittedly lays down a presumption in 
favour of decentralisation,
132
 it does not lay down an irrefutable presumption. In fact, 
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality require that the EU 
should legislate only to the extent necessary and that EU measures should leave as much 
scope for national decisions as possible, while securing the aim of the measure and observing 
the requirements of the Treaty.
133
 In other words, a rigorous subsidiarity analysis may not 
necessarily result in EU action being altogether avoided. The principle of subsidiarity may 
rather lead to an ‘extension of the activities of the Union within the framework of its powers 
when circumstances so require’.134 
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As Lyon-Caen noted shortly after the principle of subsidiarity was first introduced in 
the EU Treaty, ‘subsidiarity can cut both ways’.135 Furthermore, Article 3 of the Protocol also 
emphasises that: 
Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be applied in the light of the objectives set out in the 
Treaty. It allows Community action within the limits of its powers to be expanded where 
circumstances so require, and conversely, to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer 
justified. 
The Court’s growing case law on the compatibility of national measures with EU free 
movement provisions strongly suggests that EU legislation is necessary if the EU is to 
achieve the dual objective of establishing and ensuring the functioning of the internal market, 
while ensuring a high level of public health protection. Internal market objectives are better 
served if cross-border issues affecting all Member States are regulated by the EU at EU-level. 
This is the case even if Member States have suffered from the lack of harmonised rules to 
varying degrees, depending in particular on the extent to which they have attempted to 
develop national comprehensive, multisectoral and evidence-based alcohol control policies. 
Writing in relation to tobacco products, the Court recently stated: 
Even if the second of those objectives might be better achieved at the level of the Member States, the 
fact remains that pursuing it at that level would be liable to entrench, if not create, situations in which 
some Member States permit the placing on the market of tobacco products containing certain 
characterising flavours, whilst others prohibit it, thus running completely counter to the first objective 
of Directive 2014/40, namely the improvement of the functioning of the internal market for tobacco 
and related products. 
The interdependence of the two objectives pursued by the directive means that the EU legislature 
could legitimately take the view that it had to establish a set of rules for the placing on the EU market 
of tobacco products with characterising flavours and that, because of that interdependence, those two 
objectives could best be achieved at EU level.
136
  
It is concerning that the Commission purports to respect the principle of subsidiarity – a legal 
principle subject to judicial review – to hide its utter lack of political will to adopt evidence-
based standards with a view to addressing inherently cross-border issues that the free 
movement of goods and services has increased rather than alleviated and that the Court’s case 
law has put in sharp focus. Why would the fact that drinking patterns vary from one Member 
State to another, in itself, lead to the conclusion that regulating the labelling and the 
marketing of alcoholic beverages is more effectively done at national rather than at EU level? 
The fragmentation of the internal market will only be increased if Member States are left to 
regulate the labelling and marketing of alcoholic beverages at national level. As discussed 
above, such measures are classified for the purposes of Article 34 TFEU as either product 
requirements or certain selling arrangements that may not apply equally in law and in fact, 
leaving it to the CJEU to determine whether these measures are proportionate. As the Council 
Conclusions of December 2015 specifically emphasise, ‘an EU strategy can further support 
and complement national public health policies’,137 calling specifically on the Commission to 
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‘focus on initiatives on the reduction of alcohol-related harm with a cross-border dimension 
and an EU added value as a follow-up to the first EU Alcohol Strategy’.138  
By failing to apply the internal market logic to alcoholic beverages as it has in relation 
to tobacco products, the EU has instrumentalised the principle of subsidiarity to reach pre-
determined outcomes.
139
 This can only lead to increased regulatory fragmentation within the 
EU, thus depriving Member States from the certainty they should be able to hope for as to the 
compatibility of their alcohol control measures with EU free movement rules, and making it 
more difficult for them to uphold the international commitments they have made to reduce 
the burden of NCDs, and in particular the harm resulting from the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE EU’S FAILURE TO ENGAGE WITH 
EVIDENCE 
The necessity of engaging with evidence when making policy on public health issues such as 
alcohol control, is emphasised throughout the literature.
140
 Alcohol control will not be fully 
effective if the evidence on, among other things, how consumers behave in purchasing 
situations
141
 and the socio-economic environment in which alcohol consumption takes 
place,
142
 are not taken into account when developing and implementing policy. The 
desirability of factoring the latest evidence into public health policymaking is also reflected 
in Article 114(3), where internal market legislative proposals relating to health must ‘take as 
a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based 
on scientific facts’.   
It is therefore all the more regrettable that the Commission has largely failed to 
engage with existing evidence which suggests that measures affecting the price,
143
 
availability and accessibility
144
 of alcoholic beverages, as well as their advertising,
145
 will 
have the most impact in decreasing rates of excessive consumption. It is striking that the EU 
Alcohol Strategy prioritised the types of policy measures that have been found to have the 
                                               
138
 ibid para 21.  
139
 Alemanno and Garde (n 5). 
140
 See for instance: RC Brownson, JF Chriqui, and KA Stamatakis, ‘Understanding Evidence-Bases Public 
Health Policy’ (2009) 99(9) American Journal of Public Health 1576; R Room, T Babor and J Rehm, ‘Alcohol 
and public health’ (2005) 365(9458) Lancet 519; P Anderson, D Chisholm and DC Fuhr, ‘Effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness of policies and programmes to reduce the harm caused by alcohol’ (2009) 373 Lancet 2234.  
141
 J Janson and D Kysar, ‘Taking Behaviouralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation’ (1999) 
112(7) Harvard Law Review 1420; A Alemanno and A Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European 
Perspective (Hart 2015).  
142
 M Marmot, The Health Gap: The Challenges of an Unequal World (Bloomsbury 2015); J van Oers and 
others, ‘Alcohol consumption, alcohol-related problems, problem drinking, and socioeconomic status’ (1999) 
34(1) Alcohol and Alcoholism 78.  
143
 A Wagenaar, MJ Salois and KA Komro, ‘Effects of beverage alcohol price and tax levels on drinking: a meta 
analysis of 1003 estimates from 112 studies’ (2009) 104(2) Addiction 179. 
144
 C Campbell and others, ‘The effectiveness of limiting alcohol outlet density as a means of reducing excessive 
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms’ (2009) 37(6) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 556.  
145
 L Smith and D Foxcroft, ‘The effect of alcohol advertising, marketing and portrayal on drinking behaviour in 
young people: systematic review of prospective cohort studies’ (2009) 9 BMC Public Health 51.  
least impact, namely information and education,
146
 or harm reduction policies (which do not 
aim to reduce consumption of alcohol but its associated harms).
147
  
A comprehensive statement of the evidence base, funded by the Commission, was 
produced specifically to support the EU Alcohol Strategy.
148
 However, as one expert noted in 
evidence given to the European Union Committee of the House of Lords on the EU Alcohol 
Strategy, ‘a lot of that evidence did not get through into the strategy itself’.149 This is all the 
more curious in light of the fact that during the drafting process for the Strategy there were 
multiple references to evidence-based policymaking and many evidentially effective 
interventions were on the table – for example in June 2004 Member State representatives 
pushed to keep the option for legislation on commercial communications open, for an EU 
minimum purchase age, and for the role of industry operators to be more clearly defined, 
while in March 2005 the informal draft of the strategy proposed for example that the 
Commission would assess the possibility of placing special rates of excise duty on specific 
beverages that caused harm among young people.
150
 The fact that the final consensus on the 
main themes and content of the Strategy,
151
 as well as the final text, bore little relation to 
earlier work on the Strategy strongly suggests that a significant ‘watering down’ influence 
was exerted on the Commission’s work, highlighting its failure to engage properly with 
evidence – or perhaps its failure to resist those who lobby against an evidence-based 
approach when such an approach negatively impacts on their private economic interests.  
Most of the evidence on self-regulation and partnership with the alcohol industry 
points to its inefficacy, due to the inherent conflicts of interest, and merely supports the use of 
self-regulatory mechanisms if it is part of a wider legislative approach to alcohol control.
152
 
The Commission however has relied almost exclusively on the self-regulation and Forum 
commitments to drive the work of the EU Strategy, being so blind as to praise its work in 
assessments of the progress of the Strategy,
153
 and ignore the conflicts of interest such 
governance mechanisms unavoidably promote.
154
  
Nobody would dispute the complexity of designing an effective EU alcohol policy. 
What is more controversial is that the EU has hardly engaged with this complexity, despite its 
strong mandate to do so, and the plethora of evidence at its disposal. This will unavoidably 
make it much more difficult for Member States to uphold their commitment to reducing the 
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burden of NCDs by 2025.
155
 Nothing will ever replace the political motivation and courage 
which are currently lacking. The suggestion that the Commission should adopt evidence-
based policies, which limit the purely economic private interests of alcoholic beverage 
operators, in order to comply with its Treaty obligations to ensure a high level of public 
health protection for all, is unlikely to meet with any sympathy in Brussels – at least for the 
time being. 
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 17. Trade and health in the European Union 
Holly Jarman and Meri Koivusalo*  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the implications of the European Union’s (EU) external trade policies, 
including the negotiation of trade agreements, for EU internal policies that affect health. The EU’s 
internal policy context has been strongly shaped by the development of international trade law under 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).
1
 WTO treaties affect EU internal policies both directly, as the result of trade disputes 
affecting the EU or its Member States, as well as indirectly, on the basis of required legislative 
changes to Member States’ domestic laws. It is therefore important to consider the changing context 
of trade decision-making when examining the EU’s internal health policies. While historic WTO 
decisions concerned largely issues of food safety and environmental health (and these remain core 
issues that dominate public discourse on trade negotiations), extrapolating solely from existing WTO 
decisions to draw lessons for current EU health policymaking ignores a raft of potential problems 
associated with newer areas of trade policy that are currently under negotiation. 
The earliest trade disputes between the EU and the United States (US) under the GATT were 
often concerned with the more stringent regulatory requirements of the US, for example, in areas of 
environmental health. This changed in the 1990s with the introduction of the WTO dispute settlement 
process.
2
 From then onwards, discussions about the link between the EU’s health policies and its trade 
policies centred on the substantive area of food regulation and the legal issue of the precautionary 
principle. They were shaped by two dispute settlement cases in particular: a Canadian challenge to the 
EU regarding occupational health and asbestos regulation
3
 and an American challenge to the EU 
regarding hormones in beef production.
4
 The EU was also subject to a WTO dispute settlement claim 
in relation to the banning of antimicrobial treatment of poultry in 2009.
5
 A potential case concerning 
the use of antibiotics in animal production was high on the policy agenda when the CJEU upheld a 
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restriction (in Pfizer) and the US immediately threatened a challenge under trade law.
6
 Trade-related 
concerns regarding EU regulation of aflatoxins have also been addressed under the WTO, as EU 
standards on aflatoxins have remained much lower than international Codex Alimentarius standards 
and lower than, for example, aflatoxin standards required by the US.
7
 
While the implications of these decisions for EU internal policies have been somewhat 
limited,
8
 the decisions directly challenged the place of the precautionary principle within the EU’s 
broader policy framework.
9
 These past dispute settlement cases also go some length to explain why 
public attention has been drawn to the potential impacts on food safety and environmental health 
regulations from a new era of transatlantic negotiations on trade. In many EU States, the impact on 
food safety and quality has been the subject of much polemic, especially in discussion of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
10
 
Direct trade policy-related challenges to EU health-related internal policies have been more 
limited in other fields under the WTO’s purview, such as services and intellectual property rights.11 
However, reliance on past trade agreements and dispute settlements to draw implications for current 
and future health law as the only reference is problematic due to the changing trade policy context. 
Governments, including those of the EU, are seeking trade negotiations towards plurilateral and 
bilateral agreements with a very broad focus on services, investment, government procurement, 
intellectual property rights and regulatory cooperation.
12
 Many health-related policies –from 
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regulations designed to protect public health, to laws governing the distribution and sale of medicines 
and medical devices, to the financing and management of health systems – could potentially fall into 
those categories. It is only through two slow and relatively closed parallel processes – international 
trade negotiations on the one hand, and internal bargaining among the EU institutions and Member 
States on the other – that this policy space will be gradually defined. 
The change in EU trade policy is in part a response to the faster and more aggressive US 
negotiation of free trade agreements with third countries, which allows some to argue that the EU is 
falling behind and letting the US gain both commercial advantage and a major role shaping trade law. 
The desire for further EU trade agreements can be seen as a response to an international trend for 
‘competitive liberalization’ strategies in which developing free trade agreements is part of a broader 
economic policy strategy.
13
 Understanding the EU’s direction of travel thus requires us to focus also 
on the context, content and direction of current negotiations. Food safety might have dominated trade 
disputes in the past, but the new generation trade agreements currently under negotiation have the 
potential to constrain policy space for health in many more areas. The following sections focus first 
on the current authority of the EU to make trade law and policy and the impacts of this on health 
policy spaces, before turning to a discussion of recent EU trade negotiations and their impact on 
health. 
 
II. CURRENT DIMENSIONS OF EU TRADE LAW AND POLICY 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON HEALTH 
Current EU trade policy is a complex domain that can be mapped along two dimensions: changes in, 
and challenges to, the jurisdiction and competence of EU institutions; and the impact of those changes 
and related trade negotiations on the available policy space for health. EU and international law are 
not separate, but rather all of one piece, with mandates for trade negotiations dependent upon internal 
EU competences. While a series of treaty changes and court decisions, described elsewhere in this 
volume, has moulded available policy space for health at the EU level, a parallel series of 
international trade negotiations has constrained the political space available to enact public policies 
within the EU and its Member States, including those aimed at protecting and promoting health. 
II.i Jurisdiction and Competence 
Over time, EU trade policymaking has evolved from a closed process dominated by governments of 
Member States to a more open, multiparty decision-making process under the EU’s ordinary 
legislative procedure. The central EU institutions historically had exclusive competence over trade 
issues through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and the EU has long held exclusive 
competence over trade in goods. But as the subject matter of trade policy has become more complex, 
going beyond the governance of tangible products, questions of competence over trade have become 
more complex also – to the extent that not even the EU institutions themselves are always clear about 
matters of competence.
14
 In Opinion 1/94, the CJEU ruled that the EU and Member States shared 
competence over key aspects of the WTO’s new trade agenda – most of trade in services and matters 
of intellectual property. This meant that the core new agreements negotiated under the World Trade 
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Organisation in these areas (the General Agreement on Trade in Services
15
, or GATS and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS) had to be concluded 
as ‘mixed’ agreements.16 Opinion 1/94 and similar decisions that followed were subsequently codified 
– but not really clarified – through the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties,17 leaving matters of jurisdiction 
far from clear. 
The Lisbon Treaty
18
 attempted to fix this confusion, confirming that the EU institutions can 
exercise exclusive competence in all areas of trade in services (except transport) and trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property. The Treaty also allowed the EU to move towards competence in 
investment, although not without leaving some lingering legal questions.
19
 This is a matter where 
different views continue to co-exist, causing significant legal uncertainty that can only be countered 
by further judgments or treaty negotiations. For example, the European Commission consulted the 
CJEU with respect to its competence to conduct negotiations concerning investment protection in the 
recent EU-Singapore FTA Agreement.
20
 
In a significant departure from previous practice in which consensus was the rule, the 
architects of the Lisbon Treaty hoped to streamline decision-making on trade by emphasising the 
ability of the Council to make decisions by qualified majority. But again, the situation is more 
complex than it appears at first glance. Article 207(4)(b) TFEU, which sets out the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy, requires the Council to act unanimously to negotiate and conclude 
agreements involving trade in social, education and health services, ‘where these agreements risk 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of 
Member States to deliver them’. 
This carve-out for health, social and education services in the Lisbon Treaty deliberately 
follows the wording of CJEU decisions with respect to the sustainable financing of health services in 
the context of EU Treaty obligations.
21
 The initial Nice and Lisbon Treaty connection between 
unanimous decisions on audiovisual services and those on so-called ‘sensitive’ services (health, 
education and social services) has, however, become broken in the context of trade negotiations. This 
is clear, for example, in the now-declassified TTIP negotiation mandate, where audiovisual services 
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are excluded, but health services are not.
22
 Health, social or educational services thus remain in a legal 
grey area. 
The role of the European Parliament (EP) in trade policymaking was also strengthened by the 
Lisbon Treaty, with the EP gaining a more significant say in the approval process on the basis of 
Article 218 TFEU.
23
 The potential power of the EP to derail trade deals was shown in the context of 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
24
 Using the powers conferred on them by the 
Lisbon Treaty for the first time, MEPs voted to reject ACTA, preventing the deal from becoming law 
in the EU and scuppering it globally. Despite the EP’s new role, however, the negotiation of trade 
agreements still mostly occurs under the purview of the Member States and the Commission. Talks on 
the recent Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), for example, were initiated before impact 
assessments were conducted and without the EP approving a mandate for the negotiations.
25
 The EP 
responded to this in its assessment of and guidance regarding TiSA in 2016 by including clear red and 
green lines as well as many detailed recommendations.
26
 
The ‘mixity’ of trade agreements also continues to matter because it determines the process 
by which such agreements can be ratified. Non-mixed agreements, where competence falls entirely 
under the purview of the central EU institutions, need to be approved in the Council, usually by 
qualified majority, and by the European Parliament. Mixed agreements, however, have to be approved 
not only by the Council and the European Parliament, but also voted through by national parliaments 
– a significant complication given the number and diversity of legislatures as well as frequent hostility 
towards the European project.  
Since negotiating a mandate for the EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement of 2012, the Council has 
implemented a workaround for this problem.
27
 Using a ‘double-decision’ mechanism, the Council 
provides two separate authorisations for the Commission to negotiate trade deals – one which refers to 
matters of exclusive competence, and another for matters of shared competence.
28
 This uncertainty 
around competences in ‘sensitive’ areas such as health and the workarounds implemented to 
circumvent them have important consequences for trade policy outcomes. Controversial ‘mixed’ areas 
of negotiation (such as investment protection in the CETA agreement) may be claimed by negotiators 
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to be part of the overall trade deal, but this may not be the case in practice once all the actors have had 
their say. 
In short, the EU’s competence to conduct trade negotiations and conclude trade agreements 
draws from its internal competences to shape the European internal market.
29
 This implies two kinds 
of challenges for EU governance. First, in terms of substantive policy areas, where the European 
Commission requires competence in order to negotiate trade agreements on those topics. Second, on 
how changing internal policies and actors’ understanding of competence affects trade negotiations. 
EU law is not distinct and separate from external international trade law – rather, both are created and 
developed in connection with trade negotiations. This can be seen in the context of the new 
transparency directive
30
 or the importance of TTIP negotiations for the Commission’s political 
guidelines,
31
 work-programme,
32
 and recent internal market strategy,
33
 but also as a longer-term 
policy development within EU trade policy.
34
  
Internal policies matter also to the extent that health care reforms within EU Member States 
establish new healthcare markets. In many EU Member States in recent years, the role of contractual 
relationships between government agencies, funders and private actors has increased within 
healthcare systems. The 2011 Directive on Patients’ Rights in Cross-border Healthcare35 and updated 
legislation affecting the mobility of health professionals
36
 have also created their own dynamics 
within the EU with potential relevance, in particular, for trade in professional services and health 
tourism. Health tourism has gained attention in the context of trade in services as a potential future 
avenue for business development and it is also sought as part of negotiation of trade agreements. 
Greater portability of social security benefits could potentially increase trade in health services 
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between the EU and middle- and lower-income countries. It has also been proposed that US patients 
could seek out care in Europe, as costs of care remain lower in the EU. It may not be solely accidental 
that the European Commission has included text regarding the mobility of patients in its trade 
agreements.
37
 In the CARIFORUM agreement between the EU and Caribbean countries, for example, 
the mobility of patients was enabled for privately-funded health services.
38
 With the exception of few 
Member States’ reservations, health tourism (mode 2) was also further expanded in the EU-Korea 
FTA for privately-funded trade in health services.
39
 Despite these aspirations, the volume of trade in 
health services still remains low for all EU Member States.
40
 Nevertheless, health tourism provides a 
perfect example of the linkages between the EU’s internal market and the policies that govern it, and 
the ability of the EU Commission to negotiate regarding those sectors as part of its trade policy. 
Dealing with health issues as part of trade negotiations immediately places health in the background 
and brings economic issues to the fore, impacting available policy space for health. 
II.ii Policy Space for Health 
Since the late twentieth century, as more complex regulatory and services issues have come to be 
considered ‘trade’ issues, questions of competence have become more complex and uncertain. The so-
called ‘new generation’ trade agreements – such as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SSFTA), the plurilateral Trade 
in Services Agreement (TiSA) and the EU-USA Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) – extend much further into national regulatory contexts and so-called ‘beyond-border’ 
measures. While most of these agreements apply to services, government procurement and investment 
as new areas of focus, the TTIP is the broadest. 
Governing tariffs and trade in goods as it applies to medicines, medical devices, alcohol or 
tobacco, while far from problem-free, remains a simpler matter than governing intellectual property 
rights, regulatory cooperation, investment protection, government procurement, State-owned 
enterprises or, more broadly, the context of trade in health services – which include the provision of 
health services across borders (e.g., electronic delivery of services, consultation, or surveillance), the 
movement of patients across borders, rules governing the commercial presence of health-oriented 
foreign companies, or the movement of medical professionals into and out of the EU. Add to this 
cross-border complexity the sensitivity of EU Member State governments and Europeans themselves 
to changes in their health systems and it is not difficult to see why trade and health issues are both 
politically fraught and legally uncertain.  
EU policies designed to promote and protect its large internal market do not always mesh well 
with its collective social and health policies or the health systems of its Member States. This is 
apparent not only in the context of external trade, but as well with respect to internal policies. The 
challenges of maintaining policy space for health apply at both the EU level (e.g., food security, 
standard-setting) and in national policy spaces with respect to the governance and financial 
sustainability of national health systems. While some accommodations can be made within EU 
policies in order to maintain governments’ ability to plan for and maintain capacity within their health 
systems in the areas of government procurement service provision, this ‘wiggle room’ can be lost as 
part of trade policies.  
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Policy space for health can be defined as the ‘freedom, scope, and mechanisms that 
governments have to choose, design and implement public policies to fulfil their aims’. 41  Trade 
agreements restrict this policy space as part of the negotiation process. The further and deeper trade-
related obligations reach into national policies, the greater their impact upon policy space for health 
tends to be. This has become reflected, in particular, in the focus on exceptions and exclusions aiming 
to protect health policy space and by debates emphasising the right to regulate for health. 
  
III. THE ROLE OF GENERAL AND HEALTH AND PUBLIC 
SERVICES EXCLUSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW-
GENERATION TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRADE LAW 
Exceptions in trade policy are of importance for health systems both in the context of EU internal 
markets as well as in relation to the negotiation of trade agreements themselves. Policy space for 
health is shaped by the necessity of maintaining existing policy space under internal market and treaty 
obligations, including for measures on sustainable financing of health systems and government 
procurement, and also of ensuring that trade negotiations do not expose national legislation to 
additional measures, such as requirements for investment protection in all sectors.  
In practice, exceptions for healthcare are based on general exceptions in the core of trade 
agreements and specific exclusions as part of Member State schedules. General exceptions for 
services are usually based on GATS Article 1.3, which applies to services chapters. Chapters of trade 
agreements regarding financial services usually have a similar exclusion for social security. This 
general exception is particularly important in States where private actors are involved as part of a 
national social security system. The GATS Article 1.3 exclusion is, however, drawn very narrowly, 
and does not include services in competition with publicly-provided services. This narrow definition 
is problematic, as described by Arena:
42
 
if governmental services under Article I:3(b) GATS are identified exclusively by reference to the two 
negative criteria in Article I:3(c) GATS, virtually all public services could be subject to the GATS, 
thus making the exemption meaningless.  
Practically every health system has some element of competition between public and private services, 
so this principle, if not qualified, could make the healthcare exception almost meaningless.  
Another route to exclusion is through specific schedules, which can be based on positive 
listing (in the GATS agreement, for example) or negative listing (such as in the CETA agreement). 
The EU has, for example, included an EU-level general exclusion for health services receiving any 
public funding. However, this exclusion covers only ‘sensitive’ services and not all public services. 
The positive news in terms of policy space is that this new exclusion is broader than previous EU 
exclusions for public utilities as it covers all modes and ‘any measures’, however, it also allows the 
European Commission to change what is included under this exclusion for health services. As 
complexity in trade agreements has increased, what has been excluded under Annexes may become 
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undermined on the basis of textual provisions in other chapters or provisions that define whether 
exclusions apply and how they are applied.
43
 The case of investment liberalisation is of importance as 
foreign investors already in a Member State can gain access to investor-State-dispute settlement if 
national regulations put foreign investors in less competitive positions than their domestic 
counterparts.
44
 To date, foreign investors have often been deterred by the strength and complexity of 
healthcare regulation, so giving them extra-territorial means to challenge regulations could change 
both relevant markets and policy space.  
In addition, excluding health services is useful only if it gives additional policy space for 
governments to act in the future – preserving the status quo is not enough. Particularly challenging are 
circular statements sometimes found in trade agreements that bind the right to regulate to compliance 
with provisions of the negotiated agreement as these are of little value in providing more policy space 
and merely state the obvious. 
The emphasis in these agreements and public statements on not lowering existing standards is 
relevant, but slightly compromised by the fact that trade agreements tend to be based on existing 
legislation in any case. The real policy space issues emerge when governments seek to impose new 
measures, that are more trade- and investment-restrictive than anticipated or in other countries or 
intentionally or unintentionally put foreign providers or investors in a worse competitive situation 
than local service providers or investors. It is not that hard to write trade law that freezes existing 
policies; it is harder to write trade law that preserves policy space for future policies. Bearing this in 
mind, the next section reviews the new generation of trade agreements currently under negotiation. 
 
IV. THE STATE OF CURRENT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: 
SHAPING THE WAY FORWARD 
IV.i Current Trade Negotiations and their Likely Impact on Health 
Driven by the EU’s severe economic problems, the consequent need to preserve political unity among 
its Member States, and perceived competition from other big global markets such as China, the EU 
has negotiated a series of large trade deals with key partners. These include the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement (TTIP) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). All three of these 
agreements are likely to be considered ‘mixed’ agreements for the purposes of ratification. They are 
all considered as ‘new generation’ trade agreements, covering not only tariffs and trade in goods, but 
also trade in services, investment and other areas of regulation. As part of a new generation of 
                                               
43
 A suitable example is the EU services proposal for TTIP negotiations as Member State exclusions no longer 
apply to operational aspects of national treatment of investors, which now cover only establishment. Without 
further discussion Member States have given foreign investors within the country a substantial advantage as 
they will have access to investor-State-dispute settlement if national treatment obligations are breached. 
Commission, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce’ 
(Proposal for Discussion 12–17 July 2015). 
44
 ibid, this draws from the Articles concerning the scope of investment protection. See Commission, 
‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and e-Commerce: Chapter II – 
Investment’ (Commission TTIP Draft Text, made public 12 November 2015) and Commission, ‘Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union’ 
(Consolidated Text) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf> accessed 20 
June 2016. 
agreements that will impact all future negotiations, their importance goes way beyond their current 
structure and substantive content. 
IV.i.a The EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA) 
The EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA)
45
 was the first fully-
negotiated new-generation trade agreement to introduce negative listing for excluded services as well 
as negotiation on investment protection. From the perspective of European health systems, potential 
implications from CETA arise from both of these features. 
Canadian negotiators made a commitment not to include health and social services under the 
agreement, as reflected in the scope of the exclusion of health services from investment liberalisation 
and from domestic regulation under CETA. However, this is not the case in relation to investment 
protection, where the agreement’s provisions cover health services. In practice, the governments were 
also restricted by their past commitments as part of scheduling services under WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services as CETA negotiations built on and expanded what had already been 
agreed to under WTO. 
A crucial aspect of CETA for EU Member States is thus whether investment protection and 
investor-State-dispute settlement should be part of the agreement. CETA has also been seen as the 
‘Trojan horse’ agreement – bringing in investment protection by stealth under the guise of an ordinary 
trade agreement. The EU’s recent public consultation on investment protection, which made headlines 
for the scale and negativity of the responses, focused on CETA provisions.
46
 The EU has since 
negotiated a similar investment chapter as part of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. This 
includes investment protection as well as extensive provisions for investment liberalisation, 
suggesting that pushing liberalisation to cover all foreign investment within countries (national 
treatment) is on the European Commission’s offensive, rather than defensive agenda. It seems, in 
other words, that the Commission views the economic advantages of investment liberalisation as 
outweighing potential threats to internal EU public policies.  
CETA is not expected to have substantial implications for the EU in other fields of 
negotiation, but the agreement has also gained less scrutiny in other aspects. Regarding medicines, the 
agreement has implications for Canada due to the increased delay of entry of generic medicines to 
Canadian markets and no possibility of imposing a requirement for innovativeness as part of data 
exclusivity requirements.
47
 While, from a public health point of view, the EU could have applied 
Canadian measures to limit the cost of medicines, such liberalisation is not the direction of travel.  
CETA will remain particularly influential on future trade policy due to its inclusion of 
negative listing and investment protection, but also because the European Commission negotiated a 
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new version for an investment court system as part of the CETA investment protection provisions in 
late stages of negotiations.
48
 The EU claims that this new multilateral investment court system, though 
yet to be constituted, would be more permanent and adhere to a better code of ethics, addressing some 
of the common complaints targeted at existing ad hoc, secretive investor-State dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
49
 
IV.i.b The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) 
Receiving far less scrutiny to date is the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), which is currently 
being negotiated by the EU and 22 other members of the WTO. The agreement seeks to extend the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in a number of service areas, and is likely to form 
the global template for rules governing trade in services, since once it is complete other countries will 
be encouraged to participate. The countries included under TiSA negotiations are diverse, ranging 
from Pakistan to the US. It is likely that TiSA negotiations will also form the basis for TTIP 
negotiations on services. Little is known publicly about the content of the negotiations, however, we 
do know that Turkey proposed to include trade in health services, including patient mobility and the 
portability of health insurance, on the TiSA agenda in a document that was leaked in 2014.
50
 
The EU has already expanded mode 2 commitments (which cover patient mobility and health 
tourism) for privately-funded health services in the EU-Caribbean and EU-Korea Free Trade 
Agreements. The inclusion of health tourism under trade agreements creates a concern also for the 
TTIP as the only restriction that US has made under GATS applies to reimbursement of costs from 
health tourism,
51
 and a number of EU Member States have not excluded health tourism at all in WTO 
negotiations. The extent to which the European Commission can negotiate in the area of patient 
mobility is likely to define how and on what basis this will be negotiated and dealt with under TiSA 
and TTIP.
52
 It is important to note that obligations with respect to national treatment in services trade 
are made in the context of the comparative competitive positions of foreign and domestic industry 
rather than the content of legislation as such. Under national treatment provisions, trade-related 
considerations generally extend to legislation which is the same (de jure) for foreign and national 
providers, but may put foreign providers in competitive disadvantage (de facto). The GATS dispute 
settlement case under the WTO on anti-gambling laws in the US implies that banning a service could 
also become understood as a market access quota of zero, and thus become incompatible with trade 
policy commitments.
53
 This is a slightly different concept of non-discrimination than the equivalent 
found in much EU law, and one that is more favourable to foreign investors in the regulated industry.  
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 This is currently negotiated on behalf of Member States. However, considering that the Commission is 
enhancing the implementation of the patient directive and mobility of patients, it is likely that taking up this 
competence more strongly as part of trade policies may be restricted more on the ground of political, rather than 
legal or jurisdictional matters. 
53
 On US-Gambling see, for example, F Ortino, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in 
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TiSA negotiations also include proposals on like treatment of mutualities (mutual societies).
54
 
The role of mutualities, public-private partnerships and non-profit organisations in service provision 
as well as requirements for local contracts or presence may come to be affected by trade negotiations 
as well as government measures seeking to restrict or limit profiteering. While investment protection 
is likely to be the main context for profit-related matters, negotiations on trade in services may also 
push towards commercialisation through imposition of the same regulatory context to all healthcare 
providers irrespective of their background and focus. There are particular questions with respect to 
domestic regulation in trade agreements such as TiSA which can be drawn to the potential and scope 
of excluding a public ‘option’ on the basis of domestic regulation. Doing so involves fulfilling related 
criteria on ‘impartiality’ or through explicit reference of government roles as complementary and 
residual as has been made in the context of some TiSA negotiation proposals in other services areas 
(postal services).
55
  
Although TiSA negotiations have not included investment protection provisions or investor-
State dispute settlement mechanisms, it does include a push towards expanding inclusion of services 
through horizontal inclusion of national treatment and negotiations on intra-corporate personnel 
transfers and activities.
56
 The role, transparency and mobility of data is a matter for TiSA negotiations. 
Data governance is likely to have implications for health systems, privacy and access to information, 
yet is unlikely to be discussed under health services restrictions. TiSA also includes negotiations on 
government procurement and financial services, which are likely to have implications for health 
services. In contrast to TTIP, the broad participation of countries in TiSA brings up concerns over 
different regulatory contexts in healthcare as well as potential consequences from health tourism such 
as the spread of antimicrobial resistance across healthcare systems for countries where multi-resistant 
strains have been found in their healthcare systems.
57
 While the ‘portability’ of health insurance or 
mobility of patients could be seen as part of the European Commission’s agenda, it is clear that the 
consequences of insurance portability and patient mobility could have implications for the 
sustainability of financing of healthcare, which is clearly a Member State competence.  
IV.i.c The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
TTIP is the most comprehensive of the trade agreements currently under negotiation, with the 
broadest regulatory implications for health systems. While the EU and US both represent high-income 
populations, their health systems differ substantially in terms of their financing and organisation. 
Services negotiations under TTIP will build on what is agreed under TiSA. However, it is generally 
assumed that the greatest implications from TTIP for health systems will result from its intellectual 
property rights (IPR) provisions, pharmaceutical pricing policies and investment protections. Under 
TTIP’s IPR provisions, further implications could emerge from potential trade secret provisions 
already under discussion within the EU.
58
 Biologicals and issues with respect to biosimilars can 
become important for access to medicines, but some aspects of negotiations such as Good 
Manufacturing Practice inspections for drugs and devices producers are more geared towards 
addressing third parties. However, as a result of sensitivities and scrutiny around pharmaceuticals and 
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pricing policies, it is possible that more controversial aspects could come to be negotiated under other 
more general provisions, such as State-owned enterprises, regulatory cooperation, transparency or 
investment protection.
59
 This being said, to the extent that the US and EU emphasise joint 
presentation of views and participation in regulatory forums and discussions, there will be limited 
scope for the EU to depart from US stances on pharmaceuticals in other global forums such as the 
World Health Organisation, United Nations or WTO.
60
 
Pharmaceutical pricing in the EU is also likely to be affected by TTIP negotiations. A crucial 
issue with respect to EU policies is to what extent negotiations will apply to pharmaceutical policies, 
reimbursement and pricing in Germany, where opposition to TTIP is higher than in many other 
countries.
61
  
TTIP is likely to affect health systems through liberalisation of investment and in some 
Member States also as part of trade in services. If trade law on government procurement includes 
health services and government procurement provisions override exclusions as part of Annexes, this 
will have implications for health systems. Requirements for competition and pro-competitive 
regulation will have implications for health systems if regulatory cooperation and competition 
chapters cover all services and national policies. If the chapter on State-owned enterprises apply to all 
services, it will constrain regulation and organisation of public-private partnerships and publicly-
funded organisations and institutions, when these operate in competition with commercial providers 
or engage with commercial activities, and can have major consequences for health systems.
62
 
Underlining the connection between internal and external markets in the EU, it is likely that some 
issues to be negotiated, such as those related to standardisation, professional mobility or regulatory 
cooperation, will be initially discussed as part of the EU’s new internal market strategy.63  
TTIP focuses heavily on regulatory cooperation, seeking to establish a new transatlantic 
regulatory dialogue between the EU and US.
64
 Negotiations will apply to ‘technical barriers to trade’ 
(which often look like public policies to those who do not share the deregulatory perspective of trade 
lawyers) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The emphasis of the regulatory dialogue will be on 
procedural issues, rather than standard-setting as such. Nevertheless, by seeking to define onerous 
measures and make the regulatory environments of the EU and US more similar, as well as by 
including requirements to seek the views and presence of stakeholders before regulatory measures can 
be taken, any new dialogue may well restrict the capacity of governments to regulate alone.  
TTIP also contains a new article on animal production and antibiotic resistance. While the 
inclusion of this article can be seen as a means of enhancing best practices for antibiotics use in 
animal production,
65
 it can also be seen as legitimating the use of antibiotics in animal production in 
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Member States, where this has been banned. Furthermore, there is already EU-USA cooperation 
under the Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) in relation to treatment 
policies.
66
 There is thus a risk that overly-close cooperation could limit the scope of the EU’s support 
for global measures and governance with respect to antibiotic resistance. 
TTIP’s intellectual property rights negotiations will also have implications for health systems, 
but the actual relevance of those sections of TTIP to health will be difficult to assess until a text is 
available. The likely impact from further enhancement of IPR protection would be reflected in the 
form of delay of entry of generics to EU markets. This would imply increased costs of new medicines. 
While no account of what has been negotiated so far has been made public, it is likely that some 
aspects would follow similar provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal recently 
concluded among 12 Pacific Rim countries, including the US.
67
 Trade secret and transparency 
provisions may have implications to access to knowledge and governance, including with respect to 
clinical trials, where European measures to enhance transparency were highlighted in the influential 
US pharmaceutical industry report for the US Trade Representative in 2013.
68
 However, the most 
controversial concern about the negotiation is with investment protection and arbitration measures.  
IV.ii Investment Protection, Arbitration and Ongoing Legal Uncertainty 
Investment protection remains the most controversial part of trade and investment agreements because 
investors can claim compensation from governments through private arbitration panels. Even if the 
investors lose, the cost of a case can be a deterrent to strong regulatory policy for poorer countries, 
and the extra hurdles it creates can slow policymaking anywhere. The need for investment arbitration 
between high income countries – where domestic courts likely provide transparent and fair means of 
redress – can also be questioned. Investment arbitration evolved as a way to protect foreign investors 
from the kinds of expropriation and nationalisation found in countries with a less pro-capitalist 
politics or a weaker rule of law, not as a way to challenge any regulations that interfere with a given 
investment’s profitability, yet this is how some companies would like to characterise such 
mechanisms. 
The role of investment protection in relation to European health law remains so far limited. 
However, the potential for further implications for national health law as well as more restrictive 
changes under EU health law could be substantial. It is anticipated that one of the main implications 
would arise from ‘regulatory chill’ as a result of claims and threat of claims as part of policy process. 
This is relevant, in particular, for public health measures, health promotion and health protection. The 
most well-known cases to date are against tobacco control measures in Australia and Uruguay, where 
tobacco firms launched investment disputes using bilateral investment treaties despite simultaneously 
pursuing their respective cases in domestic courts.
69
 Although not currently subject to legal arbitration, 
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similar issues exist with respect to alcohol policies and alcohol control. This is the case for both 
CETA and TTIP, as both Canada and the US maintain alcohol restrictions.
70
 
A number of other high-profile international arbitration cases (and corresponding cases in the 
highest domestic courts) currently contribute to the climate of political and legal uncertainty around 
trade and health issues in the EU. One of the cases is the so-called Micula-Brothers case, which is 
likely to have directly contributed to the explicit exclusion of subsidies from investment protection.
71
 
There are several arbitration cases that are of relevance to health systems. These have been applied to 
government decisions to withdraw or limit privatisation. Achmea (Eureko) challenged Poland when 
the government withdrew from privatisation plans and Poland was required to compensate.
72
 Slovakia 
was challenged by the same company due to its requirement that in publicly-financed health insurance 
services the returns should be invested back into healthcare system.
73
 However, the company lost a 
third case where it sought to influence the legislative process on the ground that it had no case as no 
legal action has taken place yet.
74
 These specific cases are, under investment agreements, signed 
before EU accession and should be phased out since there is no space in EU law for bilateral 
investment treaties between Member States. Nonetheless, the cases show some of the options that 
bilateral investment treaties create for investors dissatisfied with government measures. In the light of 
commercialisation and contractualisation of healthcare systems across European countries it is likely 
that government efforts to contain costs could become a focus for investment arbitration, if these 
measures seriously limit the returns expected to be gained from the investment or end up putting 
foreign investors in a different position compared to local public, non-governmental or other forms of 
operators, such as mutualities.   
Health systems spend substantial amounts on medicines and new health technologies. This 
implies that decisions concerning ICT and data systems, medical technologies and medicines are a 
potential focus for arbitration simply due to the fact that public contracting and spending is of crucial 
importance to respective markets and that these markets do involve health systems in practice. 
Particular attention should be drawn to intellectual property rights and approval, and reimbursement 
of new medicines. Eli Lilly has already challenged a Canadian court decision in the field of 
medicines.
75
 In the Trans-Pacific Partnership, specific wording concerning medicines was established 
and clarified for investment protection provisions. It indicates major potential for claims in the field.
76
 
                                               
70
 On the relationship between alcohol control and trade, see DW Ziegler, ‘The alcohol industry and trade 
agreements: a preliminary assessment’ (2009) 104(s1) Addiction 13; T Babor and others, Alcohol: No Ordinary 
Commodity (1st edn, OUP 2003). 
71
 The Micula-Brothers case involved investor arbitration between Sweden and Romania on the basis of 
withdrawal of regional subsidies, which was a requirement for Romania as part of joining the EU. EU right to 
regulation proposals now make explicit that State subsidies are not affected by investment protection. See, Ioan 
Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v Romania , 
ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Award (11 December 2013). 
72
 Eureko B.V. v Republic of Poland, ad hoc Partial Award (19 August 2005). 
73
 Achmea B.V. v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2008-13, Award (7 December 2012). 
74
 Achmea B.V. v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2013-12 (Number 2), Award (18 December 
2014). 
75
 Eli Lilly and Company v The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2 (Ongoing) 
76
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘TPP Full Text’, Chapter 9 – Investment (Office of the 
United States Trade Representative) <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-full-text> accessed 20 June 2016. 
The European Commission has sought a new Investment Court System as part of TTIP and 
CETA negotiations.
77
 However, the proposed system does not solve essential problems in relation to 
health policies and may, in fact, create new problems. An early version of the TTIP right to regulate 
introduced the word necessary, which is tied more to obligations of not restricting trade or 
investment.
78
 However, it has now been removed from the CETA version.
79
 While what is proposed 
as part of CETA agreement, in particular, is an improvement on the previous version, it is, however, 
not sufficient to remove problems and concerns with respect to compensation claims.
80
 What is 
suggested by the European Commission does not limit scope for compensation claims in other areas 
than State subsidies and, from a health policy perspective, does thus not provide the watertight 
solution it seeks to introduce.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Trade and health provide many important examples of the interactions between political will and legal 
frameworks. The architects of the Lisbon Treaty were keen to confer exclusive competence on the EU 
institutions to negotiate agreements on trade in services, including trade in health services. Yet 
objections to establishing liberalised markets in health services from Member State governments, the 
public and health policy advocates resulted in a number of legal caveats and political workarounds 
being introduced. Furthermore, while recent treaty changes have made it more difficult for Member 
States to veto trade agreements, the ability of the European Parliament to disrupt the conclusion and 
ratification of trade agreements has increased.  
The European Commission’s efforts to provide negotiation documents for public 
consumption is a positive move beyond managed consultations with a limited number of civil society 
groups. However, this does put the Commission under more scrutiny in terms of what is promised and 
delivered. In this context, problems clearly emerge in the field of financial services, investment, 
intellectual property rights and investment protection.  
The latest generation of trade agreements needs to be seen as a new framework with a 
purpose of shaping how governments can regulate to protect and promote health. The most crucial 
aspects of the negotiations do not apply to changes in current standards or maintaining current policies, 
but to the policy space for health in the future. Furthermore, the public need to know what is meant by 
EU officials when they speak of their intention to maintain high standards of regulation in areas such 
as health. In this regard, actual textual provisions achieved as part of negotiations are more important 
than aspirational statements, letters and reassurances.  
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In addition to a more traditional trade context with the focus on market access or tariffs, the 
TTIP negotiations, in particular, have a more ideological focus on creating a market- and investor-
driven regulatory environment. The architects of the agreement see an expanding role for markets and 
investors, and a more contested and limited role for public services and government interventions. 
While these negotiations can be seen to take place in parallel to how the EU and US govern their 
internal markets, the ideological shift is shaped further by the particular aspects of the internal policy 
process within the US and the EU.  
The WHO Director-General has warned Ministries of Health in the TPP context that if they 
are not at the negotiation table, they will be on the menu.
81
 The message to EU Member States 
responsible for the financing of healthcare systems should be the same. The European Commission 
has so far failed to convince the public and concerned advocates that trade negotiations will not affect 
national health systems and their financing. This could have been possible and entirely in the scope of 
negotiations, but it was not the political choice of the Commission to do so in relation to investment 
liberalisation, investment protection or explicit exclusion of social security and pension systems from 
financial services.  
On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty leaves scope for Member States to use their powers to 
apply political pressure and to veto on the basis of implications of negotiations to the organisation and 
financing of their healthcare systems. Furthermore, it is also possible that crucial decisions concerning 
health systems and trade negotiations are taken at European level as part of European Parliament 
scrutiny, rather than national level. The ultimate fate of the new generation of trade agreements may 
well be determined by political will as much as by legal frameworks. 
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 18. The EU’s (emergent) global health law and policy 
Tamara K Hervey 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research in EU health law has largely focused on the internal: how EU health law operates 
within the EU. Without overstating the EU’s capacity to engage in global health law and 
policymaking, this chapter, along with the previous chapter, takes the position that the EU’s 
external or global health law and policy is becoming increasingly important,1 and tracks 
some of its substantive and conceptual effects.  
The first holistic treatment of the EU’s external or global health law is in Hervey and 
McHale’s EU Health Law.2 That analysis brings together, in a thematic discussion, disparate 
areas of outward-facing EU health law, which are also among the topics that make up global 
health law. In a sense, therefore, Hervey and McHale define EU global health law, with a 
wide substantive focus: (non-exhaustively) medical tourism; communicable disease 
transmission; public health threats from globally traded products; regulation of global 
markets in pharmaceuticals and medical devices; global clinical trials regulation; global trade 
(and foreign direct investment) in health services; health professional migration; access to 
essential medicines; and the ‘right to health’.  
The concept of ‘global health law’ probably emerged at around the same time as the 
popularisation of the word ‘globalisation’, in the 1980s. 3  While there is no fixed 
understanding of ‘global health law’, its core focus is both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ international law 
which ‘shapes norms, processes and institutions to attain the highest possible standards of 
physical and mental health for the world’s populations’.4 A central plank of ‘global health 
law’ is global human rights law.5 Closely connected to global ethics, and justice,6 those who 
                                               
1 The EU is not a particularly powerful global health actor, see TK Hervey and JV McHale, European Union 
Health Law: Themes and Implications (CUP 2015) 530–1. Contrast policy areas such as security and defence, 
energy or the environment. There are significant gaps in the EU’s external health law, such as the lack of EU 
law directly and explicitly concerned with global trade in human organs, Hervey and McHale 483. 
2 Hervey and McHale (n 2) 433–532. 
3 M Freeman, ‘Global Health: An Introduction’ in M Freeman, S Hawkes and B Bennett (eds), Law and Global 
Health: Current Legal Issues Volume 16 (OUP 2014); see also: LO Gostin, Global Health Law (Harvard 
University Press 2014); T Murphy, Health and Human Rights (Hart 2013); IG Cohen (ed), The 
Globalisation of Healthcare: Legal and Ethical Issues (OUP 2013); CM Flood and T Lemmens, 
‘Global Health Challenges and the Role of Law’ (2013) 41(1) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 9. 
4 Gostin (n 3) 59. 
5 TW Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program’ (2005) 36(1–2) Metaphilosophy 182; J 
Harrington and M Stuttaford (eds), Global Health and Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives 
(Routledge 2010); Gostin (n 3); P Eleftheriadis, ‘Global Rights and the Sanctity of Life’ in Cohen (n 3); 
M Stuttaford, J Harrington and G Lewando-Hundt, ‘Sites for health rights: Local, national, 
conceive global health law in this way focus on matters such as access to healthcare, and to 
essential medicines,7 and so consider institutional design and economic resourcing of health 
systems, as well as the ethics of medical research.8 A second central building block of global 
health law is the many ways in which the global trading system affects health, given the 
relationships between economic development and health.9 These aspects of global health law 
are wide ranging. They include the obligations of developing and least-developed countries 
(‘the global South’) which are supported by mechanisms such as those of the IMF and World 
Bank. They cover the free trade conditionality of access by traders in those countries to 
markets in the developed world, for instance expressed through legal instruments overseen by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Such bigger picture legal concepts are supplemented 
and supported by detailed, sector-specific, international instruments covering trade in organs, 
human tissue and cells, human blood;10 pharmaceuticals11 and medical devices; and products 
                                                                                                                                                  
regional and global’ (2012) 74(1) Social Science and Medicine 1; L London and H Schneider, 
‘Globalization and health inequalities: Can a human rights paradigm create space for civil society 
action?’ (2012) 74(1) Social Science and Medicine 6; JM Mann and others, ‘Health and Human Rights’ 
(1994) 1(1) Journal of Health and Human Rights 6; CA Toebes, ‘The Right to Health’, in A Eide, C Krause and 
A Rosas (eds), Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001); CA Toebes, 
The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Intersentia 1999). 
6 See, eg, MJ Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Allen Lane 2012); JP Ruger, 
Health and Social Justice (OUP 2010); N Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly (CUP 2008); J 
Coggon, ‘Global Health, Law, and Ethics: Fragmented Sovereignty and the Limits of Universal Theory’ in 
Freeman, Hawkes and Bennett (n 3). 
7  See, eg, the discussion in: J Harrington, O Aginam and P Yu (eds), The Global Governance of AIDS: 
Intellectual Property and Access to Essential Medicines (Edward Elgar 2012); E Jackson, Law and the 
Regulation of Medicines (Hart 2012) 193–8; J Harrington, ‘Access to Essential Medicines in Kenya: Intellectual 
Property, Anti-Counterfeiting, and the Right to Health’ in Freeman, Hawkes and Bennett (n 3). 
8  See, for instance, discussions of global bioethics governance, such as through the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics (adopted 19 October 2005); eg, J Montgomery, ‘Bioethics as a Governance Practice’ 
(2016) 24 Health Care Analysis 3; R Ashcroft, ‘The troubled relationship between bioethics and human rights’ 
in M Freeman (ed), Law and Bioethics (OUP 2008); R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological 
Revolution (OUP 2013). There is also the (unethical) ‘10/90 gap’ – ‘health problems which affect 90 per cent of 
the world’s population attract only 10 per cent of the global funding for health research’, Jackson (n 7) 191; see: 
Global Forum for Health Research, ‘The 10/90 Report on Health Research’ (GCFR 1999). See further Chapter 6 
in this book. 
9 Global health inequalities are related to stages of economic development, as health and poverty are inter-
related, although the correlation between poverty and health is not a perfect or direct one. Many studies show 
that poverty is a key indicator for poor health, and vice versa. For some global research see World Bank, WHO 
and Voices of the Poor, ‘Dying For Change’ (c 2001) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAH/Resources/Publications/Dying-for-Change/dyifull2.pdf> accessed 
21 June 2016; for European examples see, WHO, Poverty, Social Exclusion and health systems in the WHO 
European Region (WHO Europe 2010); and WHO, Poverty and Social Exclusion in the WHO European 
Region: health systems respond (WHO Europe 2010). 
10 See, eg, the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (adopted 4 April 
1997, entered into force 1 December 1999) CETS 164, Article 21, and Council of Europe Protocol on 
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (adopted 24 January 2002, entered into force 1 May 
2006) CETS 186; Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs (adopted 25 March 
2015) CETS 216. 
that have important effects on the health of populations (in particular food, chemicals, alcohol 
and tobacco).12  
All of these key aspects of global health law (trade, development, human rights) are 
also important aspects of the EU’s external relations law. The focus for this chapter is 
therefore those substantive areas. To set the scene, the chapter first explains a little more 
about the legal and institutional architectures within which EU external health law and policy 
is developed. For more detail on the trade aspects, readers are referred to Chapter 17. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES 
Literature on the institutional architectures of global health law, particularly its trade and 
human rights aspects, tends to focus either on the institutions supporting global health law’s 
notion of the ‘right to health’, or on those supporting global trade as it affects health, 
particularly in populations on the global South. Institutions supporting global development 
are often subsumed within one or the other, especially the latter.  
This is also true of the literature on aspects of EU external health law and policy. It is 
not surprising. The European Commission’s attempt to bring the two together in its 2010 
Communication The EU Role in Global Health13 proved over-ambitious. Rather, the EU’s 
external health law and policy has continued to be developed, in the main, through the 
distinctive institutional architectures that support EU external trade law and policy, EU 
development law and policy, and EU external human rights law and policy. This is reflected, 
for instance, in the rotating chair of the European Commission’s Global Health Forum, which 
is organised by the DGs for Health and Consumers, Development and Cooperation, and 
Research and Innovation, in turn.14 
The general context for the EU’s external health law and policy is as follows. The EU 
has international legal personality.15 It is party to hundreds of international treaties, some of 
which are concluded by the EU acting on behalf of its Member States (where the EU has 
‘exclusive competence’), many of which are concluded by the EU and its Member States 
                                                                                                                                                  
11 See, eg, instruments adopted by the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements 
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), which was launched in 1990 as a joint 
regulatory/industry project to make new pharmaceutical development and registration processes more efficient 
in the interests of patients, public health and cost-effectiveness. 
12 See, eg, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (adopted 21 May 2003, entered into force 27 
February 2005) 2302 UNTS 166; or the WHO and UN Food and Agricultural Office’s Codex Alimentarius 
Commission established in 1963. 
13 Commission, ‘The EU Role in Global Health’ (Communication) COM (2010) 128 final. 
14  Commission, ‘Global Health Policy Forum in 2014’ (European Commission, 21 February 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/health/eu_world/global_health/events_2014_en.htm> accessed 21 June 2016. Five events 
took place in 2014, but apparently only one in 2015 and one in 2016.  
15 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/01 (TEU), Article 47. 
(known as ‘mixed agreements’). 16  The EU also participates in numerous international 
organisations. In its global health policy, the EU’s institutional relationships with other actors 
are those of cooperation,17 representing the non-hierarchical nature of global health law and 
policymaking.18 
On the trade side, the main international organisations relevant to global health law 
and policy are the WTO and the UN’s World Health Organisation (WHO). The World Trade 
Organisation brings together more than 150 countries, and the EU itself, through a series of 
trading agreements,19 supported by an institutional infrastructure. The WTO’s infrastructure 
is among the most highly developed of international organisations, and includes the quasi-
judicial arrangements under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, through which WTO 
members (including the EU) agree to resolve trade disputes. As many trade disputes are about 
protecting human health, these structures are a central part of the institutional arrangements 
of EU external health law, and of global health law. However, the position of the WTO as the 
organising structure for global trade law and policy has been challenged recently by several 
multi- and bi-lateral trading agreements, in particular the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).20 
The WHO is not obviously a trade organisation, but actually many of its activities 
involve global trade. Many of these concern risks to health through the movements of people, 
products and/or services in global trading chains. For instance, the WHO’s International 
Health Regulations cover public health risks and emergencies of international concern.21 The 
EU’s Centre for Disease Prevention and Control works with those systems, for instance, to 
control migration of health workers as seen recently during the Ebola outbreak in East Africa, 
                                               
16 P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 117; B Van Vooren and RA Wessel, EU 
External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (CUP 2014) 55–63. For instance, in Opinion 1/94 Opinion 
Pursuant To Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty (WTO Agreement) ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, [1994] ECR I-5267, the 
CJEU held that the EU did not at the time have exclusive competence over external trade in services, hence the 
EU could not join the WTO except through a ‘mixed agreement’. 
17 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/01 (TFEU), 
Article 168(3). 
18 Contrast those who argue for a hierarchical ‘global health constitution’, eg, Ruger (n 6); K Buse, L Gostin and 
E Friedman, ‘Pathways towards a Framework Convention on Global Health: Political Mobilization for the 
Human Right to Health’ in Freeman, Hawkes and Bennett (n 3); A Krajewska, ‘Bioethics and Human Rights in 
the Constitutional Formation of Global Health’ (2015) 4(4) Laws 771. 
19 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30 October 1947, entered into force provisionally 1 
January 1948) 55 UNTS 194 (GATT); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (adopted 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995) 1868 UNTS 120 (TBT); General Agreement on Trade in Services (adopted 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 183 (GATS); Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 
299 (TRIPS). 
20 See further below. 
21 See further: Gostin (n 3) Chapter 6; B Von Tigerstrom, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations and 
Restraint of National Health Measures’ (2005) 13 Health Law Journal 35; WHO, ‘Global Crisis – Global 
Solutions: Managing Public Health Emergencies of International Concern Through the Revised International 
Health Regulations’ (Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHO 2002). 
or the earlier SARS, H1N1 or H4N1 outbreaks.22 The WHO’s Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, to which the EU is a signatory, is another example. It seeks to disseminate 
best practice in tobacco regulation, through a model based on international environmental 
law.23 
Other important institutions through which EU external health law and policy is 
developed include the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements 
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), which seeks to align technical 
rules for quality, safety and efficacy of novel pharmaceuticals. The pharmaceuticals market is 
of course a global market. The non-binding ICH guidelines have a ‘hard’ legal effect in the 
EU and elsewhere, because EU or national clinical trial or marketing authorisation rules 
require de facto compliance. For trade in food, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (a 
collaboration between the UN’s Food and Agriculture Office and the WHO), of which the 
EU is also a member, determines internationally harmonised standards seeking to secure 
consumer safety and fair dealing in global food trade.  
The international institutional contexts within which EU development law and 
policy24 unfolds are even more disparate than those for trade. The main EU legislation on 
development cooperation 25  is focused around what are now the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals. 26  The partnership model, which has been the mainstay of EU 
                                               
22 See further Chapters 5 and 13 in this book. See European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 
‘Partnerships’ (ECDC) <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/Partnerships/Pages/partnerships.aspx> accessed 21 
June 2016; see: SL Greer and M Mätzke, ‘Bacteria without Borders: Communicable Disease Politics in Europe’ 
(2012) 37(6) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 887; SL Greer, ‘The European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control: Hub or Hollow Core?’ (2012) 37(6) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1001; 
HA Elliott, DK Jones and SL Greer, ‘Mapping Communicable Disease Control in the European Union’ (2012) 
37(6) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 935; M Liverani and R Coker, ‘Protecting Europe from 
Diseases: From the International Sanitary Conferences to the ECDC’ (2012) 37(6) Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law 915; Gostin (n 3) Chapter 12. 
23 See I Kickbusch, ‘Foreword’ in W Hein, S Bartsch and L Kohlmorgen (eds), Global Health Governance and 
the Fight Against HIV/AIDS (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) xiii. See also: Shibuya and others, ‘WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control: development of an evidence based global public health treaty’ (2003) 
327(7407) British Medical Journal 154; L Taylor and DW Bettcher, ‘WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control: a global ‘good’ for public health’ (2000) 78(7) Bulletin of the WHO 920; R Roemer, A Taylor and J 
Lariviere, ‘Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’ (2005) 95(6) American Journal of 
Public Health 936. Contrast Taylor and others, ‘The impact of trade liberalization on tobacco consumption’ in P 
Jha and FJ Chaloupka (eds), Tobacco in Developing Countries (OUP 2000). 
24  Some doubt that ‘EU development policy’ is even a meaningful category, certainly when it comes to 
development aid, see the project reported, ‘Why we should stop talking about ‘European’ development aid’ 
EurActiv (14 April 2014) <www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/why-we-should-stop-talking-about-
european-development-aid-301551> accessed 21 June 2016; and the special issue of European Politics and 
Society (Various contributors, ‘The Eurasian Project in Global Perspective’ (2016) 17 (suppl.1) European 
Politics and Society) on The Europeanisation of Development Policy, which shows only modest levels of 
Europeanisation of domestic development policy.  
25 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 233/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing 
instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014–2020 [2014] OJ L77/44.  
26 These 17 goals, adopted by 193 UN countries in September 2015, are the successors to the Millennium 
Development Goals, see UN, ‘Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform’ (United Nations) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/> accessed 21 June 2016. 
development policy for decades, means that the EU interacts with many State, private and 
especially ‘third sector’ institutions in pursuing its development policy, often on a project 
basis. Important examples for EU external health law include the Global Fund to fight 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, working with the World Bank, WHO and the ‘Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation’, an institutional framework for cooperation 
between public and private actors.27  
But actually the main mechanism for EU development law and policy is trade. This is 
succinctly expressed, for instance, in the recitals to the Council’s 2010 position on the 
Commission’s proposed amendment to the 2006 EU Development Cooperation Regulation:28  
Whereas:  
(1) The Union’s development policy aims to reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty. 
(2) The Union, as a member of the WTO, is committed to mainstreaming trade in 
development strategies and to promoting international trade in order to advance 
development and reduce – and, in the long term, eradicate – poverty worldwide. 
 
So the institutional architecture for EU external trade law and policy also represents at least 
part of the architecture for EU external development law and policy. 
On the human rights side, the key relevant international institutions also operate through the 
auspices of the UN. The World Health Organisation tends not to express its work in human 
rights’ terms. But the UN’s various human rights instruments, particularly more recent 
instruments,29 recognise the ‘right to health’ in several of its different meanings.30 The EU’s 
own Charter of Fundamental Rights acknowledges these international instruments as sources 
                                               
27 See Hervey and McHale (n 1) 491, 498; S Bartsch, ‘The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria’ in Hein, Bartsch and Kohlmorgen (n 23); J Clemens and others, ‘Ten years of the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization: challenges and progress’ (2010) 11(12) Nature Immunology 1069; S Nwaka and 
RG Ridley, ‘Virtual drug discovery and development for neglected diseases through public-private partnerships’ 
(2003) 2 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 919. 
28 Council, ‘Position (EU) 4/2011 of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 establishing a financing 
instrument for development cooperation Adopted by the Council on 10 December 2010’ [2011] OJ C7E/17. 
29 Such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities UNGA Res 61/106 (13 December 2006) 
UN Doc A/RES/61/106.  
30  See, eg, Toebes (1999) (n 5); Toebes (2001) (n 5); B Toebes, ‘Right to Health and Health Care’, 
Encyclopaedia for Human Rights (2009) Vol 2, 365; K Buse, L Gostin and E Friedman, ‘Pathways towards a 
Framework Convention on Global Health: Political Mobilization for the Human Right to Health’ in Freeman, 
Hawkes and Bennett (n 3); J Montgomery, ‘Recognising a Right to Health’ in R Beddard and DM Hill (eds), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Progress and Achievement (Macmillan 1992); A Hendriks, ‘The Right to 
Health’ (1998) 5 European Journal of Health Law 389; J Harrington, ‘Access to Essential Medicines in Kenya: 
IP, Anti-Counterfeiting, and the Right to Health’ in Freeman, Hawkes and Bennett (n 3); P Eleftheriadis, ‘A 
Right to Health Care’ (2012) 40 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 268; U Baxi, ‘The Place of the Human 
Right to Health and Context Approach to Global Justice’ in J Harrington and M Stuttaford (eds), Global Health 
and Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Routledge 2010); A Den Exter and H Hermans, The 
Right to Health Care in Several European Countries (Kluwer Law International 1995). 
of inspiration for its provisions, with at least potential implications for their interpretation and 
implementation.31 
The EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is also inspired by the instruments of 
European regional human rights organisations, particularly the Council of Europe. For 
instance, the EU’s Charter, Article 3 on the ‘right to integrity of the person’,32 draws on the 
Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine in its 
prohibitions of eugenic practices, reproductive cloning and ‘making the human body and its 
parts a source of financial gain’. Article 8(1) of the EU’s Charter33 draws on the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 and the Council of Europe Convention on Data 
Processing 1981. When courts (national or the CJEU) interpret the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, they must take account of the Council of Europe’s instruments and their 
interpretations in that context.34 EU legislation and policy must be compliant with those 
instruments.35 So, for example, the EU’s Data Protection Regulation explicitly refers to the 
CFREU as expressing the legal concepts underpinning the proposal. 36  The geographical 
scope of that Regulation extends beyond the EU’s borders to those who handle data of people 
residing in the EU, where the data processing relates to ‘offering of goods or services to such 
data subjects in the Union’. 37  So, for instance, a provider of genetic testing services 
established outside the EU38 will have to comply with EU data protection law if it contracts 
with anyone within the EU.  
                                               
31 See TK Hervey and JV McHale, ‘Article 35 – The Right to Health Care’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014); TK Hervey, ‘We Don’t See a Connection: The 
‘Right to Health’ in the EU Charter and European Social Charter’ in G De Búrca and B De Witte (eds), Social 
Rights in Europe (OUP 2005). 
32 See S Michalowski, ‘Article 3 – Right to Integrity of the Person’ in Peers and others (n 31). 
33 See H Kranenborg, ‘Article 8 – Protection of Personal Data’, in Peers and others (n 31). 
34 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (CFREU), Article 52(3). See 
further Chapter 4 in this book. 
35 TFEU, Article 263. 
36 See European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1, Recital 1; and see also 
Commission, ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World, a European Data Protection Framework for the 
21st Century’ (Communication) COM (2012) 9 final, ‘5. DATA PROTECTION IN A GLOBALISED 
WORLD Individuals’ rights must continue to be ensured when personal data is transferred from the EU to 
third countries, and whenever individuals in Member States are targeted and their data is used or analysed by 
third country service providers. This means that EU data protection standards have to apply regardless of the 
geographical location of a company or its processing facility.’ 
37 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1, Article 3(2)(a). See further Chapter 
10 in this book. 
38 Such as, for instance, California-based 23andMe. The European Commission, using its delegated powers, has 
a list of countries regarded as ensuring an adequate level of data protection, see Commission, ‘Commission 
decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal data in third countries’ (European Commission) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm> accessed 21 June 
2016. So far, it includes Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organisations), Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, 
This brief overview shows some of the ways in which the EU interacts with the 
institutional architectures supporting global health law. The key feature of these arrangements 
is the centrality of trade as the organising legal and policy idea behind global health law and 
policy initiatives. As a consequence, the institutions of most significance are not ‘global 
health’ institutions per se. The EU’s contributions to global health law are not, in the main, 
pursued through institutions which have as their central mission or guiding ideology the aim 
of seeking to ‘attain the highest possible standards of physical and mental health for the 
world’s populations’.39  
 
III. TRADE/DEVELOPMENT 
Although EU development law has different legal bases and institutional arrangements from 
EU trade law, both in general and when it comes to health, the two are inextricably 
intertwined.40 The relationships between trade and health are not straightforward, but, as a 
broad generalisation, economic development improves population health.41  
Where the EU creates its external or global health law and policy, it must 
accommodate two competing constitutional requirements. The EU is constitutionally required 
to liberalise world trade, and foreign direct investment.42 It is also constitutionally required to 
‘mainstream’ health in all its policies and activities.43 The EU’s development law and policy 
achieves this accommodation through the notion of modified or embedded liberalism, also 
associated with the WTO.44  
From its origins, EU development policy has proceeded on the basis that development 
is best promoted through integration of economies, trade liberalisation and market access. 
Initially the focus of EU development law was on relations with former colonies of EU 
Member States,45 and international agreements embodied both free trade and development 
aid provisions.46 Development aid, over time, came to include a range of social matters, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay and the US Department of Commerce's Safe 
Harbour Privacy Principles.  
39 Gostin (n 3) 59. 
40 See Hervey and McHale (n 1) 463–9. 
41 See above, n 9. 
42 TFEU, Article 206. 
43 TFEU, Article 9; TFEU, Article 168. 
44 G Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order’ (1982) 36(2) International Organization 379; Gostin (n 3) Chapter 9, 272–289. 
45  See L Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in M Cremona (ed), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP 2008); M Broberg, ‘The EU’s Legal Ties with its Former 
Colonies – When Old Love Never Dies’ (2011) DIIS Working paper 2011:01 <http://diis.dk/en/research/the-
eus-legal-ties-with-its-former-colonies> accessed 21 June 2016.  
46 Yaoundé I Convention between EAMA (Associated African and Malgache Countries) and EEC (adopted 20 
July 1963, entered into force 1 June 1964); Yaoundé II Convention between EAMA and EEC (1969); Lomé 
including health, but especially human rights and democracy.47 By 2006, the EU’s Global 
Europe strategy 48  had made explicit links between trade, development, and the EU’s 
economy and global competitiveness of EU industries. The EU’s novel health technologies 
industries are often explicitly mentioned. These links are set to continue.49 Attempts in 2010–
2014 to move away from the central focus on free trade,50 especially to recognise the need to 
treat differently the world’s poorest populations, 51  have been mothballed. The EU’s 
contributions to global health through its development law and policy are and will continue to 
be based on the logics of economic development through trade. But this is a particular variant 
of a free trade ideology. 
In the context of the WTO, the EU accommodates free trade and the need to protect 
health and the WTO’s recognition of a series of exceptions52 to the rule of trade in goods,53 
services 54  and intellectual property, particularly in the case of pharmaceuticals. 55  Most 
                                                                                                                                                  
Convention I (adopted 28 February 1975, entered into force April 1976), II (1979), III (1984) and IV (1990); 
Cotonou Agreement (signed 23 June 2000, entered into force 1 April 2003). 
47 See Hervey and McHale (n 1) 464–9; Bartels (n 45); M Cremona, ‘Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in 
the EC’s Trade Agreements’ in D O’Keeffe and N Emiliou (eds), The European Union and World Trade Law 
(Wiley 1996). 
48 Commission, ‘Global Europe Competing in the World: A contribution to the EU’s growth and jobs strategy’ 
(Communication) COM (2006) 567 final. 
49 Commission, ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 
strategy’ COM (2010) 612 final. 
50 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 27 September 2011 on a New Trade Policy for Europe under the Europe 
2020 Strategy’ [2013] OJ CE56/87; see: European Global Strategy, B Fägersten and others, ‘Towards a 
European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World’ (European Global Strategy 
Project, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 2013); G Grevi, ‘A progressive European Global 
Strategy’ (Policy Brief No 140, FRIDE 2012). 
51 Approximately 1.2 billion people (that is around 17% of the world’s population) live in extreme poverty, 
defined by the UN as existing on less than $1.25 a day, United Nations, ‘The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2014’ (UN 2014) 8-9.  
52 Governments retain the right, in the international economic law of the WTO, to regulate markets to secure 
non-economic goals, including health protection and promotion. 
53 For instance, Article XX (b) of the GATT permits measures ‘necessary to protect human … life or health’, 
and Article 2.2 of the TBT provides that States parties must ensure that mandatory requirements concerning 
product characteristics must not be more restrictive of trade than necessary to meet a legitimate objective, such 
as human health protection. So, for example, national rules on the ingredients, packaging and labelling for 
pharmaceuticals, covered by EU pharmaceutical law, fall within Article 2.2 TBT. The health measures of 
Article XX(b) GATT have been elaborated in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 493 (SPS Agreement). If such 
a measure is in conformity with the SPS Agreement, it is presumed to conform with the GATT, see Article 2.4, 
SPS Agreement. 
54 The scope of WTO rules on trade in services is such that global trade in health services is not mandated by 
WTO membership, and the EU has pursued a policy of both protecting European health services from external 
competition, and securing maximum flexibility for Member States who wish to open up certain aspects of the 
health services sector to non-European providers or investors. See Hervey and McHale (n 1) 453–4; H Jarman, 
‘Trade in Services and the Public’s Health: A ‘Fortress Europe’ for Health?’ in SL Greer and P Kurzer (eds), 
European Union Public Health Policy: Regional and Global Trends (Routledge 2013); M Krajewski, ‘Patient 
Mobility Beyond Calais: Health Services Under WTO Law’ in JW Van de Gronden and others (eds), Health 
importantly, the Doha Declaration 2001 reaffirms ‘TRIPS flexibilities’: the rights of WTO 
member countries to interpret and apply TRIPS in ways which ‘protect public health and, in 
particular … promote access to medicines for all’.56 Some aspects of EU global health policy, 
such as EU provision of technical assistance to developing countries in intellectual property 
matters, support these TRIPS flexibilities.57  
Embedded liberalism and the rule-exception relationship between free trade and 
health in WTO law, and in EU development law and policy, are problematic for global health 
policy activists. They see health and trade as inverted in this rule-exception: why should trade 
be valued more highly than human health? In the EU, these types of concerns are often 
directed against the US, which has a different regulatory settlement and approach for many 
aspects of trade which directly affect health, such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
environmental and food regulation. 58  The ‘received wisdom’ is that the EU is more 
precautionary 59  than the US, which adopts a more ‘science-based’ and therefore liberal 
                                                                                                                                                  
Care and EU Law (Springer 2011); L Reynolds and others, ‘Competition-based reform of the National Health 
Service in England: A One-Way Street?’ (2012) 42(2) International Journal of Health Services 213. 
55 TRIPS obliges member countries to bring into force intellectual property laws, including patent protections 
for inventions. For new pharmaceuticals, TRIPS global patent protection excludes generic equivalents from the 
market place for 20 years. Before TRIPS entered into force in 1995, many developing countries (and especially 
India, known as ‘the developing world’s pharmacy’ provided a place where generics could be made, much more 
cheaply, both for home markets, and for markets in other developing and least developed countries. See Oxfam 
India, ‘Oxfam calls on EU not to shut down ‘pharmacy of the developing World’ (Oxfam, 9 February 2012) 
<www.oxfam.org.uk/media-centre/press-releases/2012/02/oxfam-calls-on-eu-not-to-shut-down-pharmacy-of-
the-developing-world> accessed 22 June 2016. See further: Hervey and McHale (n 1) 486–492; Gostin (n 3) 
285–295; Jackson (n 7) 193. In the context of WTO law on intellectual property, some general rules which 
would potentially have far-reaching negative effects for global health, such as the global patent protection for 
new pharmaceuticals, have been modified by a series of mechanisms within the WTO arrangements. 
Developing countries, such as India, had a 10-year transitional period, and least developed countries were not 
required to be fully TRIPS-compliant until 2016, TRIPS, Article 65(4).  
56  See further W Hein, ‘Global Health Governance and WTO/TRIPS: Conflicts between ‘Global “Market 
Creation” and “Global Social Rights”’ in Hein, Bartsch and Kohlmorgen (n 23) 49; A Bozik, ‘Essential 
Medicines: The Crisis in Developing Countries’ (2011) 7(2) Yale Journal of Medicine and Law at 13; C Correa 
and D Matthews, ‘The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and its Impact on Access to Medicines and the Right to 
Health’ (Discussion Paper, UNDP 2011); O Aginam and J Harrington, ‘Introduction’ in Harrington, Aginam 
and Yu (n 7).  
57 Under Article 61 TRIPS, see: D Matthews and V Munoz-Tellez, ‘Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: 
The US, Japan and the EC in Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 9(6) Journal of World Intellectual Property 629. 
58 Some of the most protracted and difficult instances of use of the WTO dispute settlement procedures involve 
disputes about how best to protect human health.  
59 See, eg, D Vogel, The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety and Environmental Risks in Europe 
and the United States (Princeton University Press 2012). The WTO instruments recognise the precautionary 
principle. See, eg, Article 5.7 SPS Agreement, which allows provisional measures where scientific information 
is insufficient, see: WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the 
United States – Appellate Body Report (13 February 1998) WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R [1998] 3 DSR 
699. For further discussion, see: J Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A 
Commentary (OUP 2007); C Button, The Power to Protect: Trade, Health, Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart 2004) 
113–162; B Mercurio and D Shao, ‘A Precautionary Approach to Decision Making: The Evolving Jurisprudence 
on Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement’ (2010) 2 Trade, Law and Development 195. 
approach to health regulation. While this is the case in some instances, it is not true across the 
board.60 So far, the EU has managed to defend its more precautionary approach within WTO 
structures, indirectly therefore making this approach legally acceptable and available to other 
countries, for instance in the global South, should they wish to adopt such an approach. If 
traders wish to access EU markets, they must comply with (precautionary) EU trading rules 
which seek to protect health.61 One important question for the future of health law and policy 
is whether the EU will retain this global ‘rule maker’ position, exporting those health values 
through its ‘embedded liberalism’ approach to trade rules to the rest of the world, in the 
context of international agreements outside the WTO context.  
Alongside the WTO agreements and institutional arrangements, the EU pursues its 
trade and development policies through a range of bi- and multi-lateral agreements with other 
countries. Usually classified as ‘first’, 62  ‘second’, 63  ‘third’ 64  and ‘fourth generation’ 65 
international agreements, those which affect global health law and policy the most are those 
in the latter categories agreed with countries such as Chile, 66 or under negotiation with 
countries such as India,67 and as well as agreements with the EU’s former colonies, such as 
the CARIFORUM agreements.68  
                                               
60 See Hervey and McHale (n 1) Chapters 12–15; Scott (n 59) 77–79, 150–151; D Collins, ‘Health Protection at 
the World Trade Organization: The J-Value as a Universal Standard for Reasonableness of Regulatory 
Precautions’ (2009) 43(5) Journal of World Trade 1071; Button (n 59) 102–113. 
61 The EU is an important ‘rule maker’ for instance in global food law – see Hervey and McHale (n 1) 517–526; 
AR Young, ‘Europe as a global regulator? The limits of EU influence in international food safety standards’ 
(2014) 21(6) Journal of European Public Policy 904; E Vos and M Weimer, ‘The Role of the EU in 
Transnational Regulation of Food Safety: Extending Experimentalist Governance?’ (2013) GR:EEN Working 
Paper No 35 <www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/green/papers/workingpapers/no._35_vos_and_weimer.pdf> 
accessed 22 June 2016.  
62 Covering only trade in goods. 
63 Covering trade in goods, services, public procurement and investment. 
64 Covering trade in goods, services, public procurement, investment, intellectual property rights, and anti-
competitive regulatory measures. 
65 Sometimes also known as ‘DCFTAs’ (deep and comprehensive free trade agreements). There are a few such 
agreements, which go even further, and seek to attain some kind of economic integration between the States 
parties. The EU agreed DCFTAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in June 2014.  
66 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part [2002] OJ L352/3. 
67  Commission, ‘Countries and Regions: India’ (European Commission) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/india/> accessed 22 June 2016. See on general 
EU-India relations, PJ Cardwell and N Samanta, ‘What Brexit would mean for relations between India and the 
UK’ The Conversation (2 May 2016) <http://theconversation.com/what-brexit-would-mean-for-relations-
between-india-and-the-uk-58374> accessed 22 June 2016; and on health, R Chanda, ‘India-EU Relations in 
Health Services: Prospects and Challenges’ (2011) 7 Globalization and Health 1. 
68 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part [2008] OJ L289/I/3. 
Generally speaking, this dense web of international law69 forms a less high-profile 
site for EU global health law-making than the WTO instruments. But the low political 
salience of trade law for global health has been challenged by civil society attention drawn to 
several more recent trade agreements, in particular the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP);70 the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA); 71  and, above all, the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US.72 
Comprehensive trade agreements, such as these, could be a potential instrument for 
improving global health. It is worth exploring, therefore, what the effects on global health in 
terms of development might be if, for instance, the model of third- and fourth-generation 
                                               
69  A list of agreements in force is available here: Commission, ‘Agreements’ (European Commission) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/#_europe> accessed 22 June 2016. 
70 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), obviously not involving the EU, agreed in October 2015 between the 
US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Chile, Mexico and Peru, 
covers a range of matters pertinent to health, including intellectual property rights. A 12-year data exclusivity 
clause (used to prevent the generics industry from accessing clinical trial data, to support marketing 
authorisations applications) on biologics (a type of pharmaceutical manufactured from living organisms, such as 
proteins, cells and tissues) in the original negotiating texts was ‘watered down’ to eight years, a longer period 
than in force in nine of the 12 TPP countries. The remaining three being Japan, Canada and the US, see: M 
Davey, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership could pose risk to public healthcare, leaked draft shows’ The Guardian (6 
August 2015) <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/06/trans-pacific-partnership-could-pose-
risk-to-public-healthcare-leaked-draft-shows> accessed 22 June 2016; Medicins sans Frontières described the 
agreement as ‘the most harmful trade pact ever for access to medicines in developing countries’, because it 
requires member countries to enforce patent protections on pharmaceuticals and squeeze out generics, see MSF, 
‘Trading Away Health: The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)’ (Medicins sans Frontières USA, 3 
March 2013) <www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/briefing-document/trading-away-health-trans-
pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp> accessed 22 June 2016; A Corderoy, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership: Health 
groups say TPP will cost lives’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 6 October 2015) 
<www.smh.com.au/national/health/transpacific-partnership-health-groups-say-tpp-will-cost-lives-20151005-
gk229t.html> accessed 22 June 2016. However, Australia’s ability to negotiate protections for its anti-tobacco 
laws (including its plain packaging laws which lead the global field in tobacco regulation) demonstrates that 
such trade agreements need not necessarily be worse for health than WTO law. The problem is, of course, that 
most countries do not enjoy Australia’s geo-political/geo-economic position when negotiating trade agreements. 
The TTP was not used as a mechanism for improving tobacco regulation in the other States parties.  
71 The Trade in Services Agreement, TiSA, is being negotiated by 23 countries (including China, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Chile, Peru) plus the EU. The agenda is essentially deregulatory, and the TiSA would take its member 
countries beyond the WTO’s GATS framework. The EU Negotiating mandate is published here: Council, ‘Draft 
Directives for the Negotiation of a Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Services’ (2015) 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6891-2013-ADD-1-DCL-1/en/pdf> accessed 22 June 2016, 
and should be read in context with the EU’s ‘revised offer’: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc_154590.pdf accessed 15 November 2016; other 
documents are here: Wikileaks, ‘Trade in Services Agreement’ (Wikileaks) <https://wikileaks.org/tisa/> 
accessed 22 June 2016; and see D Dayen, ‘The Scariest Trade Deal Nobody’s Talking About Just Suffered a Big 
Leak’ New Republic (4 June 2016) <https://newrepublic.com/article/121967/whats-really-going-trade-services-
agreement> accessed 22 June 2016. 
72 See further Chapter 17 in this book; and F de Ville and G Siles-Brügge, The Truth about the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (Polity 2016). 
trade agreements were to be applied in the EU’s trade relations with the rest of the world. 
Three main observations are pertinent: 
First, comprehensive trade agreements do not pursue the type of regulatory approach 
pursued (sometimes in spite of the European Commission’s ‘better regulation’ agendas) by 
the TFEU. Much of EU law that protects health is based on health-respecting harmonisation: 
the development of EU-level rules that apply across the whole of the single EU market. 
Granted, these rules do not always express the highest possible protections for health, in spite 
of the obligation in the TFEU to that effect.73 But neither do they always express a lowest 
common denominator: far from it. One of the surprising things about EU health law is that it 
does not always operate through a deregulatory imperative, and the adopted regulatory 
standards are sometimes the product of a ‘race to the top’, not the bottom. The EU’s health 
law articulates the idea of the EU market as a particularly safe, particularly ethical market.74 
And it protects the specificities of European health systems.75 
If the EU were to use comprehensive trade agreements to pursue a harmonisation (or 
even an erga omnes mutual recognition of national standards) agenda that embodies high 
levels of protection for human health, there would be an incentive for producers outside the 
market created by such trade agreements to align their practices so as to access that market, 
by compliance with harmonised (or mutually recognised) standards. That would support a 
push towards higher regulatory standards in other countries, and represent an opportunity to 
improve health law in those countries. But, for instance, the TTIP will not allow access to the 
whole TTIP market through compliance with either EU or US regulatory standards. So this 
opportunity is lost. 
Second, although there is to be a ‘sustainable development’ chapter of TTIP, the EU 
negotiating text is very light on anything to do with development, and does not include 
anything to do with health and global development. 76  So as things stand, that is a lost 
opportunity too. 
Third, and perhaps the most important in the longer term, the effects of these types of 
agreements look set to permanently destabilise the WTO – with its embedded liberalism 
model – as the institutional site for global regulation of trade, and, consequently, of 
development through trade.77 The implications for non-EU States are significant. Take, for 
instance, a State that seeks to enter into third- or fourth-generation trade agreements with 
both the EU and the US to develop its economy (with the consequent indirect effects on 
                                               
73 TFEU, Article 168(1). 
74 See, for instance, G Bache, ML Flear and TK Hervey, ‘The Defining Features of the European Union’s 
Approach to Regulating New Health Technologies’ in ML Flear and others (eds), European Law and New 
Health Technologies (OUP 2013). 
75 See Hervey and McHale (n 1) Chapters 9–11; TK Hervey, ‘The National Health Service, TTIP and the EU 
Referendum’ (EU Law Analysis, 17 April 2016) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/the-nhs-ttip-and-
eu-referendum.html> accessed 22 June 2016.  
76 It is mainly about preserving European labour rights, and about environmental protection see: Commission 
‘Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter /Labour and Environment: EU Paper outlining key issues and 
elements for provisions in the TTIP’ (EU Position Paper for negotiating round 19–23 May 2014) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153024.pdf> accessed 22 June 2016. 
77 See n 71.  
health of its population). This is the case for many EU eastern neighbourhood and southern 
Mediterranean countries, with whom the EU is negotiating such agreements.78 Matters such 
as justifiable technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures – all of which 
have implications for health protection – are relatively settled within the WTO structures. But 
bi- and multi-lateral agreements reopen those debates, and unless they adopt a common EU-
US standard (for, say, GM food) – which is highly unlikely – countries outside the EU/US 
will struggle to reconcile the opposing approaches in their hoped-for trading partners. 79 
Opportunities to improve health through economic development supported by such 
comprehensive trade agreements will be lost. 
More importantly for global health, bi- and multi-lateral treaties destabilise the TRIPS 
settlement, and in particular its approach to access to essential medicines in the context of a 
global proprietary pharmaceutical industry relying on patent protection to freeze out the 
generics industry. The TPP negotiations show how the pharmaceutical industry was able to 
use this opportunity to reopen matters, such as the ‘evergreening’ of patents,80 that were ‘on 
their way to being settled’ through the WTO.81 Patent terms are extended beyond the WTO’s 
20-year period through provisions such as Articles 18.46 and 18.48 of the Intellectual 
Property Chapter of the TPP. This provides that patent owners may require States to adjust 
the term of patents to compensate for ‘unreasonable delays’ in issuance of patents, and that 
for pharmaceutical products, patent terms must be adjusted to compensate for ‘unreasonable 
curtailment’ of the patent term ‘as a result of the marketing approval process’.  
The hegemony of the WTO is fundamentally challenged by the new global 
phenomenon of third- and fourth-generation free trade agreements. Of course, it would be a 
mistake to overstate the ways in which WTO mechanisms and institutions have been used to 
pursue global health agendas. But there is no doubt that, at least to some small extent, they 
have been. The opportunity for the EU to continue to pursue global health through trade and 
development law and policy based on the WTO’s ‘embedded liberalism’ looks set to be lost, 
unless it can be brought within those new bi- and multi-lateral trade agreements.  
 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS 
The other principal global institutional setting through which civil society has been able to 
pursue a global health agenda is that of international human rights institutions. There is a 
                                               
78  Negotiations are concluded in DCFTAs with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova. Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and 
Tunisia all in the frame for future negotiations. 
79 T Kovziridze, ‘Differences in Regulatory Approach between the EU and the US: Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership and its impact on trade with third countries’ in D Cardoso and others (eds), The 
Transatlantic Colossus: Global Contributions to Broaden the Debate on the EU-US Free Trade 
Agreement (Berlin Forum on Global Politics 2014) (also available free online). 
80 Various practices of the pharmaceutical industry that seek to extend their patent rights, see H Moir and D 
Gleeson, ‘Evergreening and how big pharma keeps drug prices high’ The Conversation (5 November 2014) 
<https://theconversation.com/explainer-evergreening-and-how-big-pharma-keeps-drug-prices-high-33623> 
accessed 22 June 2016; F Chaudhry, ‘The TAFTA/TTIP and Treatment Access: What does the Agreement mean 
for Intellectual Property Rights over Essential Medicines’ in Cardoso and others (n 79). 
81 Chaudhry (n 80).  
significant literature on global health and human rights. 82  This ranges from the wildly 
optimistic through to the deeply critical/pessimistic. There is no doubt, though, that human 
rights ideas have been used to promote global health, at least in some high-profile instances, 
such as access to HIV/retroviral medication in developing countries,83 or regulation of organ 
donation by donors in developing countries. 84 There is also no doubt that human rights 
represents a powerful counter-narrative, or alternative framing, to the trade/development 
framing of global health law. 
This is seen, for instance, in the EU’s regulation of organ donation,85 which is based 
on human rights-inspired principles of non-commodification of the human body. However, as 
Hervey and McHale observe, the EU legislation is ‘blind’ to the realities of global markets in 
human organs. In general, legislation across the globe has proved ineffective in tackling 
persistent human rights breaches, given the demand and supply drivers in the context of such 
disparities of wealth between donors and their eventual recipients.86  
                                               
82 See above n 81; J Biehl and A Petryna (eds), When People Come First: Critical Studies in Global 
Health (Princeton University Press 2013); JM Zuniga, SP Marks and LO Gostin (eds), Advancing the Human 
Right to Health (OUP 2013). 
83 The best-known example involving South Africa, see Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC). See eg Hein, Bartsch and Kohlmorgen (n 23); EB Kramer, ‘“No one may be 
refused emergency medical treatment” – ethical dilemmas in South African emergency medicine’ (2008) 1 
South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 53; CR Sunstein, ‘Social and Economic Rights – Lessons from 
South Africa’ (1999) 11 Constitutional Forum 123; P O’Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: 
International Standards and Comparative Experiences (Routledge 2012); M Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights 
and the Forms of Judicial Review’ (2003) 82 Texas Law Review 1895; MS Kende, ‘South African 
Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 6 Chapman 
Law Review 137; T Roux, ‘Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2009) 7 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 106; EC Christiansen, ‘Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-
Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court’ (2006) 38(2) Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 321; J Dugard, ‘Court of first instance? Towards a pro-poor jurisdiction for the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 261; L Forman, ‘Ensuring Reasonable 
Health: Health Rights, the Judiciary, and South African HIV/AIDS Policy’ (2005) 33(4) Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics 711. 
84 See, eg, IG Cohen, Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics (OUP 2015); S McGuinness 
and JV McHale, ‘Transnational crimes related to health: How should law respond to illicit organ tourism?’ 
(2014) 34(4) Legal Studies 682; D Sperling, ‘Human Trafficking and Organ Trade: Does the Law Really Care 
for the Health of People’ in Freeman, Hawkes and Bennett (n 3); WHO, ‘WHO Guiding Principles on Human 
Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation’ Sixty-third World Health Assembly (May 2010) Resolution 
WHA63.22; Council of Europe, ‘Committee of Ministers Recommendation 2004(7) to member states on organ 
trafficking’ (Council of Europe, 19 May 2004) <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=744621> accessed 22 June 
2016. 
85 European Parliament and Council Directive 2010/45/EU of 7 July 2010 on standards of quality and safety of 
human organs intended for transplantation [2010] OJ L207/14. This is the currect number, see Corrigendum to 
Directive 2010/45/EU OJ [2010] L243/68. See further Chapter 9 in this book; Hervey and McHale (n 1) 358-60, 
478–483. 
86 eg, Cohen (n 84); Sperling (n 34); IG Cohen, ‘Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of International 
Markets for Organs’ (2013) 41(1) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 269; and see the studies cited in Hervey 
and McHale (n 1) 472–477. 
In the instance of access to essential medicines, where this aspect of the human right 
to health is impeded by global intellectual property law, the EU’s legal approach in general is 
to acknowledge TRIPS’ flexibilities in its legal texts, but also to insist on effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive intellectual property rights enforcement. Candidate examples 
include the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement with the CARIFORUM States, and its 
2010 free trade agreement with Korea. The EU has done almost nothing to provide incentives 
to the pharmaceutical industry to develop medicines for the global South.87 That said, the EU 
has provided technical assistance to developing countries in intellectual property matters, to 
help those countries to incorporate TRIPS’ flexibilities in national law, including flexibilities 
protecting public health.88 
The EU’s development policy, including access to budget support for developing 
countries, and support for projects and programmes within the EU’s development themes, has 
long been subject to human rights conditionality.89 This is also expressed in the most recent 
versions of EU development policy, see for instance the Council’s Conclusions on A New 
Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015.90 But 
in the context of law and policy relevant to ‘the right to health’ this human rights 
conditionality is theoretical, rather than having any practical effects.  
The essential problem with global human rights law as a mechanism for pursuing 
global health is that international law, with its underpinning assumptions of State sovereignty 
                                               
87 Hervey and McHale (n 1) 498–501; Jackson (n 7) 199–204. 
88 Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (n 57) 
89 Budget support from EU development funds – human rights conditionality (see Commission, ‘Budget support 
and dialogue with partner countries’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-
aid/budget-support/index_en.htm_en> accessed 22 June 2016; and see European Parliament and Council 
Regulation (EU) 233/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation 
for the period 2014–2020 [2014] OJ L77/44, Recital 7, ‘Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, the 
promotion of the rule of law, democratic principles, transparency, good governance, peace and stability and 
gender equality are essential for the development of partner countries, and those issues should be mainstreamed 
in the Union’s development policy, particularly in programming and in agreements with partner countries’ and 
Article 3(1)(1), ‘The Union shall seek to promote, develop and consolidate the principles of democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms on which it is founded, through dialogue and 
cooperation with partner countries and regions.’ 
90 Council, ‘A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 – 
Council conclusions’ (2015), Part II ‘Guiding principles for a new global partnership’, para 6, ‘The December 
2014 Council conclusions set out a number of guiding principles for a new global partnership. We affirm those 
principles of universality, shared responsibility, mutual accountability, consideration of respective capabilities, 
and a multi-stakeholder approach. The new global partnership should also be based on and promote human 
rights, equality, nondiscrimination, democratic institutions, good governance, rule of law, inclusiveness, 
environmental sustainability and respect for planetary boundaries. Women’s rights, gender equality and the 
empowerment of women and girls, as well as being ends in themselves, are a key means of implementation and 
should be promoted at all levels.’ 
See also (same document) para 9, ‘The EU and its Member States consider the following to be key components 
of a comprehensive approach to means of implementation in the context of a new Global Partnership: (i) 
establishing an enabling and conducive policy environment at all levels; (ii) developing capacity to deliver; (iii) 
mobilising and making effective use of domestic public finance; (iv) mobilising and making effective use of 
international public finance; (v) mobilising the domestic and international private sector; (vi) stimulating trade 
and investments; (vii) fostering science, technology and innovation; and (viii) addressing the challenges and 
harnessing the positive effects of migration.’ 
and State equality, is insufficiently attentive to the differences in geo-political and geo-
economic power between ‘sovereign’ States. Where trade is global and is conducted on terms 
dictated by not only the WTO, and bi- and multi-lateral trade agreements with powerful 
(Western) countries, but also the IMF and World Bank, States may be frustrated where they 
seek to improve the health of their populations through, for instance, building health 
infrastructure and systems.91 All of this lies far from the revised approach to geo-economics 
implied by the root-and-branch reform to global trade law that it would take to tackle global 
health disparities.  
The solution, according to authors such as Mukherjee, is civil society action to assert 
a collective notion of ‘right to health’, such as that seen in the AIDS movement and the 
movement for debt relief. Such a collective ‘right to health’ is variously taken to mean, for 
instance, a general right to be healthy; a right to a basic package of medical treatments; and a 
right to social insurance or tax-based access to healthcare (either in general, or a specific set 
of healthcare entitlements, such as emergency treatment).92 But conceiving of human rights 
as a matter for collective action also carries with it certain risks as a strategy for using law to 
improve global health. Collective social rights such as the right to health are seen as 
aspirational and programmatic only. In particular, conceptualising human rights as 
collectively enjoyed and therefore to be collectively enforced risks throwing away one of the 
most powerful aspects of human rights as an asset in tackling inequalities: their individual 
judicial enforceability. As it constitutes a positive claim on the State, rather than a freedom 
from State interference, the collective ‘right to health’ is not seen as being an enforceable 
claim or entitlement.93 The movement for debt relief, in particular, is framed much more in 
terms of ethics, justice and even charity than the human rights framing of entitlement.  
It is particularly sobering to contrast what the EU has been able to achieve using a 
human rights approach to health rights within the EU. Although the overarching ‘DNA’ of 
internal EU law is trade and creation of the ‘internal market’, the EU has been able to secure 
not insignificant protection for human rights, as individual patients’ rights, as well as 
relationships of solidarity and equality embodied in collective arrangements for healthcare 
within EU national health systems. 94  By contrast, even taking into account the EU’s 
                                               
91 JS Mukherjee, ‘Financing governments: towards achieving the right to health’ in Zuniga, Marks and Gostin (n 
82). 
92 It is not necessary that a right be entirely determinate in order to be classed as a human right: few would argue 
that the right to life is not a human right, yet the right to life clearly does not mean the right to eternal life, and 
there is significant disagreement about when it begins and ends. Civil and political rights may be (or have been) 
under-determined in terms of their substantive content, but they become more determinate through human rights 
practice. See further, TK Hervey, ‘Health Equality, Solidarity and Human Rights in European Union Law’ in A 
Silveira, M Canotilho and P Madeira Froufe (eds), Citizenship and Solidarity in the European Union: From the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Crisis, the State of the Art (Peter Lang 2013) 341–66. 
93 Many civil and political rights also involve a claim on the State, see further, A Eide and A Rosas, ‘Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge’ in A Eide, K Krause and A Rosas (eds), Economic, Cultural 
and Social Rights (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 3. Further, it has been pointed out forcefully that 
such economic and social rights are in practice more important than the civil and political rights that are 
commonly assumed to be their superiors. ‘What permanent achievement is there in saving people from torture, 
only to find that they are killed by … disease that could be prevented?’ Eide and Rosas, 7; HJ Steiner, P Alston 
and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials (OUP 
2008) 255, ‘Of what use is the right to free speech to those who are starving and illiterate?’. 
94 Hervey and McHale (n 1) Chapters 8–11. 
constrained competence to develop its external or global health law, the EU has missed 
opportunities to tackle global health inequalities through human rights mechanisms.95 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The EU’s external health law and policy, and the ways in which EU law intersects with 
global health law and policy, take place through three main institutional and conceptual 
vectors: trade; development; and human rights. The institutional structures and legal 
mechanisms supporting these are, in the main, quite distinct, although there are strong 
overlaps between development and trade, and also areas where human rights intersect with 
those other vectors, such as the concept of ‘human rights conditionality’.  
Some opportunities for improvements in global health have been opened up by the 
EU’s pursuing of modified or embedded liberalism through global trade rules, particular 
through the WTO. The pursuing of TRIPS’ flexibilities, for instance, has assisted in securing 
significantly the chances of access to essential medicines in developing countries. The public 
health protections from WTO rules recognising precaution in new technologies, such as in 
food law, are another example. But these examples show the potential for the EU to 
contribute to global health, a potential that remains largely unrealised. 
Finally, although not discussed above, we should not forget two important practical 
aspects of EU contributions to global health law. First, as the EU has expanded its 
membership, especially to the east, it has improved population health in its new Member 
States. The mechanisms the EU has used to do so include the transfer of development aid and 
expertise, but also EU economic law – which is, of course, at heart based on an extremely 
comprehensive trade agreement, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. For 
instance, taking one example where the EU is a global leader in health regulation, all 
consumers of tobacco within the EU are protected by stringent EU-level rules on composition 
of tobacco products, packaging and advertising.96 By expanding its geographical scope, the 
EU improves health, including in developing and transitional countries.  
Second, the practical reach of EU law extends outside its formal Member States, to 
include associated States (including former colonies) and neighbourhood States, as well as 
States which are trading partners. Companies in those countries seeking to access the EU 
market need to align their production practices, as well as their products, to EU regulatory 
standards. Where the EU’s regulatory standards are more protective of health than those 
                                               
95 Hervey and McHale (n 1) Chapter 17, and summary, 501–2. 
96 See further Chapter 14 in this book; Hervey and McHale (n 1) 390–403; A Gilmore and M McKee, ‘Tobacco 
control policy: the European dimension’ (2002) 2(4) Clinical Medicine 335; A Gilmore and M McKee, 
‘Tobacco policy in the European Union’ in EA Feldman and R Bayer (eds), Unfiltered: Conflicts Over Tobacco 
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health policies’ in E Mossialos and others (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European 
Union Law and Policy (CUP 2010); DT Studlar, ‘Tobacco Control: The End of Europe’s Love Affair with 
Smoking?’ in Greer and Kurzer (n 54); A Alemanno and A Garde (eds), Regulating Lifestyle Risks: The EU, 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets (CUP 2015); A Alemanno and A Garde, ‘The Emergence of an EU 
Lifestyle Policy: The Case of Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets’ (2013) 50(6) Common Market Law 
Review 1745; A Alemanno, ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Towards a New EU Tobacco Products Directive’ (2012) 
18(2) Columbia Journal of European Law 197. 
elsewhere in the world, the effect is a ‘race to the top’, and the EU can be seen as a de facto 
global ‘rule-maker’. We have seen this process, for instance, in the improving of various 
aspects of health in the EU’s accession countries, as their economies develop and they align 
their economic laws to EU law in preparation for membership.97 Governments outside the EU 
are not legally obliged to align their regulations to EU standards, but they face political 
pressure from domestic producers to do so. A candidate example is EU-led ethical rules about 
clinical trials, including privacy and data protection rules.98 
In conclusion, although the EU’s external or global health law and policy lacks the 
conceptual unity of its internal health law and policy, it is a discernible aspect of EU law and 
policy, which looks set to increase through patterns of Europeanisation, as was the case with 
its internal health law. However, in the final analysis, the current assessment of EU external 
or global health law is that it is full of missed opportunities to support global health, and the 
direction of travel looks set to continue to miss those opportunities.  
 
                                               
97 For instance, health indicators in Bulgaria and Romania improved as the economies developed. 
98 But see, eg, ML Flear, Governing Public Health (Hart 2015); ML Flear, ‘Offshoring Clinical Trials: The 
Mutable Ethics, Weak Protections and Vulnerable Subjects of EU Law’ (2015) 16 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 75. 
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 19. The impediment of health laws’ values in the constitutional 
setting of the EU 
Anniek de Ruijter* 
 
(…) account must be taken of the fact that the health and life of humans rank foremost among the 
assets and interests protected by the Treaty and that it is for the Member States to determine the level 
of protection which they wish to afford to public health and the way in which that level is to be 
achieved. Since the level may vary from one Member State to another, Member States should be 
allowed a measure of discretion1 
In the above-cited Perez case, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) refers to health and life of 
humans to rank foremost among the interests protected under EU law. Hence the EU is to leave 
discretion to the Member States to determine the level of health protection in each Member State. 
However, the involvement of the EU, through law and policy in the field of human health is vast, 
regardless of limited specific legal competence in the field (Article 168 TFEU). On the basis of an 
array of other legal competences, especially Article 114 TFEU on the functioning of the EU’s internal 
market, the importance and authority of the EU in the field of human health is ever-growing.2 
What is the relationship between the role of the EU and the values central in the field of 
human health? By such ‘health values’, I mean the guiding principles whereby a society in general 
ensures the merit of a health policy or law. When a topic goes to the core of the manner in which 
humans shape mutual relationships and obligations (in the current case with respect to human health), 
there is a good argument to make that we need more justification than law, or a democratic rule, may 
be able to provide.3 Health values are often articulated through law, but they are self-standing. In the 
context of bioethics, they are understood as having an intrinsic importance that gives expression to 
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Silent Revolution: The expansion of EU power in the field of human health’ (PhD thesis, University of 
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para 44. And see further references Case C-141/07 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2008:492, [2008] ECR 
I-6935, para 51, and Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others (Doc 
Morris) ECLI:EU:C:2009:316, [2009] ECR I-4171 para 19. 
2 A de Ruijter, The Expansion of EU Power in the Field of Human Health (OUP 2016) (forthcoming). DS 
Martinsen, An Ever More Powerful Court?: The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European 
Union (OUP 2015). 
3 O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 2002) 73 (who explains that ‘political legitimation is not 
enough for an ethical justification of fundamental rights). But see S Bagatur, ‘Toward a Democratic Conception 
of Human Rights’ (2014) 2(1) Theoria and Praxis 
<http://theoriandpraxis.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/theoriandpraxis/article/view/39372> accessed 22 June 2016. 
standards for conduct in individual cases and in the organisation of public health and healthcare.4 
However, my focus here is not on bioethics specifically, nor the particular ethical questions on the 
basis of health values as they emerge in the EU. Rather, to achieve the objective of navigating the 
intricacies of ‘European Union Health Law’ and related policies, in their constitutional setting, the 
focus of this chapter is the relationship between health values, fundamental rights and health law and 
policy.  
The central document that may immediately come to mind to EU health lawyers on these 
topics is the 2006 ‘Council Conclusions on Common Values and Principles in health care’.5 These 
conclusions were adopted when Member States agreed that the domestic healthcare systems were 
highly affected by the CJEU case law affecting the individual access to medical care, and the core 
values of ‘universality, access to good quality care, equity and solidarity’ needed safeguarding.6 
Noting the links between values and ethics, I propose a somewhat wider scope for ‘EU health values’, 
and thus include human dignity, which is a central value of health law in the Western world 
generally.7 Hence, my focus is the values of solidarity, universal access, equality and human dignity.  
The chapter argues that due to the EU’s current constitutional setting – which refers generally 
to the legislative limitations on the exercise of EU public authority of its institutions for adopting 
health law, including the protection and promotion of fundamental rights in that respect – EU health 
law and policy is not able to promote and protect the values that are embedded in Member States’ 
national health law and policy fully. The chapter will proceed as follows: first, the chapter turns to the 
place of values in (EU) health law and policy. Second, the chapter looks at the manner in which these 
values are expressed in the context of specific EU fundamental rights that have particular bearing on 
EU health law and policy. Third, the chapter addresses the place of EU health law in the EU 
constitutional setting and how EU health law affects values. By way of conclusion the chapter 
proposes a new research agenda on the constitutional embedding of values in health law in the EU.  
 
I. VALUES IN (EU) HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 
In health law, values and human rights play an important role. Together they make up the central 
aspects that form the fabric of most health laws in the Western world, and beyond. By contrast, 
according to most accounts, EU health law developed as a side issue of internal market law. 
Furthermore, EU health law came about as national health laws and regulations became exceptions to 
the creation of the EU internal market (deregulation). A relevant famous and foundational CJEU 
decision is the Cassis de Dijon case, in which the CJEU ruled on the extent of national power to adopt 
health-related alcohol laws.8  
                                               
4 TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, OUP 2012).  
5 Council Conclusions on Common values and principles in European Union health systems [2006] OJ C146/1. 
6 ibid.  
7 M Frischhut, ‘“EU”: Short for “Ethical” Union, the Role of Ethics in European Union Law’ (2015) 75(3) 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 531; C Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Bloomsbury 
2011). TK Hervey and JV McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes and Implications (CUP 2015) 40, 95. 
The authors outline in the EU context: ‘The most we might expect is a change to the way courts express the 
discussion in such cases – a certain suppression of explicit consideration of ethical questions, replaced by a 
discussion of trade in goods or services.’ 
8 In Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, [1979] ECR 649, the public health exception for goods in the Treaty (currently Article 36 
EU health law and policy have also been a means to re-regulate the EU market in areas where 
national regulatory barriers to trade were removed to create the internal single EU market. In the 
Tobacco Advertising I case it is established that the European legislator cannot create legislation with 
health as a central and single objective. There must be an internal market connection as a legal basis 
for most EU health law (Article 114 TFEU, but see certain paragraphs in Article 168 TFEU).9 There 
are numerous examples here in the area of food safety, medicines and access to medical benefits in 
another Member State, where the market connection is the basis for EU regulation. However, over the 
past half-century in the Member States, health law developed on rather different foundational bases.  
Generally, in the Member States health law regulates relationships of solidarity, of ethics, 
professional trust and the protection of human physical dignity, in the face of shared risks and 
opportunities related to life, disease and mortality.10 Health laws in the Member States on the whole 
express the values of solidarity, universal access, equality and human dignity. These values are 
translated in national public health programmes and healthcare systems in various ways.11 The values 
of equality and solidarity are expressed in the general rule that all citizens have ‘universal access’ to 
medical treatment.12 Human dignity is expressed in rules regarding the protection of informed consent 
in medical research and medical treatment or in national laws that guarantee a ‘right to know and not 
to know’ and the right to inviolability and physical integrity. In a public health sense human dignity is 
expressed in rules about eugenics and other research-related regulations. Besides the general national 
laws and policies that express the values and principles of health law, these values are expressed in 
constitutional law and the application of (EU or Council of Europe ECHR) human rights.13 
Hence, national health laws largely protect a number of specifically health and human dignity-
related rights,14 such as informed consent, the protection of medical and health data, secrecy and 
professional medical standards, medical liability and the right to equal ‘universal’ access to medical 
care.15 The shared foundational basis of rights and objectives that can be found in national health laws, 
are the ‘values’ of health law. Given the EU’s constitutional order and the setting in which the 
growing role of the EU in human health regulation is taking place, the question is to what extent the 
EU is able to facilitate health values as EU values, or are they left behind at Member State level? One 
                                                                                                                                                  
TFEU) as broadened through the establishment of a Rule of Reason-doctrine that applies only to national 
measures that treat products from another Member State equally. 
9 Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising I) ECLI:EU:C:2000:544, 
[2000] ECR I-8419. 
10 Hervey and McHale (n 7).  
11 ED Kinney and BA Clark, ‘Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World’ (2004) 37(2) Cornell International Law Journal 285. B Toebes, ‘Introduction: Health and Human 
Rights in Europe’ in B Toebes and others (eds), Health and Human Rights in Europe (Intersentia 2012). 
12 Nobody can be denied access to medical care.  
13 Kinney and Clark (n 11). HJ Leenen, ‘Health Law in the Twenty-First Century’ (1998) 5(4) European Journal 
of Health Law 341; HJ Leenen, JKM Gevers and G Pinet, The Rights of Patients in Europe (WHO; Kluwer 
1993); J Legemaate, ‘Integrating Health Law and Policy: A European Perspective’ (2002) 60(2) Health Policy 
101; TK Hervey, ‘We Don’t See a Connection: The “right to Health” in the EU Charter and European Social 
Charter’ in G De Búrca and B De Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (OUP 2005); JV McHale, ‘Fundamental 
Rights and Health Care’, in E Mossialos and others (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of 
EU Law and Policy (CUP 2010). 
14 Frischhut (n 7). 
15 A de Ruijter, ‘EU Integration in the Field of Human Health, Review Article’ (2016) Journal of European 
Integration (forthcoming).  
strategy for protecting the values of solidarity, equality, universal access and human dignity generally 
could be through the above indicated legal expression in fundamental rights. In the next section the 
relationship between values and fundamental rights, and the role of fundamental rights in EU health 
law is addressed. 
 
II. THE EXPRESSION OF HEALTH VALUES IN EU 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
II.i Health Values and Fundamental Rights 
Values in bioethical research and analysis have a separate meaning from fundamental rights or human 
rights. ‘Fundamental rights’, rather than the term ‘human rights’ does not define one body of rights as 
more ‘fundamental’ than the other, but it refers to rights with a similar meaning, applicable as EU law. 
It is the term used in EU law to describe these types of rights. ‘Fundamental rights’ in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU refers to the legal praxis that is used in balancing the legitimacy of the 
EU’s policies, legal rights claims against the Member States, against institutions of the EU or in some 
cases even in horizontal, private relationships.16 Human rights usually have a broader (international) 
or more abstract connotation.17 In this more abstract connotation, human rights can also refer to what 
is understood here as ‘values’.  
Bioethics and the human rights discourse in many ways grew up together after the Second 
World War, where particularly the Nuremberg Trials had an important and contested role to play.18 In 
the literature there are different approaches to the relationship between bioethical values –both in an 
individual health context, and with regard to population health – and rights. On the one hand, it has 
been argued that to speak of values or human rights in legal terms provides a universal language for 
‘the development of international legal standards for biomedicine’.19 Values in this respect provide a 
normative basis for specific fundamental health-related rights. George Annas even refers to bioethics 
and law as ‘estranged twins’ in this respect. 20 On the other hand, there is also criticism of the 
immediate relationship between values and fundamental or human rights. Bioethicists have argued 
that rights have their own legitimacy problems and that it limits the moral concepts that are used and 
                                               
16 Commission, ‘2013 Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ COM (2014) 224 
final; C Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental 
Rights in Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England (Wolters Kluwer 2008) 6. 
See further Chapter 3 in this book. 
17 R Alexy, ‘Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights’ in AJ Menendez and EO Eriksen (eds), Arguing 
Fundamental Rights (Springer 2006) 17. 
18 E Fenton, ‘Bioethics and Human Rights’ in JD Arras, E Fenton and R Kukla (eds), The Routledge Companion 
to Bioethics (Routledge 2014). 
19 R Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics’ (2009) 34 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 223, 224. Also see LP Knowles, ‘The Lingua Franca of Human Rights and 
the Rise of a Global Bioethic’ (2001) 10 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 253. 
20 GJ Annas, ‘Human Rights and American Bioethics: Resistance Is Futile’ (2010) 19 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 133. 
relevant when referring to broader values that have a self-standing importance. Moreover, a rights-
based approach is only one of the many perspectives in this regard.21  
The innate plurality of the EU legal order and the growing importance of fundamental rights 
(CFREU) and the underlying ‘ethical’ (naturalistic) implications of rights, makes their impact 
controversial in the European context. Rights are increasingly used to legitimate important decisions 
that affect the autonomy of the Member States.22 In a political conception, rights in the EU are also 
controversial, given the absence of a formal EU constitution.23 Furthermore, rights in the deeper sense 
of common humanistic values are particularly controversial in the health context.24 The different 
underlying reasons for the regulation of abortions across Member States, is a striking example. It is 
therefore important to reconcile the ‘legal’, ‘political’ and the ‘ethical’ conceptions of values and 
human rights, for instance through democratic notions or on the basis of other theories.25 This is 
particularly the case for the EU, where an actual ‘fundamental rights policy’,26 including Article 2 
TEU itself presupposes a preconceived idea of shared values, an idea in which direction to take the 
EU in this respect,27 rather than merely taking the status quo of fundamental rights protection as a 
matter of social practice, and thus dependent on place and time, as implied by a political conception of 
human rights.28 What remains is the expression of values in EU health law. In this respect, as will be 
outlined below, there are different aspects of EU health law that express various degrees of values of 
health law, yet EU fundamental rights and EU values and principles are the primary locus whereof EU 
values in health law are expressed.  
II.ii Health Values in EU Fundamental Rights 
In the context of health law, each Member State itself has formulated the values and principles that 
underlie its national healthcare system or systems.29 When the Council adopted its Conclusions on 
                                               
21 O’Neill (n 3). Other approaches could be the classical utilitarian or deontological approaches, or a capabilities 
perspective etc. M Freeman, Law and Bioethics (OUP 2008). 
22 E Muir, ‘The Fundamental Rights implications of EU Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges’ (2014) 51 
Common Market Law Review 219. 
23 AJ Menendez ‘Some elements of a theory of European fundamental rights’ in Menendez and Eriksen (n 17) 
156. 
24 Menendez and Eriksen (n 17). 
25 Bagatur (n 3); ibid. P Gilabert, ‘Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights’ (2011) 39(4) Political 
Theory 439; SM Liao and A Etinson, ‘Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of Human Rights: A False 
Polemic?’ (2012) 9(3) The Journal of Moral Philosophy 327 and see Alexy (n 17). 
26 P Alston and JHH Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union 
and Human Rights’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 658; A von Bogdandy, ‘The European 
Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human Rights and the Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 1307. 
27 This also shows in some of the CJEU’s case law on the Charter where the interpretation is usually based on a 
preconceived idea of rights ‘that were already protected’ in the EU legal order, see on this point and a discussion 
of these cases, P Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 
Common Market Law Review 945. 
28 R Forst ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach’ 
(2010) 120 Ethics 711, 727, emphasising the ‘internal’ role (inside a political system) of human rights for 
assessing legitimacy and see further Bagatur (n 3) 9. 
29 Council Conclusions (n 5). 
Common Values and Principles in EU Health Systems, 30  it referred to ‘common’ values and 
principles among the Member States. The legal status of those common values and principles, and 
their relationship to fundamental rights in the sense of EU law, depends on whether the Council was 
referring to these values and principles in the sense of Article 2 and 6 TEU.  
Article 6(3) TEU holds that: 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.  
The language of the Council’s 2006 statement of Common Values (referring to ‘values’, rather than 
principles of EU law) suggests that it is not intended to constitute a statement of general principles of 
EU law, that are on equal footing with fundamental rights. However, in combination with particular 
fundamental rights of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU),31 it could be argued 
that the Common Values in the 2006 Council Conclusions may help shape the interpretation of 
fundamental rights in the context of EU health law. The 2006 Common Values were a response to the 
CJEU line of case law at the time, in the field of cross-border healthcare. They were intended to feed 
into the legislative process that eventually resulted in the Patients Rights’ Directive.32 Therefore the 
2006 Common Values represent an indication of the baseline of principles that are common to the 
Member States, and in that regard they could also at least be taken into consideration in the EU 
legislative process, although this is not legally required. At the same time, the 2006 Common Values 
were written so as to stress their importance in the context of the organisation of national healthcare 
systems, a matter over which the Treaty explicitly requires national competence. In the field of public 
health, where the EU enjoys greater competence, however, there is no explicit document that refers to 
for instance values of solidarity or equality. In the central legal provisions, Article 9 TFEU and 
Article 168 TFEU, the central objective is formulated as ‘a high level of human health’, which is 
difficult to determine.  
The values of solidarity, equality, universal access and human dignity are addressed in the 
CFREU. For an outline of the importance and application of the CFREU, and also general principles 
of EU law, and how these different legal sources have gained importance in the EU legal order, 
readers are referred to Calum Young’s chapter.33 The EU’s adherence to the protection and promotion 
of fundamental rights, on the basis of EU primary law, is expressed as a constitutional value. Article 2 
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lays the foundation of the EU’s agreed ‘common values’ as 
the basis of the EU’s constitutional structure.  
Article 2 TEU 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. [emphasis added] 
                                               
30 ibid. 
31  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391. 
32 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights 
in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45 (Patients’ Rights Directive).  
33 Also see McHale (n 13); TK Hervey, ‘The “Right to Health” in European Union Law’, in TK Hervey and J 
Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart 2003); Hervey 
and McHale (n 7). 
 Article 3TEU 
(1) The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.  
 
Importantly, the respect for rights in itself is taken to be a foundational value of the European 
Union, which is assumed to be a value that is common to the Member States. Arguably, given that the 
values in Article 2 TEU are taken to be common to the Member States,34 this means that reference to 
national identity (Article 4(2) TEU) cannot be used in the case of infringements of the values held in 
Article 2 TEU.35 Furthermore, Article 2 TEU refers to ‘human rights’ and not ‘fundamental rights’, 
which are protected under Article 6 TEU by reference to, for example, the CFREU. As mentioned 
‘human rights’ as a term is usually used to connote a deeper meaning that goes to underlying, deeper 
values when speaking in terms of ‘rights’. These deeper values are sometimes also referred to as 
‘rights’ but rather in a particular ethical sense.  
The fundamental rights in the CFREU that express the EU health law values of solidarity, 
equality, universal access and human dignity can be found as follows in Table 19.1. 
Table 19.1 Overview of the health topics potentially affected by European fundamental rights 
Value/human 
right 
Fundamental 
right 
European 
provisions 
EU Health topics involved 
Human dignity Human 
dignity 
1 CFREU End of life issues, access to health care, long 
term care 
Human dignity 
(Respect for 
human 
life/autonomy) 
Right to life 2 CFREU 
 
Access to abortion in another Member State  
End of life issues, euthanasia 
Protection of life through public health 
measures  
Environmental health threats 
Human dignity Informed 
consent 
3 CFREU Bodily integrity, inviolability of the human 
body, autonomy in medical decisions, the right 
to refuse medical treatment 
                                               
34 Article 49 TEU on membership to the Union also refers to adherence to its values in Article 2 TEU 
35 LFM Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’ in A Jakab 
and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (OUP 
2016). (Although given the status of the right to health as a principle in the CFREU it is unlikely that Article 7 
TEU as an enforcement mechanism will easily be evoked in the case of health rights’ violations in Member 
States.) 
Human dignity Prohibition of 
torture and 
inhuman and 
degrading 
punishment 
4 CFREU Confinement of persons with mental 
disabilities 
Rape, sexual abuse 
Undue delay of access to health care 
Human dignity Privacy and 
family life, 
data 
protection 
 
7, 8 CFREU Medical research 
Protection of personal data, confidentiality of 
medical files (ehealth) 
Medical files/psychological background Union 
civil servants 
Human dignity Information 
and 
participation 
11 CFREU Access to health-related information to services 
and public health. 
Informed consent 
Dignity, 
equality, 
solidarity  
Education 14 CFREU Education as a social determinant of health  
Sex education as public health  
Equality Protection of 
mothers, 
children and 
of the family 
24 CFREU Paid and sufficient maternity leave 
Social and family benefits 
Equality directive, disabilities, gender etc. 
Equality, 
solidarity and 
universal 
access 
Non-
discrimination 
20-26 
CFREU 
Non-discrimination in access to health care 
services and preventive care 
Equality, 
solidarity 
Employment 32 CFREU Occupational health  
Employment as a social determinant 
Solidarity and 
Equality 
Social 
security 
 33 CFREU Social security as a social determinant of 
public health 
Equality, 
universal 
access 
Right to 
health 
Right to 
access health 
35 CFREU Access to health care and other (public) health 
services, Access to preventive care 
Protection of public health  
care Reproductive Health 
Protection of environment as it affects public 
health 
Occupational health 
Regulation of services of general interests 
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
 
Yet, the fact that these shared and common values can be distinguished at EU level in the field of 
health, does not solve the puzzle of what effect the constitutional nature of the EU has on the 
protection and promotion of these values within EU health law. The values that underlie EU health 
law as common values are difficult to balance on their own, when they are competing – and losing – 
to other values or principles of the EU’s free market.36 It is at least arguable that the internal market 
freedoms form the very reason for the EU health law’s existence. 37  The four freedoms as 
constitutional principles are even stronger than the EU constitutional principle of subsidiarity in the 
field of health, which explains the recurrent paradox that the internal market legal basis (Article 114 
TFEU) forms the legislative ground for many aspects of EU health law, where Member States at the 
same time have limited EU powers (Article 168(5) public health and (7) healthcare TFEU).  
 
III. HEALTH LAW IN THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The question regarding the role of the EU’s constitutional order brings into perspective a classical 
thesis by Fritz Scharpf. Scharpf proposes that the EU’s limited legislative competence in areas outside 
the internal market objectives create a constitutional asymmetry. 38  The institutional and legal 
constraints for the EU to adopt ‘market-correcting policies’ favour economically liberal interests and 
policies, which in turn constrain Member States at national level to pursue welfare goals. At the same 
time, as recently argued by Dieter Grimm, the EU’s legal order is ‘over-constitutionalized’. In most 
political systems, constitutions function to legitimise and limit political power. Constitutional rules 
form the ‘framework for politics, not the blueprint for all political decisions.’39 
The ‘over-constitutionalisation’ of the EU refers to the notion that the four freedoms and the 
                                               
36 See particularly Chapter 11 in this book which refers to the competing values of the common market in EU 
competition law.  
37 For an alternative position, see Hervey and McHale (n 7); TK Hervey, ‘Telling stories about European Union 
Health Law: The emergence of a new field of law’ (2016) Comparative European Politics DOI 
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38 A de Ruijter and TK Hervey, ‘Healthcare and the Lisbon Agenda’ in P Copeland and D Papadimitriou (eds), 
The EU’s Lisbon Strategy: Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure (Palgrave 2012); see F Scharpf, ‘The 
Asymmetry of European Integration or why the EU cannot be a “Social Market Economy”’ (2010) 8(2) Socio-
Economic Review 211. 
39 D Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’ (2015) 21 European Law 
Journal 460. 
objective of the creation of an internal market overrides all other legitimate policy objectives, due to 
their constitutional status in the Treaties and their function as constitutional review standard for the 
CJEU. The field of health in the EU exemplifies Grimm’s thesis, given that the CJEU has had a 
central role in reaffirming the recasting of national public health considerations as ‘exceptions’ even 
beyond those exceptions that are mentioned in the Treaties.40 Importantly, however, in the field of 
human health, Member States’ health law is directly impacted by EU inroads into this field. 41 
Liberalisation and privatisation, together with the effects of globalisation and the constitutional 
context of the EU make it difficult for the Member States to uphold their standards of social welfare 
in order to retain their economic competitiveness.42  
Furthermore, the EU does not have a budget that can be used to alleviate these effects in light 
of values such as equality, solidarity and universal access. The European public health programme 
only has a small budget that pales in comparison to the national budgets for public health and 
healthcare services and programmes.43 Nevertheless the EU public health programmes are an example 
of positive integration at EU level that actually redistributes funds in the area of social welfare. And 
although the public health programmes over the years have had to make do on very low budgets,44 
they have links with the much larger budget of the EU research programme that allocates more than 
six billion Euros for health. The priorities defined in the Programme Committee for the public health 
programme filter through in the funding priorities that are chosen in the Programme Committee of the 
health programme under the heading of DG Research.45 Moreover, much of the public health budget 
is distributed through co-funding, which means any activity or action usually needs at least 40 per 
cent funding from other sources. Another aspect that plays into this is that the EU public health 
programmes play a role in the distribution of EU structural funds, in that objectives of the public 
health programmes are mirrored with respect to the budget for health priorities in the structural 
funds.46 However, EU macroeconomic policy has had a much deeper impact on the protection of 
values of health in the Member States. 
In Chapter 12 Sokol and Mijatović outline how the EU facilitated the existence of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is the governance structure established by (or for) the 
Eurozone countries. With regard to the countries that received financial aid during the Euro crisis, the 
ESM established Memorandums of Understanding (MoU), monitored by the European Commission. 
Non-compliance with these MoUs can result in sanctions. As a result, the healthcare systems of these 
Member States, and particularly the ability of Member States to determine their own budgets for 
healthcare spending, were immediately affected. Given that the ESM is outside the EU legal realm, 
the first question is whether EU law on fundamental rights even applies. Furthermore, Member States 
                                               
40 See Cassis de Dijon (n 8), ‘The Rule of Reason’. 
41 TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (CUP 2004). In this first edition, this 
dynamic is meticulously mapped.  
42 Grimm (n 40); see further Chapter 12 in this book. 
43 See de Ruijter (n 2). 
44 Averaging 300 to 500 million Euros. 
45 This link with research and health at EU level goes back to the 1950s since the ECSC funded research 
programmes in the area of occupational diseases. Over the course of the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, 
research into communicable diseases was also funded by the Community – this was mainly in the context of the 
common market and agriculture However, also in the field of research and technology biomedical research 
became funded at the European level in the area of biotechnology. Commission, ‘Biology and Health Protection 
Programme: Research Programme 1976–1980’ (Proposal) COM (75) 351 final. See de Ruijter (n 2). 
46 J Watson, ‘Health and Structural Funds 2007–2013 (2013): Country and regional assessment’ (Report for DG 
SANCO, 2009) and see ibid. 
are subject to the European Semester, which is an EU governance mechanism for national 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies based on the Stability and Growth Pact. Also in this regard the 
Member States have been pushed towards cutting public spending in the field of health.47 
 Aside from deregulation, (EU) macroeconomic policies and their impact on the Member States’ 
abilities to sustain national health policies in accordance with the values of solidarity, equality and 
universal access, re-regulation of human health law and policy at EU level is a third factor to consider 
in terms of its effect on the upholding of health values. Particularly in the field of public health, a 
massive regulatory effort has been undertaken in the EU to create markets by ensuring health and 
safety. However, also in this respect as the tobacco advertising saga foretold, the EU has only a 
limited legislative basis for recreating health protection regulation at EU level. As Marjolein van 
Asselt, Ellen Vos and Michelle Everson have argued persuasively, the manner in which the EU re-
regulates in the field of public health is also depoliticised through what Sheila Jasanoff calls the 
‘constitutional role of’ science.48 Their central thesis is that the EU obfuscates political disagreement 
about balancing health risks with economic aims, through science.49 Moreover the EU constitutional 
order – similar to Dieter Grimm’s observations – puts executive actors in the lead, particularly also in 
politically sensitive policy issues.50 Van Asselt, Vos and Everson have shown how the EU regulators 
use public health regulation as a tool to enhance the EU’s legitimacy. In their research they establish 
that for public health regulation, science is needed to align economies in order to limit market forces. 
However, the EU – in so doing – excludes the value or ethical considerations that are actually at play. 
Ethics, specifically bioethics, are formally still largely determined at Member State level.51 In some 
specific areas of EU secondary regulation, ethics committees are involved, however their contribution 
is fragmented and in a recent overview of the EU’s approach to ethics it was outlined that many gaps 
remain at EU level, also in areas affected by EU internal market regulation.52  
 Human dignity as a value lies at the basis of all elements of law and involvement in health, and 
can thus be taken as the foundation for a number of specific patients’ rights.53 At EU level, however, 
what human dignity requires is essentially left up to the Member States.54 But the question of human 
dignity could also become a EU issue – in this regard Article 3 CFREU on the integrity of the person 
is closely related to the principle of human dignity.55 Human dignity can refer both to the individual 
in terms of personal integrity and to protecting the society at large. The principles outlined in Article 3 
                                               
47 See Grimm (n 40). R Baeten and B Vanhercke, ‘Inside the Black Box: The EU’s Economic Surveillance of 
National Healthcare Systems’ (2016) Comparative European Politics DOI: 10.1057/cep.2016.10 
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/cep.2016.10> accessed 7 July 2016. 
48 See S Jasanoff in M Weimer and A de Ruijter, The Co-Production of EU Expert and Executive Power in the 
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52 ibid. 
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54 See Case C-36/02 Omega ECLI:EU:C:2004:614, [2004] ECR I-09609 and see S Douglas-Scott, ‘The 
European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 645. 
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77 and 78 on the basis of human dignity for not allowing patentability of elements of the human body. 
CFREU generally are also part of the Council of Europe’s ECHR, except for informed consent, which 
has only been developed in the case law of the ECtHR on the basis of Article 8 ECHR.56 The second 
paragraph of Article 3 CFREU specifically outlines that informed consent must be respected in the 
field of medicine and biology, and that eugenic practices, particularly those aiming at the selection of 
persons, making the human body and its parts a source for financial gain and reproductive cloning of 
human beings, are prohibited.57 The prohibition of reproductive cloning reflects the value of human 
dignity at population level, for instance with regard to the regulation of clinical trials at EU level or 
even with the appropriation of funds for medical research from the EU.58  
 Human dignity also plays a role in the context of EU regulation of medicines. For instance, take 
the authorisation of gene therapy with respect to the regulation of pharmaceuticals at EU level. In 
2013, the European Commission approved the medicine Glybera. This medicine uses a virus to 
deliver DNA encoding a lipid-processing enzyme to patients that lack this gene mutation. Gene 
therapy alters the human genetic code; the question is how this is different from a ‘eugenic practice’ 
and to what extent this (should) affect the authorisation of these therapies at EU level.59  
The constitutional setting of the EU, where economic objectives (i.e. the policy content itself) is 
protected as constitutional values, affects the place and protection of values in EU health law, that are 
central to the health law of the Member States – values such as human dignity, equality and solidarity. 
At Member State level, the EU law also affects health law, as it is approached as a barrier to trade, 
whereas at EU level, health law is recreated, but its inherent values are depoliticised through science. 
The constitutional balance between the economic ‘values of efficiency’ as outlined in the chapter by 
van de Gronden and Rusu, and health values is – because of the constitutional setting of health law in 
the EU – more likely to favour economic aims rather than health values. However, these values are 
not always opposing. For example, as Hervey and McHale outline, EU competition law has likely 
contributed to consumer benefits and a lowering of prices in the healthcare sector, which is important 
in ensuring universal access and upholds the values of solidarity and equality.60 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: FUTURE RESEARCH 
Comparing the status of health values in the Member States and at EU level would substantiate the 
claim that the EU impedes health values through EU health law. However, the argument is not that 
simple. On the one hand, Member States to a large extent retain their own competences in the field of 
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health in the EU as the Court of Justice clearly outlines in the above-cited Perez case. On the other 
hand, deregulation, macroeconomic policies and reregulation also affect the values that are part and 
parcel of health law at national level. Member States’ health law has not remained unchanged in the 
past decade, and this is in a large part due to EU health law and regulation.  
EU health law has a bearing on the same health values that form the foundations of national 
health law and its backbone is formed not only by internal market law, but also by EU fundamental 
rights law. Yet the impediment of EU values underlying health law is arguably stronger at national 
level due to the constitutional setting at EU level. Given the constitutional order of the EU, in which 
the policy content is determined at constitutional level, mostly by competition law and economic free 
movement principles and values, EU health law is lacking in terms of its protection and promotion of 
the values of solidarity, human dignity and the protection of the plurality of Member States.  
Besides the importance of the ‘EU economic constitution’ in this respect, another factor to 
consider is the role of science. Science in the EU has the important role of depoliticising and taking the 
discussion on its innately related values such as human dignity out of the political equation. Health law 
and policy related to science or new technologies and aspects such as the commodification of human 
body parts etc. are often not presented as political choices at EU level, but rather presented as 
necessary for competiveness or innovation. The argument as put forward by many scholars is that the 
EU needs a more lively and real democratic debate. However also in this respect, the economic values 
and aims being a central connecting factor in the EU constitutional structure could prove to be 
problematic. As Mark Flear exemplifies in the field of citizens science,61 even when participative 
democratic procedures are used in order to politicise and legitimise political choices on values that are 
made in the field of science, also here democratic participation is captured by the dominant economic 
constitution in which the objectives of science have been predetermined (knowledge economy, 
competitiveness, innovation).  
These problems are constitutional because they address the manner in which the EU is able to 
create health law. This is an inherently democratic problem, but also a problem of the nature of EU 
health law itself. Hence, it is up to future research in the field of EU human health law, legal scholars 
and political and social science to ask whether the constitutional order of the EU can be changed or 
set up in a manner in which EU health laws’ values will not have to compete so hard with EU 
economic values.  
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